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Melissa B.  Jacoby & Edward J.  Janger  
 
Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 
abstract.  In Chrysler’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy, a finding that the debtor was losing $100 
million per day justified the hurry-up sale of the company to Fiat. The assertion that a firm is a 
melting ice cube is frequently offered, soon after a bankruptcy filing, to justify a quick sale of the 
firm under § 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. This raises a policy question: is this speed and the 
attendant streamlining of process a bug or feature? Do hurry-up going-concern sales maximize 
value for the bankruptcy estate, or do they facilitate collusive deals among incumbent managers, 
senior creditors, and potential purchasers? The answer is a little bit of both. It is crucial to 
distinguish between sales where the court and parties have good information about the value of 
the company and the costs of delay, from those in which melting ice cube leverage is used to 
exploit information asymmetries and to lock in a favored deal. To accomplish this sorting and 
reduce opportunistic use of transactional leverage, we seek to allocate the increased risks of 
forgone process to the beneficiaries of the sale rather than to the bankruptcy estate. We propose 
that a reserve—the Ice Cube Bond—be set aside at the time of sale to preserve any potential 
disputes about valuation and priority for resolution after the sale has closed. This approach 
retains expedited § 363 sales as a useful way to quiet title in complex assets and maximize value, 
while preserving the opportunities for negotiation and adjudication contemplated by the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
 
authors.  Melissa Jacoby is Graham Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill. Edward Janger is David M. Barse Professor, Brooklyn Law School. The authors 
would like to thank Miriam Baer, Donald Bernstein, Susan Block-Lieb, Frederic Bloom, 
Matthew Bruckner, Jim Fanto, Adam Feibelman, Michael Gerber, Elizabeth Gibson, Michelle 
Harner, Gloria Jacoby, Randall Klein, Jonathan Landers, Richard Levin, Adam Levitin, Lynn 
LoPucki, Stephen Lubben, Ronald Mann, Harvey Miller, David Neff, James Park, Michael 
Simkovic, Nancy Rapoport, Chris Serkin, Charles Tabb, Michael Temin, Andrew Verstein, 
Spencer Weber Waller, and Mark Weidemaier, as well as participants in the Vanderbilt and Pace 
Law School faculty workshops, and the Brooklyn Law School Summer Faculty Workshop, for 
helpful comments on earlier drafts. Colleen Connelly, Graham Ford, Guangya Liu, Brett Neve, 
and Michelle Merck Walker provided able research assistance at various stages of this project. 
Mistakes are, of course, ours alone. The authors would also like to thank Deans Joan Wexler and 
Nick Allard, the Dean’s Research Funds at Brooklyn Law School, and the University of North 
Carolina School of Law, for generous support of this project. We are grateful to the UCLA-
LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, and particularly to Lynn LoPucki and Doug Irion, for 
sharing updated data.








article contents  
introduction 865 
i.  expedited sales of all or substantially all assets: articulating 
the problem 874 
A.  The Doctrinal Framework for Chapter 11 Sales 874 
B.  Chrysler and the Problem of Melting Ice Cube Leverage 883 
ii. rethinking the theoretical debate 889 
A.  The Value Created by Bankruptcy (Sales) 892 
B.  Cataloguing the Problems with Expedited All-Asset Sales 895 
1.  Valuation Problems 895 
a.  Information Scarcity and the Informational Sweet Spot 896 
b.  Information Asymmetry 899 
c.  Leverage 901 
d.  Conflicts and Principal-Agent Problems 902 
e.  Institutional Capacity (Ex Ante) 904 
2.  Distributional Consequences 905 
C.  Quantifying and Allocating the Costs and Benefits of Expedited All-Asset 
Sales 910 
1.  The Speed Premium and Increased Error Costs—Kaldor-Hicks 
Efficiency 910 
2.  Distributional Consequences—Pareto Optimality and Bargaining over 
the Speed Premium 914 
a.  Baseline Distributions—Best Interests and Pareto Optimality 914 
b.  Allocating the Speed Premium 916 
i.   Who Is Entitled to the Speed Premium? 917 
ii.  Delayed Realization, Chapter-11-Created Value, and the Limits 
of Proceeds 918 
iii. Gaps in Security and Priority 922 
iv.  Impact of Bankruptcy Priority Rules on Allocation of the 
Bankruptcy-Code-Created Value 925 
 







iii. ice cube bonds 926 
A.  Authorization Under Current Law 928 
B.  Operationalizing the Ice Cube Bond 931 
1.  How Much? 931 
2.  Who Pays? 934 
3.  When to Release? 935 
C.  Potential Concerns 936 
1.  Priority Rules 936 
2.  Institutional Competence 938 
3.  Incentives 942 
4.  Bargaining 943 
























Financially distressed companies can melt like ice cubes: every day that a 
company burns through more cash than it earns, it loses value.1 In Chrysler’s 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court’s finding that the car company 
was losing $100 million per day justified a hurry-up going-concern sale of all 
of its assets under § 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.2 The Second Circuit 
agreed that these exigent circumstances justified the procedural shortcuts taken 
to accomplish the sale, citing the “melting ice cube” theory.3 
Though the Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit decision in 
Chrysler,4 the Second Circuit’s use of the melting ice cube argument was well 
within the judicial mainstream.5 The government’s role as a source of debtor-
in-possession and exit financing was novel, but the expedited sale of all the 
company’s assets outside a plan of reorganization was not. Hurry-up all-asset 
sales under § 363 of the Code (“363 sales”) are now a common feature in the 
bankruptcies of large public companies.6 A decade ago, Douglas Baird and 
Robert Rasmussen declared the classic business reorganization dead; the 
going-concern sale had replaced the traditional Chapter 11 reorganization.7 
While the claim may have been overstated as an empirical matter, many high-
profile Chapter 11 cases, including the bankruptcies of Enron, Adelphia, and 
 
1.  See, e.g., Transcript of Sale Hearing at 177, In re Polaroid Corp., No. 01-10864 (Bankr. D. 
Del. June 28, 2002), Docket No. 1255 (characterizing Polaroid as a melting ice cube). 
2.  In re Chrysler LLC, No. 09-50002, 2009 WL 5131534, at *7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2009) 
(“Currently, the Debtors are losing over $100 million dollars per day.”). For an argument 
contesting that Chrysler was a melting ice cube, see Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the 
Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727, 751 (2010). 
3.  In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated sub nom. Ind. State Police 
Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009). 
4.  Id. 
5.  Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1, 30-31 
(2007) (reporting that sixteen of the thirty § 363 cases in their sample of large public 
company bankruptcies made melting ice cube arguments). 
6.  See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text. 
7.  See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673, 
674 (2003) [hereinafter Baird & Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight]; Douglas G. Baird & 
Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 784-85 (2002) 
[hereinafter Baird & Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy]. But see Lynn M. LoPucki, The 
Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird and Rasmussen’s The End of Bankruptcy, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 645, 648 (2003) (demonstrating that traditional reorganizations have 
increased since the 1980s, not disappeared). 
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Lehman Brothers, have disposed of major assets through sales outside of a 
Chapter 11 plan.8 Members of Congress were sufficiently concerned after the 
Gulf oil spill that BP would try to engineer a quick 363 sale to shed liabilities 
that they preemptively sought to change the Code.9 Pleas for quick 363 sales 
frequently feature the melting ice cube argument—a “strong assertion of non-
viability” because of an alleged rapid wasting of assets—as a justification for 
short-circuiting the Chapter 11 plan process.10 The practical effect is to lock up 
the proposed sale package, and to raise the cost of investigating alternatives. 
Although the largest cases attract public attention, small- and mid-market 
cases also feature proposals for quick all-asset sales.11 Smaller debtors may have 
fewer assets to burn, fewer financing options, a weaker corporate infrastructure 
to help keep the business together, less publicly available financial information, 
and a lower likelihood of an active creditors’ committee to counterbalance other 
forces. A going-concern sale may be the best, or only, option, but, as these 
cases often involve non-public companies, concerns about leverage resulting 
from timing-related information asymmetries may be even greater.12 In such 
cases, the disclosure regime associated with Chapter 11 plan confirmation may 
be of particular value. 
Quick sales, therefore, raise a policy question in bankruptcies of all sizes: is 
Chapter 11’s speed and flexibility a bug or a feature? Do these sales maximize 
value for the bankruptcy estate? Or do they facilitate collusive deals between 
incumbent managers, senior creditors, and potential purchasers? The answer is 
a little bit of both. Some companies really are melting away—worth far more 
today than they will be tomorrow. Acting quickly will benefit all stakeholders. 
But calling something a melting ice cube does not make it one. And, even the 
 
8.  See infra notes 117-119 and accompanying text. 
9.  Securing Protections for the Injured from Limitations on Liability Act, H.R. 5503, 111th 
Cong. § 5 (2010) (seeking to impose new successor liability requirements on debtors that file 
for bankruptcy with significant Oil Pollution Act liabilities and that move to sell assets 
under § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code). This bill passed the House of Representatives but was 
never taken up in the Senate. 
10.  LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 5, at 30-31. 
11.  See, e.g., In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407, 419 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (noting that 
smaller cases have “followed the lead” of big cases and “the result has been a huge increase 
in motions to sell substantial parts (or all) of the estate under § 363(b) prior to plan 
confirmation”). 
12.  For a recent example, see Erik Larson, Journal Register Approved to Sell Assets in Bankruptcy 
Court, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 21, 2013, 5:23 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03 
-21/journal-register-approved-to-sell-assets-in-bankruptcy-court-1-.html. 
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fact of a melting ice cube does not justify exploitation of the resulting 
transactional leverage to disadvantage other claimants. It is, therefore, crucial 
to distinguish a case in which the court and claimants have good information 
about the company’s value and the costs of delay, from a case in which sale 
proponents13 are seeking to exploit information asymmetries and crisis-created 
leverage to strong-arm a deal that opportunistically appropriates value.14 
Speed comes at a cost. Early in a bankruptcy case, information is limited on 
two separate axes: the value of claims against the firm and the cost of taking 
time to learn more. Characterizing the company as a melting ice cube ratchets 
up the perceived costs of learning more and enables a prospective purchaser to 
present its terms as “now or never,” or “my way or the highway.” The melting 
ice cube argument is, thus, a tool that can be used to lock-in or strong-arm a 
particular deal.15 In this regard, we join a number of corporate and bankruptcy 
scholars who have raised concerns about management-sponsored corporate 
sales, in which parties with leverage cement a favored deal through devices 
such as lock-up agreements, topping fees, bidder protections, or breakup fees.16 
 
13.  The debtor-in-possession (a term the Code uses for a business in Chapter 11 that does not 
have its management displaced by a trustee) formally proposes the sale. But a 363 sale is 
unlikely to have momentum and go forward unless other parties—incumbent managers 
(who may be seeking to preserve their own interests rather than looking out for the best 
interest of the company), some key creditor constituency, or a secured lender—believes a 
particular sale to be in its own best interest. The term sale proponent refers to whatever 
coalition of parties, other than the buyer, supports the sale. 
14.  The subject of this Article therefore has important resonances with the corporate mergers 
and acquisitions literature on devices embedded in negotiated sales agreements that deter 
other bidders. These can come in the form of break-up fees, topping fees, or lock-up 
agreements. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock-ups in 
Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. REV. 239, 323-32 (1990); Stephen Fraidin & Jon 
D. Hanson, Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103 YALE L.J. 1739, 1742 (1994); David A. Skeel, Jr., 
Lockups and Delaware Venue in Corporate Law and Bankruptcy, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1243, 1245, 
1247 (2000); Robert Daines & Jon D. Hanson, The Corporate Law Paradox: The Case for 
Restructuring Corporate Law, 102 YALE L.J. 577, 594 (1992) (reviewing FRANK H. 
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE CORPORATE LAW PARADOX: THE CASE FOR 
RESTRUCTURING CORPORATE LAW (1991)). 
15.  See supra note 14 (noting resonances with the corporate literature on lock-ups); infra 
Subsection III.C.5 (comparing the “melting ice cube” argument with other lock-up related 
proposals). 
16.  Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain and Option-Preservation Priority in Chapter 11, 78 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 759, 787 (2011); Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 14; Daines & Hanson, supra note 
14. 
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As currently applied, the Code and case law are inadequate to address the 
challenges posed by expedited all-asset sales. Section 363(b) of the Code 
provides, in relevant part, that the debtor may sell property of the estate “other 
than in the ordinary course of business” with court approval after “notice and 
hearing.”17 This language applies equally to sales of a single company car as it 
does to the sale of an entire car company. The Code provides no substantive 
guidance or remedial nuance to enable the court or creditors to sort between 
positive and negative value sales, or to determine when delaying the sale would 
be beneficial to the estate.18 
The leading decision in the Second Circuit, Lionel, overturned a bankruptcy 
court order approving the sale of stock in a subsidiary because the debtor-in-
possession proffered no “business justification” for short-circuiting the 
Chapter 11 plan process.19 Yet, the Lionel standard has evolved to provide a 
blueprint for hurry-up sale motions.20 Under current practice, if the sale 
proponent offers a plausible business justification, the court can (and, we 
believe, usually does) approve it.21 Some courts have issued guidelines or local 
rules of procedure to put more flesh onto the sale review process.22 Sales 
sometimes do not go forward due to other challenges. But when a proposed 
sale is presented as a unique, time-limited opportunity, judges understandably 
are reluctant to stand in the way. If delay risks destroying millions of dollars in 
value, that is a high price to pay for process.23 Those pushing the quick sale can 
thus exploit this Hobson’s choice to their advantage. 
 
17.  11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2012). 
18.  See infra Section I.A. 
19.  Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel), 722 F.2d 1063, 1070-72 (2d Cir. 
1983). 
20.  See infra Section I.A; see also LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 5, at 12-13 (discussing courts’ 
requirements for § 363 approval in the context of competitive pressures on bankruptcy 
courts). 
21.  Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Stephen J. Lubben, Sales or Plans: A Comparative Account of the “New” 
Corporate Reorganization, 56 MCGILL L.J. 591, 621 (2011) (asserting that the risks associated 
with manipulating the bankruptcy process are now “more extreme in the United States 
because courts will now allow a section 363 sale to replace a plan in almost every case”). For 
examples of rejected sale motions, see infra note 74. 
22.  See, e.g., In re Adoption of Amended Guidelines for the Conduct of Asset Sales, General 
Order Amending M-331, M-383 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2009); see also infra note 253 
(citing guidelines and local rules of procedure). 
23.  See In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 493 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (discussing the 
reluctance of the bankruptcy court to play “Russian Roulette” in the GM case). 
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Recent empirical work by Lynn LoPucki and Joseph Doherty suggests that 
this concern is not merely theoretical. After finding that 363 sales yielded a 
substantially lower percentage of book value than reorganizations in large 
public company bankruptcies, they concluded that quick all-asset sales were 
working to the benefit of purchasers (and senior creditors), but to the 
detriment of other claimants and the bankruptcy estate.24 Other commentators 
have interpreted LoPucki and Doherty’s results as showing that § 363 allows 
senior secured creditors to push for “inefficient fire sale[s].”25 
Chrysler notwithstanding, in recent years, senior secured creditors have 
more typically played a significant, if not dominant, role in the decision to 
pursue a 363 sale.26 Frequently, the secured creditor asserts a first-priority lien 
on all of the company’s assets and further asserts that the company is worth 
less than the amount of its claims.27 If other claimants are deeply under water, 
why should they have anything to say about the sale’s timing and terms? 
We see several reasons. First, a so-called blanket lien may not be 
comprehensive due to creditor error, gaps in the scope of statutory schemes, 
and value that is not lienable at all or not traceable to the lender’s collateral.28 
Second, it is not obvious that the secured creditor is entitled to the firm’s 
reorganization premium or the speed premium allegedly created by a quick 
sale.29 Early all-asset sales also foreclose any hope for junior claim or interest 
 
24.  LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 5, at 44-45. 
25.  See, e.g., Casey, supra note 16, at 761. For critiques of Bankruptcy Fire Sales and responses, see 
infra note 271 and accompanying text. 
26.  See, e.g., Casey, supra note 16, at 760-61, 782. Opponents of the Chrysler sale complained it 
was being used to transfer value to employees at the expense of secured creditors. See infra 
Section I.B. This assertion is atypical for 363 sales. See Richard M. Hynes, Reorganization as 
Redemption, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 183, 199 (2011) (discussing why senior creditors usually 
support quick sales). A more typical objection is that the sale reallocates value to secured 
lenders at the expense of unsecured claimants. This concern loomed large in the so-called 
“gifting” cases where undersecured senior creditors sought to reallocate sales proceeds to 
specific unsecured creditors in order to procure their support for the sale. See, e.g., In re 
DBSD N. Am., Inc., 634 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2011). 
27.  See Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 1 
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 513-14 (2009); infra note 195; cf. Randall Klein & Danielle Juhle, 
Majority Rules: Non-Cash Bids and the Reorganization Sale, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 297, 298 
(2010) (discussing how senior secured creditors must decide whether to assert liens on the 
company’s collateral). 
28.  See infra Subsection II.C.2.b. 
29.  See infra Subsection II.C.2.b. Baird and Jackson argued that a secured creditor should be 
able to bargain for its security interest to include the going-concern (or enterprise) value of 
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holders that the assets will increase in value during the case, either by waiting 
to sell at a later date, or by reorganizing the business. This reorganization 
option has monetary value, and therefore should be considered when analyzing 
the costs of a quick sale.30 All-asset sales outside a Chapter 11 plan constitute a 
realization on the debtor’s assets, foreclosing the reorganization option, and 
transferring any upside to the purchaser.31 These points undercut the argument 
that a senior secured creditor should be treated functionally as a sole owner of a 
bankrupt firm for governance purposes.32 
 
the debtor, although they did not assert that this view reflected the law at the time of their 
publication: 
Thus, we believe, a secured creditor with a security interest in specific “hard” 
assets should be treated as having a claim to the asset’s liquidation value. Its 
secured claim should reach no further. . . . 
        This conclusion, however, does not undercut the idea that a creditor should 
be able to bargain for a priority interest in the going-concern surplus in priority to 
other creditors. 
  Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the 
Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 738, 782-83 (1988) (footnotes omitted); see also 
Douglas G. Baird & Anthony J. Casey, No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the Law of Corporate 
Reorganizations, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17 n.59 (2013) (citing Bargaining After the Fall as 
defending the liquidation value as the creditor’s entitlement). 
30.  Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 455 (1999) 
(“The right to get an equity interest for its fair market value is ‘property’ as the word is 
ordinarily used. Options to acquire an interest in a firm, even at its market value, trade for a 
positive price.” (quoting DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 261 (rev. ed. 
1993))); see Stephen J. Lubben, Real Options and the Other Liquidation Decision 17-18 (Am. 
Law & Econ. Ass’n, Working Paper No. 26, 2005), http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent 
.cgi?article=1510&context=alea (noting the value of having an option that allows an investor 
to capture upside potential while avoiding downside risk). 
31.  For example, in Lionel, the debtor ultimately sold the subsidiary at issue for a significant 
premium over the original proposed sale price. See infra Section I.A. While that increase was 
not guaranteed, in a quick sale the bankruptcy estate would have lost that “option value.” 
32.  Although we often speak, for convenience, of a single secured lender, the credit facility 
might have been extended by a coalition or syndicate of lenders, especially in larger Chapter 
11 cases. See, e.g., Kenneth Daniels & Gabriel G. Ramirez, Information, Credit Risk, Lender 
Specialization and Loan Pricing: Evidence from the DIP Financing Market, 34 J. FIN. SERVICES 
RES. 35, 45 & tbl.2 (2008) (reporting on the frequency of syndicated debtor-in-possession 
loans in its sample of bankruptcy cases, and finding that “about 69% of the DIP loans to 
small firms are syndicated in contrast to 84% and 91% syndication rate for loans to medium 
and large firms, respectively”); Klein & Juhle, supra note 27, at 313 (noting the proliferation 
of both syndicated and non-syndicated senior secured debt facilities). As explained further 
infra note 255, while there might be disagreements within the syndicate about the best 
course of action for the debtor, this does not affect the syndicate members’ rights or 
incentives vis-à-vis the debtor. 
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The recent literature on 363 sales has been polarized, especially after 
Chrysler. Some critics have focused on speed and failure to expose the proposed 
deal to the market.33 Others have argued that the Chrysler sale was inconsistent 
with existing bankruptcy law.34 Stephen Lubben, by contrast, has contended 
that Chrysler’s bankruptcy was “no big deal”; hurry-up all-asset sales have 
gone on for years, after all.35 We take a different approach. We acknowledge 
that all-asset 363 sales are not new. In some cases, full-blown process must give 
way to the need for speed. Flexibility, however, creates opportunities for abuse. 
The difficulty is devising a mechanism to permit quick sales that are beneficial, 
while discouraging their opportunistic use. 
Our proposal—the Ice Cube Bond—preserves not only the finality of sale, 
but also the possibility of ex post judicial factfinding and negotiation about 
valuation and entitlements. We propose a mandatory holdback of a portion of 
363 sale proceeds to allow later resolution of disputes about value and priority. 
The holdback would not be required for sales conducted pursuant to a Chapter 
11 plan. The reserved funds would be retained by the bankruptcy estate and 
distributed as unencumbered funds unless the claimant could show that (1) the 
estate had not been harmed by the procedural shortcut (e.g., that the ice cube 
was indeed melting), and (2) it was entitled to the reserved funds as proceeds 
of its collateral or under applicable priority rules. The Ice Cube Bond does not 
 
33.  Barry E. Adler, A Reassessment of Bankruptcy Reorganization after Chrysler and General 
Motors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 305 (2010); Roe & Skeel, supra note 2. 
34.  Ralph Brubaker & Charles Jordan Tabb, Bankruptcy Reorganizations and the Troubling Legacy 
of Chrysler and GM, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1375, 1377-79; see also Adler, supra note 33, at 306 
(“[T]he sale in Chrysler was . . . inconsistent with the principles that undergird the 
[Bankruptcy] Code.”). 
35.  Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
531 (2009); see also Daniel J. Bussel & Kenneth N. Klee, Recalibrating Consent in Bankruptcy, 
83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 663, 666 (2009) (critiquing GM and Chrysler but acknowledging that 
they “are only the most extreme examples” of the contemporary practice of displacing 
Chapter 11 reorganization plans with 363 sales). In the opinion approving the sale order in 
the General Motors case, the bankruptcy court noted, 
While because of the size of this case and the interests at stake, GM’s chapter 11 
case can hardly be regarded as routine, GM’s proposed section 363 sale breaks no 
new ground. This is exactly the type of situation where under the Second 
Circuit’s many holdings, there is good business reason for an immediate sale. GM 
does not have the luxury to wait for the ultimate confirmation of a plan, and the 
only alternative to an immediate sale is liquidation. 
  In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 493 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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foreclose the possibility of quick sales, but reduces the ability to use the melting 
ice cube threat to strong-arm a sweetheart deal. 
The Ice Cube Bond works by limiting the extent to which sale proponents 
can externalize the increased valuation risk associated with quick all-asset sales, 
as well as the extent to which they can use crisis leverage to reallocate value. 
The Bond does not disturb the finality of the sale, as the sale order would grant 
the purchaser clear title. However, the reservation of funds shifts at least some 
of the risk associated with such sales to those who seek to conduct the sale 
outside of the Chapter 11 plan process, and preserves for later determination, 
any disputes about perfection or priority. Our approach thus reinforces the 
separation between governance decisions about value maximization from those 
about value distribution, and should help courts sort between sales in which 
speed is essential, and those in which it is merely tactical. 
Conceptually, at least, the Ice Cube Bond is neither unfamiliar nor 
complicated. Although there might be benefits to statutory implementation, 
courts could implement the Ice Cube Bond today, either on a case-by-case basis 
or through local rules or guidelines. Outside of bankruptcy, it is standard 
practice for federal courts to require that a bond be posted in association with 
preliminary injunctive relief.36 Courts already have the power to surcharge a 
secured creditor’s collateral under § 506(c), to compensate the bankruptcy 
estate for sale expense, as well as the power to preserve disputes about liens 
and priority, by creating disputed claims reserves.37 
The Ice Cube Bond also reflects principles common in state foreclosure law. 
Procedural noncompliance with state foreclosure law can result in the loss of 
the secured creditor’s right to collect a deficiency judgment even if the sale 
stands.38 When the melting ice cube argument is used to forgo the protections 
associated with confirming a Chapter 11 plan, this should be considered a 
 
36.  See infra Section III.A. 
37.  See infra Section III.A. 
38.  For personal property foreclosures under the Uniform Commercial Code, a commercially 
unreasonable sale leads to the loss of the right to collect a deficiency unless the secured party 
can prove that the improper sale did not depress the purchase price. U.C.C. § 9-626 (2010). 
For real property, the Restatement rule is that the mortgagee can always reduce the 
deficiency by proving that the fair market value was greater than the foreclosure price. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.4 (1997). Noncompliance with state law 
procedures plus even a slightly below-market sale price may cause the sale to be set aside. Id. 
§ 8.3 cmt. c, illus. 11; see infra Subsection III.B.3. 
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procedurally aberrational disposition of estate assets.39 With an Ice Cube Bond, 
the sale can go forward and be protected against reversal, but release and 
distribution of the holdback will be determined later. 
This Article is divided into three Parts. In Part I, we lay out the doctrinal 
framework for expedited all-asset sales in bankruptcy under § 363 of the Code. 
We extend the insight of Baird and Morrison that Chapter 11 cases have an 
informational sweet spot at which point the parties and court have learned 
enough about the debtor to make an intelligent decision about the disposition 
of the assets.40 We illustrate how the bankruptcy estate currently bears the 
increased risk of erroneous undervaluation caused by hurry-up sales, thus 
distorting both governance incentives and normative distributional 
commitments in the Code. In Part II, we systematically identify benefits and 
harms of hurry-up all-asset sales, and discuss how they should be allocated. In 
Part III, we explore the Ice Cube Bond’s capacity, by setting aside a portion of 
the sale proceeds, to reallocate the risk associated with expedited sales and 
preserve the ability of the judge to resolve the legal issues raised by the case. 
 
39.  See, e.g., In re Merit Grp., Inc., 464 B.R. 240, 250-51 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011) (raising concerns 
that even justifiable speed ends up trumping anticipated Chapter 11 procedures); In re 
Cloverleaf Enters., No. 09-20056, 2010 WL 1445487, at *2 (Bankr. D. Md. Apr. 2, 2010) 
(“Sales of substantially all of a debtor’s assets are authorized under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) of 
the Bankruptcy Code. However, as the Bankruptcy Code contemplates in chapter 11 that 
sales of all of a debtor’s asset[s] take place under 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4) after disclosure of 
and balloting on a Plan of Reorganization or Liquidation, sales of all assets outside of a plan 
in a case under Chapter 11 are extraordinary and should be viewed as an exception to the 
rule.”); In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407, 422 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (outlining the 
existing jurisprudence, including the sale of “crown jewel assets,” and noting that it would 
be very helpful if the Fifth Circuit would take another look at the boundaries of § 363(b) 
sales); id. at 423-24 (“Proposals for quick sales, understood only by a few parties who would 
benefit from the sale, are inherently suspect.”); id. at 424 (discussing negotiation and 
acceptance under a Chapter 11 plan process as the “quid pro quo for extraordinary bankruptcy 
benefits”); In re On-Site Sourcing, Inc. 412 B.R. 817, 822 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2009) (discussing 
the procedural differences between 363 sales and sales after Chapter 11 plan confirmation); 
In re Channel One Commc’ns, Inc., 117 B.R. 493, 496 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990) (discussing 
the need for heightened scrutiny due to the fact that 363 sales do not incorporate Chapter 11 
plan protections). For a discussion of the intended deliberative process for Chapter 11 at the 
time of and shortly after its enactment, see John C. Anderson & Peter G. Wright, Liquidating 
Plans of Reorganization, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 29, 51 (1982); and J. Ronald Trost, Business 
Reorganizations Under Chapter 11 of the New Bankruptcy Code, 34 BUS. L. 1309 (1979). 
40.  Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
356 (2001); Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making: An Empirical Study of 
Continuation Bias in Small-Business Bankruptcies, 50 J.L. & ECON. 381 (2007) (presenting an 
empirical study modeling the optimal decisionmaking point, and showing an absence of 
continuation bias in cases filed in the Northern District of Illinois). 
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The Ice Cube Bond proposal embraces and utilizes a court’s ability to serve as 
an ex post decisionmaker in a variety of contexts that purely market-based 
proposals cannot. This both simplifies the task of operationalizing the 
proposal, and allows a healthy agnosticism about which version of the Ice Cube 
Bond will work best in a particular case. 
i .   expedited sales of all or substantially all assets:  
articulating the problem 
A.  The Doctrinal Framework for Chapter 11 Sales 
Firms are permitted to operate—to use and sell their assets—while in 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy.41 This power to use and sell property of the bankruptcy 
estate serves several distinct functions. On the one hand, it permits the debtor 
to stay in business. Thus, for example, a debtor retailer generally can continue 
to sell inventory in the ordinary course of business without seeking court 
permission.42 On the other hand, it also permits the debtor-in-possession to 
liquidate by selling assets outside the ordinary course of business, if that is the 
best way to realize on the value of the estate.43 But sales outside the ordinary 
course must either be conducted under a confirmed Chapter 11 plan or, with 
court approval, after notice and a hearing.44 Since this court supervision arises 
ex ante, the debtor’s business decisions are subject to constraints beyond those 
of ordinary corporate law.45 The sales at issue might involve a single asset, such 
as a corporate car or jet, entire subsidiaries of the debtor, or substantially all of 
a debtor’s assets. A sale may be part of an overall liquidation, or incidental to 
reorganization. While the stakes of approval or rejection of a sale rise with the 
centrality of the asset to the debtor’s business, the Code provides no more 
 
41.  11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2012) (giving a debtor-in-possession the powers of a trustee); id. § 1108 
(authorizing the debtor’s business to operate in Chapter 11 unless the court orders 
otherwise); id. § 363 (setting forth rules about the use, sale, and lease of property of the 
estate by the trustee). 
42.  See id. § 363(c). 
43.  Id. § 363(b); see also Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 37 n.2 
(2008) (describing the 363-sale process). 
44.  11 U.S.C. § 363(b). 
45.  See Marshall Huebner & Rajesh James, Duties and Obligations of Officers and Directors in §363 
Sales, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2009-Jan. 2010, at 36 (discussing operationalizing the 
obligation to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate). 
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specific guidance for a going-concern sale than it does for the sale of a spare 
pizza oven.46 Section 363 is a provision of general applicability to all kinds of 
bankruptcies, untailored to specific types of cases and circumstances.47 
Out of this generality has emerged flexibility. Compared to state 
foreclosure law, bankruptcy is a congenial place to sell assets. In any kind of 
bankruptcy case, the court has the power to approve sales of assets free and 
clear of liens and encumbrances.48 The asserted liens and priority claims are 
simply shifted to the sale proceeds.49 Thus, the assets can be sold in bundles 
that are calculated to maximize value, even if multiple liens and lenders have 
 
46.  See generally Kenneth N. Klee & Richard Levin, Rethinking Chapter 11, 21 NORTON J. BANKR. 
L. & PRAC. 1, 12 (2012) (discussing the lack of guidance in § 363). Current § 363(b) provides 
that the debtor may sell property of the estate “outside of the ordinary course of business” 
with court approval after “notice and hearing.” 11 U.S.C. § 363(b). Federal Rule of 
Bankruptcy Procedure 6003(b) provides that a motion to sell property of the estate cannot 
be approved within the first twenty-one days after the filing of a bankruptcy petition unless 
necessary to avoid immediate and irreparable harm. FED. R. BANKR. P. 6003(b). Federal 
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 6004 governs motions for sale of property more generally. 
For example, subsection (a) cross-references the rules that stipulate the notice requirements, 
while subsection (f) provides that sales outside the ordinary course of business may be by 
private sale or by public auction. Id. R. 6004. Districts provide local rules of procedure or 
guidelines to supplement the federal rules. 
47.  Section 363 governs a trustee’s or debtor-in-possession’s use, sale, and lease of property of 
the estate in all chapters of the Code. The provision distinguishes between actions that are, 
or are not, in the ordinary course of business, see 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)-(c), and its applicability 
also depends on whether the action involves the expenditure of cash collateral, which 
triggers special protection for secured creditors whose interests encumber that cash 
collateral, see id. § 363(a), (c). Section 363 also entitles secured creditors to seek adequate 
protection of their interests in other respects, id. § 363(e), and gives them the right to credit 
bid their debt unless the court orders otherwise, id. § 363(k). 
48.  Id. §§ 363(b), (f), 1141(c); In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407, 424, 427 (Bankr. S.D. 
Tex. 2009) (comparing the benefits of a bankruptcy sale, including cleaner title, to state law 
sale); AM. BANKR. INST., A COMPARISON SHOPPING GUIDE FOR 363 SALES § 2.3.2 (Jonathan P. 
Friedland ed., 2009) [hereinafter “COMPARISON SHOPPING GUIDE”] (discussing the 
opportunity for cleaner title in bankruptcy than in state law sales, and the circumstances 
under which future claimants might try to sue the purchaser and ways to reduce this risk). 
For the confusion that otherwise ensues over the potential liability of asset purchasers under 
state law, see John H. Matheson, Successor Liability, 96 MINN. L. REV. 371 (2011) (proposing 
a federal successor liability statute). But see Michael Busenkell & Ryan Cicoski, At the 
Intersection of Successor Liability and the Bankruptcy Code, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2012, at 22 
(discussing a recent South Carolina state supreme court decision that refused to enforce a 
bankruptcy court order approving a 363 sale free and clear of all claims and interests arising 
before the sale). 
49.  11 U.S.C. § 363(f). 
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claims against the property, while saving any bickering over distribution for 
later.50 The power to transfer clean title backed by a federal court sale or plan 
confirmation order is considerably more attractive than the quitclaim deed one 
generally gets following a state law foreclosure sale.51 Moreover, by design, 
challenging a bankruptcy court’s confirmed sale order is very difficult; absent a 
showing of bad faith, even a successful appeal of a sale order will not result in 
reversal of the sale.52 Due to the design of the statute as well as the overall 
 
50.  See, e.g., In re Motors Liquidation Co., 482 B.R. 485, 487-88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(describing the process of reserving proceeds in an escrow account pending a dispute over 
the extent of lenders’ rights); In re Taneja, No. 08-13293-SSM, 2011 WL 1045286, at *4 
(Bankr. E.D. Va. Mar. 16, 2011) (vacating a portion of the sale order directing payment of 
proceeds to a specific party, and requiring that the proceeds of the sale be available pending 
the resolution of adversary proceedings about the validity of the lien); In re Bos. Generating, 
LLC, 440 B.R. 302, 335 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (instructing debtors to establish a reserve 
funded from proceeds pending further agreement or resolution); In re Balco Equities Ltd., 
323 B.R. 85, 100 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (authorizing a sale and stating that funds will be 
held in escrow pending the outcome of the specific adversary proceeding); In re Surplus 
Furniture Liquidators, Inc., 199 B.R. 136, 145 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1995) (approving a sale free 
and clear under § 363(f)(4) and providing that the contested lien will attach to the proceeds 
of the sale pending resolution). 
51.  Section 1141 makes clear that a confirmed plan vests the assets free and clear of existing 
claims. 11 U.S.C. § 1141. Section 363(f) provides that property may be sold free and clear of 
any interest if one of several requirements is satisfied, but does not explicitly speak of sales 
free and clear of “claims.” Id. § 363(f). Yet, the leading circuit decisions on the matter have 
concluded that the provision also applies to creditors’ claims, cutting off successor liability. 
See, e.g., In re Trans World Airlines, 322 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 2003); In re Leckie Smokeless Coal 
Co., 99 F.3d 573 (4th Cir. 1996); George W. Kuney, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code Section 
363(f) and Undermining the Chapter 11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235, 267 (2002) (describing 
dominant case law as being “363(f) can be used to sell property free and clear of claims that 
could otherwise” be asserted under state law theories of successor liability, and criticizing 
this interpretation); Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?, 47 B.C. 
L. REV. 129, 156 (2005) (discussing the attractiveness of bankruptcy sales due in part to their 
“unique ability to cleanse the assets of a distressed company” by “remov[ing] the 
uncertainty of successor liability, fraudulent transfer claims, and lien issues”). The range of 
claims that courts have held can be cut off goes beyond those of private claimants. See, e.g., 
In re WBQ P’ship, 189 B.R. 97, 99 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) (holding a 363 sale of a nursing 
home free and clear of claims of the Virginia Department of Medical Assistance Services); 
Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Stephen J. Lubben, Involuntary Creditors and Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 
U.B.C. L. REV. 253, 255 (2012) (discussing the use of bankruptcy sales to “cleanse” assets of 
environmental liabilities). Section 363 sales are also thought to bring more value than tax 
sales. See, e.g., In re Strategic Labor, Inc., 467 B.R. 11, 19 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012). 
52.  11 U.S.C. § 363(m); In re Westpoint Stevens, Inc., 600 F.3d 231, 248 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(interpreting § 363(m) as a limit on the jurisdiction of the court of appeals to review sales 
beyond challenges relating to the good faith finding, noting the importance of sale finality, 
and that other circuits have held similarly). It also is difficult to unwind a Chapter 11 plan 
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direction of case law on sales free and clear, these benefits are available for sales 
under § 363, as well as sales under a liquidating Chapter 11 plan. Due to this 
ability to quiet and convey title in complex assets, bankruptcy courts have 
become favored locations for selling business units or whole companies. 
Although the Code drafters contemplated that going-concern sales could be 
conducted through Chapter 11 plans,53 such sales now often occur under § 363 
instead.54 The well-known Lionel case provides the standard typically applied to 
significant sales of assets through § 363 in Chapter 11 cases. Instead of the 
“business judgment” standard typical for less significant sales, the debtor must 
present a “business justification.” In Lionel, the debtor, with the support of the 
creditors’ committee, sought approval of a sale of its majority stock holding in 
a subsidiary.55 The debtor and the creditors’ committee wanted that sale to 
occur prior to completion of the plan confirmation process.56 The SEC filed an 
objection, and the shareholders, represented by an equity committee, appealed 
the court’s order.57 
The Second Circuit reversed the lower court’s approval of the sale because 
the creditors’ committee’s insistence was the only reason given for accelerating 
the sale of the subsidiary—not a sufficient justification for a sale outside a 
 
confirmation order absent a stay pending appeal. See In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc. 691 F.3d 
476 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining and applying the doctrine of equitable mootness). 
53.  11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4); see also supra note 39 (listing cases that discuss differences between 
363 sales and sales through Chapter 11 plans). 
54.  ROBERT E. GINSBERG, ROBERT D. MARTIN & SUSAN V. KELLEY, GINSBERG & MARTIN ON 
BANKRUPTCY § 5.05 (2013) (explaining that 363 “sales have become the norm, and include 
sophisticated technologies to allow potential buyers to perform due diligence and a 
standardized procedure for approving the sale procedures and conducting the sale”); Bussel 
& Klee, supra note 35, at 730-31 (comparing the early days of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, 
when substantial 363 sales were “exceptional situations,” to today, when they are more 
common); Lubben, supra note 35, at 532 (noting that “quick lender-controlled § 363 sale[s] 
. . . are entirely within the mainstream of chapter 11 practice for the last decade”). One 
hundred and fifty large public company Chapter 11 cases filed between 1978 and 2012 
included 363 sales of substantially all assets. This figure is based on the UCLA-LoPucki 
Bankruptcy Research Database. See UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, UCLA 
SCH. L., http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu (last visited Sept. 3, 2013). A list of nearly seventy all-
asset 363 sales of large public companies from 1980-2003, with filing-to-sale times, can be 
found in LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE 170-71 tbl.11 (2005). As noted in 2007, “[i]n 
the 1990s, section 363 sales of large public companies grew from a trickle to a flood.” 
LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 5, at 14. 
55.  In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1983). 
56.  See id. at 1065. 
57.  Id. at 1065-66. 
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Chapter 11 plan. The panel majority set forth a standard that future courts 
would invoke frequently: approval of sales of significant assets outside of a 
Chapter 11 plan did not require an emergency, but did require a good business 
justification.58 The court admonished that “a bankruptcy judge must not 
blindly follow the hue and cry of the most vocal special interest groups; rather, 
he should consider all salient factors pertaining to the proceeding and, 
accordingly, act to further the diverse interests of the debtor, creditors and 
equity holders, alike.”59 One hallmark of the Lionel majority opinion, which 
other courts note, is that courts need flexibility to do what is best under the 
circumstances.60 
Lionel also illustrates the valuation risk associated with all-asset sales 
outside a plan, as well as the value of the reorganization option. In dissent, 
Judge Winter argued that the objection to the sale was a last-ditch effort by 
out-of-the-money equity holders to get some value out of this case, and that 
the majority’s ruling would be costly for Lionel’s creditors.61 In this case, 
though, the asset did not waste away: when the debtor later sold the 
subsidiary’s stock, albeit two years later, the sale generated a price fifty-four 
percent higher than the bid that resulted in the earlier appeal.62 
One might expect modern citations to Lionel to support courts’ and 
creditors’ concerns about quick going-concern sales outside of a Chapter 11 
plan. Recent cases tend to involve assets far more difficult to value than a 
profitable subsidiary, and tend to be requested earlier in the case. In Lionel, the 
 
58.  Id. at 1071. 
59.  Id. The majority decision specified factors that subsequent cases note regularly, including 
the time elapsed since the bankruptcy filing, the likelihood of a successful Chapter 11 plan in 
the near future, and the predicted valuation stability of the assets for which sale is proposed. 
Id. 
60.  See, e.g., In re Fin. News Network, 980 F.2d 165, 169 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Lionel, 722 F.2d at 
1069); In re Bos. Generating, 440 B.R. 302, 321-22 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (identifying 
factors to consider based on Lionel and more recent cases). 
61.  Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1072 (Winter, J., dissenting); see Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, 
Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain, 115 YALE L.J. 1930, 
1932 (2006) (discussing how today’s bankruptcy judges are unlikely to let junior interests 
“play for time”); id. at 1944 n.36 (noting the efforts by out-of-the-money creditors to seek to 
delay a sale to shift distribution). 
62.  The initial price was $50 million. Lionel Corp. to Sell 82% Stake in Dale, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.  
27, 1983, http://www.nytimes.com/1983/09/27/business/lionel-corp-to-sell-82-stake-in-dale 
.html. Two years later, after an auction process, the same stock sold for $76.9 million. 
Reuters, Lionel-Dale Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1985, http://www.nytimes.com/1985/09/20 
/business/lionel-dale-pact.html. 
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debtor moved for the sale well over a year after the initiation of bankruptcy. 
But today, it is common for debtors to enter bankruptcy announcing an 
intended going-concern sale,63 and to file a sale motion within hours, days, or 
weeks of filing. Looking across the largest public company Chapter 11 cases 
involving 363 sales since the Code became effective in October 1979, the 
median time between filing and final sale approval is 110 days.64 Roughly a 
quarter of all such cases have sales approved in sixty days or fewer, and 
approximately ten percent have sales confirmed within forty-two days.65 
Focusing on cases since 2000, the median time from filing to substantial 363 
sale drops by around two weeks.66 Although similar data are not available for 
smaller and non-public cases, we have no reason to believe those sales move at 
a more deliberate pace, and, indeed, suspect they are prone to move more 
quickly, especially if the firm has severe liquidity constraints. For example, in a 
 
63.  See, e.g., In re On-Site Sourcing, Inc., 412 B.R. 817, 819 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2009) (filing a sale 
motion five hours after filing Chapter 11 petition); Motion for Interim and Final Orders at 3, 
In re Oreck Corp., No. 13-04006, 2013 WL 2242408 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.) (describing an 
intended going-concern sale the day the Chapter 11 filing was made); Steven Church & Phil 
Milford, Zacky Farms Files Bankruptcy, Cites Cost of Poultry Feed, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 9, 2012, 
4:33 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-09/zacky-farms-files-bankruptcy 
-cites-cost-of-poultry-feed.html (reporting on debtor-in-possession financing contingent  
on commencing going-concern sale process immediately); Katy Stech, International  
Media Group Files for Bankruptcy to Sell Stations, DOW JONES DBR SMALL CAP  
2 (Jan. 11, 2012), http://turnaroundunderground.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01 
/ShoreBankHolding.pdf (“International Media Group Inc. filed for bankruptcy protection 
to sell its multilingual television stations that broadcast throughout California and 
Hawaii.”); Katy Stech, Vacuum Maker Oreck Files for Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., May 7,  
2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323826804578469373481951496 
(describing Oreck’s simultaneous filings of a bankruptcy case and announcement of “plans 
to sell its operations . . . at a bankruptcy auction that the company could hold within 
weeks”); Update 1 – Northstar Aerospace Seeks Creditor Protection, REUTERS (June 14, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USL3E8HE6Z220120614 (describing the debtor’s 
announcement, on the same day it filed for Chapter 11 protection, that “it ha[d] entered into 
a ‘stalking horse’ agreement with Wynnchurch Capital Ltd to sell its assets”). 
64.  UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, UCLA SCH. L., http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu 
(last visited Sept. 3, 2013). As of April 2013, 150 cases met the 363-sale criteria in the UCLA-
LoPucki Database. Eighteen were missing the date of the sale. 
65.  Id. Of the 150 363-sale cases in the dataset, 125 were filed in 2000 or later. 
66.  Id.; see FED. R. BANKR. P. 6003 (prohibiting courts from approving 363 sales in the first 
twenty-one days of a bankruptcy case unless relief is necessary to prevent immediate and 
irreparable harm); Jonathan M. Landers, The Changing Face of Chapter 11 for Large Operating 
Businesses, 8 PRATT’S J. BANKR. L. 99, 111-12 (2012) (discussing the quick-sale trend). Parties 
also are entitled to twenty-one days’ notice of a motion for such a sale, although the period 
may be shortened for cause. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(2). 
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sample of sixty asset sales, spanning a range of sizes, collected by the American 
Bankruptcy Institute, about forty-two percent of the sale transactions were 
approved within twenty-one to ninety-eight days after the filing.67 One can 
read these results as suggesting that the Lionel standard has evolved to provide 
a blueprint for the successful motion for a quick sale of assets of all kinds. 
In this regard, the facts of Lionel and the fate of its legal holding 
encapsulate a central concern that motivates this Article. As an empirical 
matter, we fear the melting ice cube metaphor is overused, and suspect that, in 
a relevant number of these cases, allowing additional time to price the assets 
and to evaluate potential deals would not impair the value.68 In Lionel, the 
Second Circuit decision essentially called the creditors’ committee’s bluff, and 
the delay resulted in a larger distribution to stakeholders.69 Lionel’s legal 
standard, however, is usually cited, discussed, and applied in written decisions 
for precisely the opposite proposition: to justify the approval, not the denial, of 
a sale motion.70 
The written opinions in Chrysler and scores of other cases cite Lionel for the 
proposition that quick sales of substantial assets are fine so long as the debtor 
articulates a good business justification. Many sources, including the Second 
Circuit opinion upholding the Chrysler sale, have cited Lionel while observing 
 
67.  COMPARISON SHOPPING GUIDE, supra note 48, at § 1.4.2 n.21. The sale orders were entered 
between 2000 and 2008, with transaction purchase prices ranging from $200,000 to $4 
billion. Id. at 23. These sales may not have been limited to those of all or substantially all 
assets of the bankruptcy filer, but the book featuring this study is focused on purchasing 
“distressed businesses,” not just discrete assets. Id. at 46. 
68.  In Lionel, the advocates of the sale presented no evidence of its need for speed other than 
that the creditors’ committee preferred the sale to go forward preplan. In re Lionel Corp., 
722 F.2d 1063 (1983). In today’s cases, the debtor often makes an affirmative melting ice 
cube argument. See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 5, at 30-31. The question is whether this 
allegation would hold up to challenge and scrutiny outside the rushed environments of 
these sale motions, especially to the extent these companies were marketed at a more 
leisurely pace before bankruptcy. 
69.  See supra note 62. 
70.  Hundreds of courts, and thousands of commentators, have cited Lionel. For a few recent 
examples of decisions in the Southern District of New York discussing sales under the Lionel 
standard, see In re GSC, Inc., 453 B.R. 132 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Lehman Bros. 
Holdings, Inc., 445 B.R. 143 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Boston Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. 
302 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Motors Liquidation Co., 430 B.R. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); and 
In re Metaldyne Corp., 409 B.R. 671 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). Lionel is frequently cited 
outside the Second Circuit as well. See Jacob A. Kling, Rethinking 363 Sales, 17 STAN. J.L. 
BUS. & FIN. 258, 272 & n.91 (2012) (observing the broader influence of the Lionel standard 
and citing other circuit court decisions). 
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the commonplace nature of 363 sales of significant assets outside of a Chapter 
11 plan.71 The Second Circuit’s Chrysler decision noted the benefits of quick all-
asset sales under § 363, including efficiency and the quieting of title through 
the power to sell free and clear of liens and interests.72 As a practical matter, 
Judge Winter’s dissent in Lionel may have carried the day. 
Rejections of sale motions can and do arise when a powerful creditor 
objects, arguing that the evidence of value, marketing, and business 
justification are lacking.73 Few decisions can be found, however, reporting a 
court’s denial of a request to sell all or substantially all assets.74 Sale orders and 
 
71.  In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 115 (2d Cir. 2009) (collecting secondary sources). 
72.  Id. 
73.  See, e.g., In re Exaeris Inc., 380 B.R. 741, 744 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) (noting that the “timing, 
relationship of [the purchaser] to [the debtor], the proposed release of [the purchaser], the 
dearth of evidence of marketing, the absence of any evidence of the value of assets, no 
evidence whatsoever about the negotiations between [the purchaser] and Debtor or the 
[unsecured creditors’] Committee, require the Court to proceed with extreme caution and 
applying the facts to the legal standards for the Sale mandates that the Court deny the 
Motion”). 
74.  Recognizing that published decisions are an underinclusive reflection of court activity, we 
nonetheless searched in Westlaw and Lexis for decisions in which courts rejected proposed 
sales of all or substantially all assets under § 363(b), which generally arose in contested sale 
environments. See, e.g., In re Cloverleaf Enters., No. 09-20056, 2010 WL 1445487 (Bankr. D. 
Md. Apr. 2, 2010); In re SCO Grp., No. 07-11337, 2009 WL 2425755 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 5, 
2009); In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009); In re Exaeris, 380 
B.R. 741; In re Encore Healthcare Assocs., 312 B.R. 52 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2004); In re Country 
Manor of Kenton, Inc., 172 B.R. 217 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994); In re Stroud Ford, Inc., 163 
B.R. 730 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1993); In re The Landing, 156 B.R. 246 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1993); 
In re Plabell Rubber Prods., Inc., 149 B.R. 475 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992); In re George Walsh 
Chevrolet, Inc., 118 B.R. 99 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990); In re Sovereign Estates, Ltd., 104 B.R. 
702 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989); In re Indus. Valley Refrigeration & Air Conditioning Supplies, 
Inc., 77 B.R. 15 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); In re Fremont Battery Co., 73 B.R. 277 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 1987); In re Crutcher Res. Corp., No. 486-42209, 1986 LEXIS 4681 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 
Dec. 31, 1986). In some other cases, courts have approved sales only after requiring changes 
in the terms of the sale order that went beyond what the law would allow. See, e.g., In re On-
Site Sourcing, Inc., 412 B.R. 817, 829-30 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2009). 
          Sales are probably more likely to be rejected in response to a dispute over whether the 
sale can be ordered free and clear of an existing interest. See, e.g., In re CDKP Dev., Inc., No. 
12-06871-8-RDD, 2012 WL 5993219 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Nov. 30, 2012); In re Dewey Ranch 
Hockey, LLC, 406 B.R. 30 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009). For additional cites, see Matthew A. 
Bruckner, Improving Bankruptcy Sales by Raising the Bar: Imposing a Preliminary Injunction 
Standard for Objections to § 363 Sales, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 12-13, 25 (2012). Bruckner joins 
us in noting that a request for a quick sale is a request for preliminary relief, akin to seeking 
a preliminary injunction. He argues that, as such, a quick sale motion should be handled in 
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denials—like much activity in bankruptcy cases—do not necessarily result in 
searchable written decisions. Nonetheless, the brevity of this citation list is 
consistent with the conventional wisdom that denials of motions to sell assets 
are rare, particularly when no powerful creditor objects.75 To the contrary, 
many contemporary 363 sales are driven by a prepetition secured creditor who 
provides only enough postpetition financing to achieve a quick sale.76 Lawyer 
Michael Richman has been quoted as saying that lenders want to keep 
distressed debtors on a “short leash” and “requir[e] that a sale . . . happen 
[quickly].”77 Moreover, creditors who initially object to a sale might ultimately 
decide not to pursue such objections, leaving a concerned court without the 
 
an adversary proceeding rather than as a contested matter, and be subjected to the 
Posner/Leubsdorf standard for granting preliminary relief. Id. at 6 (citing Am. Hosp. 
Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986)); see also John Leubsdorf, 
The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 541-44 (1978) (describing the 
standard and its rationale). In his view, an injunction should only be granted if the value of 
the quick sale exceeds the increased error cost. We see Bruckner as being on the right track, 
but his proposals have a number of important flaws. First, his approach does not address 
the informational asymmetries that exist early in the case or limit the effect of melting ice 
cube leverage. Second, in our view, courts already attempt to apply something akin to the 
Posner/Leubsdorf standard through the requirement that the quick sale be in the best 
interest of the estate. Third, opening an adversary proceeding will require the imposition of 
the strictures of the rules in the 7000 portion of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, 
which may limit the ability to move quickly in the cases in which the business really is a 
melting ice cube. FED R. BANKR. P. 7001-87 (rules applicable to adversary proceedings). 
75.  LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 5, at 40 (“[W]e know of no modern case in which a large 
public company debtor proposed a sale and the court refused to approve it.”); see also David 
A. Skeel, Jr., Competing Narratives in Corporate Bankruptcy: Debtor in Control vs. No Time to 
Spare, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1187, 1199 (discussing how the “no time to spare” narrative 
and talk of melting ice cubes make “second guessing unthinkable”). 
76.  See George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 19, 108-09 (2004); 
Lubben, supra note 35, at 535. 
77.  Diane Davis, Business Bankruptcy Filing Trends to Remain Same in 2011, Restructuring Experts 
Say, BNA Bankr. L. Rep., Dec. 8, 2010, ISSN 1522-5313; Jacqueline Palank, Firms in Chapter 
11 Face Fast Trip to Auction Block, WALL. ST. J., Jan. 14, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424127887324595704578239501613326288.html (stating that “[m]ore companies 
that wind up in bankruptcy court are facing a stark demand from their banks: Sell yourself 
now” and offering specific examples of quick sales tied to pressure from prepetition secured 
lenders); see also Ben-Ishai & Lubben, supra note 21, at 596, 598, 622-23 (discussing concerns 
about the effects of lender-driven 363 sales); Landers, supra note 66, at 107, 112-13 
(discussing the role of lenders); Lubben, supra note 35, at 535 (also discussing the role of 
lenders); Skeel, supra note 75, at 1200 (commenting that “[b]ankruptcy judges have usually 
insisted on bidding rules that allow several weeks, and often more, for the debtor to 
advertise the sale, look for other bidders, and perhaps negotiate a higher price,” but that sale 
proponents implore judges to move things along more quickly). 
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optimal adversarial presentation of the issues.78 Even if the judge or creditors 
suspect the purchaser is underpaying, or that someone is taking advantage of a 
melting ice cube argument, they do not, under current practice, have a 
workable mechanism for preserving the economic status quo while developing 
the facts. 
B.  Chrysler and the Problem of Melting Ice Cube Leverage  
While post-Lionel practice has evolved over three decades, the Chrysler 
bankruptcy placed the Lionel court’s concern about valuation in high relief, and 
raised a new concern—distribution. With regard to valuation, critics 
complained that the sale happened too quickly to determine asset values with 
confidence. To these observers, the speed of the sale signified insufficient 
exposure to the market to determine whether other purchasers might be 
willing to pay more.79 Concerns about distribution in Chrysler were also closely 
related to the leverage created by the melting ice cube argument. That leverage, 
it was argued, allowed the U.S. government to dictate the manner in which the 
funds were distributed, short circuiting the protections of the Chapter 11 plan 
process, and allegedly violating the rights of secured bondholders.80 Secured 
bondholders were receiving a smaller percentage distribution on their claims 
than employees who held unsecured pension claims, an apparent violation of 
normal priority principles. If secured creditors with liens on all assets were not 
 
78.  See infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text. Ben-Ishai and Lubben suggest that potential 
objectors may refrain from objecting in response to side payments from the debtor or the 
purchaser. Ben-Ishai & Lubben, supra note 21, at 621-22; see also In re On-Site Sourcing, Inc., 
412 B.R. 817, 827-28 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2009) (criticizing a proposed dedicated trust from 
363-sale proceeds for unsecured creditors used to pave the way for a quick sale approval by 
eliminating a creditor committee objection). 
79.  See, e.g., Adler, supra note 33, at 307-08 (arguing that the sale procedures did not maximize 
price or promote competitive bidding). The court noted, however, that Chrysler’s owners 
had been trying to sell the company for over a year before the firm filed for bankruptcy. In re 
Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 90 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
80.  In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 120 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated sub nom. Ind. State Police 
Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009) (“[T]he Indiana Pensioners argue . . . 
that the majority lenders were intimidated or bullied into approving the Sale in order to 
preserve or enhance relations with the government, or other players in the transaction. . . . 
The Pensioners argue that this renders the lenders’ consent ineffective or infirm.”). 
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paid in full, it was asked, how could a class of unsecured creditors receive a 
distribution at all, let alone a greater percentage payout?81 
Extraordinary government intervention explains a lot. The U.S. Treasury 
pumped vast amounts of money into the Chrysler case—with seemingly little 
regard to the value of the assets—and sought to dictate where the money went. 
One can conceptualize two distinct transactions: (1) a purchase of Chrysler’s 
assets, and (2) a (choose one:) payout, bailout, or buyoff to the (choose one:) 
employees, organized labor, or employee benefit plans to handle the company’s 
unfunded pension liability. Under §§ 1113 and 1114 of the Code, Chrysler could 
not unilaterally modify those plans without either consent, or compliance with 
an involved, statutorily mandated, bargaining process.82 In other words, part of 
the government financial contribution to facilitate a sale of Chrysler may not 
have been a payment for the assets at all, but a decision by the Treasury 
Department to use TARP funds to cover a portion of Chrysler’s unfunded 
pension liability with New Chrysler stock, and thereby secure the necessary 
union support.83 
The bankruptcy court appears to have recognized this when it found the 
liquidation value of the secured lenders’ collateral was $800 million,84 making 
the $2.2 billion paid to the secured bondholders more than adequate 
compensation for the value of their claims. Indeed, the agent of the 
bondholders consented to this distribution after a majority of secured 
bondholders agreed.85 Thus, to the extent that the government offered 
payment to purchase labor peace and to ensure continued operation as a going 
concern, it is hard to characterize those funds as proceeds of the bondholders’ 
 
81.  Todd Zywicki, Chrysler and the Rule of Law, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2009, http://online.wsj 
.com/news/articles/SB124217356836613091.html. 
82.  11 U.S.C. §§ 1113, 1114 (2012) (providing special rights to unions and retirees); see Huebner 
& James, supra note 45, at 93 (discussing a court of appeals decision that held that giving 
equity in New Chrysler to the union benefit fund did not violate bankruptcy priority rules); 
Lubben, supra note 35, at 537-38 (same). 
83.  Zywicki, supra note 81, suggests that the payments to the unions were a political payoff to 
the unions. Id. (“The Obama administration’s behavior . . . is a profound challenge to the 
rule of law. Secured creditors—entitled to first priority . . . have been browbeaten . . . into 
accepting only 30 cents on the dollar . . . . Meanwhile, the United Auto Workers union, 
holding junior creditor claims, will get about 50 cents on the dollar.”). This payment was 
not mere politics, however; as noted in text, such support was necessary because the unions’ 
bargaining rights created by §§ 1113 and 1114 of the Code gave the unions the power to hold 
up the sale. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1113, 1114. 
84.  In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 97 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
85.  Id. at 102. 
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collateral. For better or worse, the government’s willingness to fund the 
purchase appears to have ensured that claimants received more than they 
would have in any conceivable alternative liquidation, and probably in any 
conceivable reorganization. 
The critical attention to Chrysler was useful, however, for casting light on a 
practice that is widespread in cases that receive neither this kind of government 
subsidy, nor this kind of publicity.86 Although expedited all-asset sales usually 
do not raise Chrysler-type distributional issues so explicitly,87 postpetition 
lenders and purchasers often seek to affect the distribution of sale proceeds to 
some extent. More importantly, these sales raise valuation questions that have 
substantial distributional consequences. In other words, for all of its unique 
features, Chrysler raises broad and important questions about when the 
temporal exigencies of a particular purchase should override the Code’s 
protections against sweetheart deals and its distributional scheme. 
Consider, for example, the first Polaroid bankruptcy sale.88 As Lynn 
LoPucki has recounted, Polaroid’s managers presented the company as a 
melting ice cube, and the confirmed sale, following a seventy-day sale process, 
was priced at a third of the company’s book value.89 The court declined to 
consider the creditors’ committee’s proposed evidence that would have 
illustrated the company was worth more.90 The dynamics of all-asset sales in 
 
86.  See Brubaker & Tabb, supra note 34, at 1377 (noting how “decisions rendered by the 
influential and respected federal courts in New York were framed as being squarely within 
the mainstream of currently accepted bankruptcy convention”). 
87.  Roe & Skeel, supra note 2, at 759 (arguing that because the sale determined the 
distributional outcome, Chrysler was a sub rosa plan—a plan disguised as a sale—and is 
doctrinally distinct from cases where the sale is not so determinative of distribution). 
88.  See generally In re Polaroid Corp., No. 01-10864 PJW, Civ. A. 02-1353 JJF, 2004 WL 253479 
(D. Del. Feb. 9, 2004) (reporting the facts of a 363 sale in April 2002, and granting the 
motion to dismiss the appeal of the sale as moot). 
89.  LOPUCKI, supra note 54, at 176-78. 
90.  Id. at 173-80 (citing the court’s view that it should not second-guess a market valuation, but 
also reporting that third parties complained that they had wanted solicitation materials but 
had not been able to receive them); LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 5, at 13-14. The 
assessment of LoPucki, and LoPucki and Doherty, related to the 2002 sale of Polaroid, not to 
the 2009 sale in the Minnesota bankruptcy court. See In re Polaroid Corp., 424 B.R. 446, 
448-49 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2010) (reporting on the 2009 sale and subsequent conversion of 
the case to a Chapter 7 case). 
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today’s bankruptcy system put courts in an untenable position, especially when 
sale proponents make melting ice cube arguments.91 
The perceived need for speed and the attendant power and danger of the 
melting ice cube argument is perhaps greater in cases with somewhat less debt 
and fewer assets, less information in the marketplace, and less public scrutiny. 
Cannondale, the bicycle manufacturer, filed for bankruptcy in 2003 and was on 
a fast track to a sale to a stalking horse bidder that left other creditors and 
potential investors with very little opportunity to evaluate the case.92 A motion 
to sell On-Site Sourcing, a digital management company, to its senior secured 
lender came just five hours after its Chapter 11 filing, and was coupled with an 
aggressive proposed debtor-in-possession financing order going well beyond 
what was necessary to keep the debtor alive until a sale.93 The court recognized 
that some of the most extreme portions of the sale order were rationally 
accepted by the debtor as the cost of moving things forward, but commented, 
“[p]ragmatism, though, does not convert a spoiler’s argument into a legitimate 
business reason.”94 Even so, the court ultimately approved the sale to the 
secured creditor, albeit conditioned on some significant amendments.95 
Humboldt Creamery was in the business of processing, distributing, and 
marketing dairy-derived products and filed for bankruptcy in late April 2009.96 
Less than ninety days into the Chapter 11 case, the debtor filed a motion to 
establish bid and sale procedures for substantially all of its assets and identified 
a stalking horse bidder (another dairy) that would pay $20.5 million or would 
receive a $300,000 breakup fee. The sale would leave little value for unsecured 
creditors.97 The stalking horse bidder was the only bidder.98 The creditors’ 
committee and unsecured note holders filed objections. But at the full hearing 
 
91.  See, e.g., In re GSC, Inc., 453 B.R. 132, 165-66 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing case law in 
favor of approving sale of a “melting ice cube” to prevent further losses); Landers, supra 
note 66, at 101, 112 (discussing the pressure on courts to approve quick sales). 
92.  See Melissa B. Jacoby, The Bankruptcy Code at Twenty-Five and the Next Generation of 
Lawmaking, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221, 235 n.81 (2004) (citing primary documents from 
Cannondale’s bankruptcy case and proposed sale). 
93.  In re On-Site Sourcing, Inc., 412 B.R. 817 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2009). 
94.  Id. at 829 n.8. 
95.  Id. at 829-30. 
96.  In re Humboldt Creamery, L.L.C., No. 09-11078, 2009 WL 2820610, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 14, 2009). 
97.  Id. 
98.  Id. 
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scheduled for August, the debtor informed the court that all objections had 
been withdrawn, leading the judge to conclude he had no choice but to accept 
the debtor’s representations about the propriety of the procedures used to 
market the assets and the detriment to the estate that might be caused by 
further delay.99 The judge approved the motion, but not before offering 
pointed commentary on going-concern 363 sales, characterizing them as 
“court-approved financial restructuring[s] stripped of all the procedural 
safeguards built into Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code by Congress, 
including disclosure and voting. Legal rights are reduced to the sole discretion 
of a lone and often over-worked bankruptcy judge.”100 
The judge went on to critique the melting ice cube argument, noting that 
the debtor could control the timing of filing to make any sale seem like more or 
less of an emergency: “it is easy enough,” he noted, “for the debtor to unplug 
the freezer prior to bankruptcy.”101 He then returned to the challenges for the 
court: 
Unless the bankruptcy judge is willing to show exceptional judicial 
courage, he or she must approve the sale. While nominally “presiding” 
over the case, the judge is reduced to a figurehead without any 
meaningful discretion and might as well leave his or her signature 
stamp with the debtor’s counsel and go on vacation or shift attention to 
consumer cases where the law may still mean something.102 
Humboldt Creamery is hardly the only case where a judge has expressed 
frustration with being backed into a corner by the parties. For example, asked 
to approve sale procedures thirty-six hours into the case because of an absolute 
unwillingness for lenders or counter-parties to consider even a slight extension, 
a Delaware bankruptcy judge lamented in the Digital Domain case: 
        I don’t offend easily and you’ve managed it. I have been through 
many, many sales. I’ve said before I’m sympathetic to the circumstances 
that you present before me . . . . 
 
99.  Id. at *1-2; see also In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407, 427 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) 
(discussing the difficulty of evaluating 363 sales in the absence of an adversarial presentation 
of the issues). 
100.  In re Humboldt Creamery, L.L.C., 2009 WL 2820610, at *1. 
101.  Id. at *2. 
102.  Id. 
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        This is a faster transaction than anything I’ve seen. I’m concerned 
with respect to the process that’s been employed. Don’t tell me about 
Lehman; don’t tell me about General Motors; don’t tell me about 
Chrysler. They have no bearing on a case such as this. 
        . . . . 
        . . . I am satisfied that the options before me today are effectively to 
shut this company down. And I’ve [been] asked, I think, to call the 
bluff, and I’m not going to call that bluff.103 
These comments highlight the problem.104 Blame need not be entirely laid at 
the feet of the debtor: some courts and commentators see the secured lender as 
the one with the power to unplug the freezer when the timing is right.105 In any 
 
103.  Transcript of Hearing on First-Day Motions Before the Honorable Brendan L. Shannon, 
United States Bankruptcy Judge at 228-30, In re Digital Domain Media Grp., Inc., No. 12-
12568, 2012 WL 6135353 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 7, 2012). As noted below, in the GM 
bankruptcy, the judge stated that he was not prepared to play “Russian roulette” with the 
estate. See infra text accompanying note 161. 
104.  As another example, a bankruptcy court in South Carolina received a request for an all-asset 
sale less than two months after the filing of the Chapter 11. An issue arose about the right of 
certain creditors to bid their debt under § 363(k). While overruling the objections, the court 
stated: 
The Debtors (without great opposition from other parties in interest) have 
demonstrated that moving with great speed is a priority in this case to increase 
the likelihood that asset values will be maximized and creditor distributions will 
result. Similar matters often move very quickly in bankruptcy proceedings to the 
advantage of all those involved. However, as in this case, urgency can raise 
significant challenges for the Court and the parties involved. These challenges can 
be problematic when the case involves a sale of substantially all of the Debtors’ 
assets without the formality of a plan and a disclosure statement. 
  In re Merit Grp., Inc., 464 B.R. 240, 250-51 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011). 
105.  See In re Channel One Commc’ns, Inc., 117 B.R. 493, 495 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990) (stating 
that the debtor would have been forced to close, losing the value of an FCC license and 
facing significant diminution in value, if the lender refused to provide funds); Ben-Ishai & 
Lubben, supra note 21, at 623 (discussing how “secured lenders can create an emergency at 
will simply by freezing the debtor’s access to the cash needed for daily operations” and how 
a “secured creditor with liens on all of the debtor’s assets . . . has the option to set a 
timetable for the bankruptcy case that will preclude any other option than a quick sale”); 
Miller & Waisman, supra note 51, at 154 (discussing the capacity of prepetition lenders to 
impose severe conditions on the debtor); Skeel, supra note 75, at 1199 (discussing how 
lenders “have increasingly insisted that the court approve both the loan and an immediate 
sale of the company’s most important assets”); Alla Raykin, Note, Section 363 Sales: Mooting 
Due Process?, 29 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 91, 128 (2012) (discussing the general concern that 
parties together are “manufacturing an emergency”). 
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event, a judge presented with a fait accompli has two options as a practical 
matter, and neither is attractive. The judge can refuse to approve or delay the 
sale, but this produces the fear and risk that the buyer will decline to go 
forward, and that the estate will suffer either because of the wasting nature of 
the assets, or because this particular sale represents a unique (and time 
sensitive) business opportunity. Alternatively, the court can approve the sale. 
Here the court may be accused of being complicit in whatever deal the debtor’s 
management, buyer, and potentially a particular lender have cooked up, but at 
least this is a bird in the hand and there will be value to distribute.106 Although 
we know of no firm statistics on approval or denial of sale motions, the 
conventional wisdom is that judges tend to take the bird in hand.107 
i i .  rethinking the theoretical debate 
Until recently, law and economics scholars consistently expressed a 
preference for bankruptcy auctions over lengthier and allegedly more costly 
reorganizations (or sales) under a Chapter 11 plan.108 They emphasized three 
themes when speaking of the Chapter 11 process. First, corporate bankruptcy 
always involves a sale of some kind: either the estate is formally sold to outside 
purchasers (piecemeal or as a going concern), or functionally sold to its own 
 
106.  Landers, supra note 66, at 101 (citing the “now or never” threat by debtors and sale 
supporters, and noting that “most” courts “reluctantly[] go along”); see also In re Gen. 
Motors Corp., 407 B.R, 463, 493 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“This is hardly the first time that 
this Court has seen creditors risk doomsday consequences to increase their incremental 
recoveries, and this Court—which is focused on preserving and maximizing value, allowing 
suppliers to survive, and helping employees keep their jobs—is not of a mind to jeopardize 
all of those goals.”); Transcript of Hearing, supra note 103, at 32 (“I don’t believe that I have 
signed a bid procedures order on first-day, because I have expressed concern that that, 
frankly, can functionally disenfranchise a committee that has statutory and fiduciary 
responsibilities.”); Palank, supra note 77 (reporting on the judge’s reluctant approval of sale 
on an extremely short timeline in the Digital Domain bankruptcy). For evidence from an 
experimental study that bankruptcy judges prefer more certain outcomes for unsecured 
creditors when considering competing reorganization plans, even though this may result in 
a lower return for those creditors, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Inside the Bankruptcy Judge’s 
Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1237-41 (2006) (reporting the results of a bankruptcy law 
version of Kahneman and Tversky’s Asian Disease problem). 
107.  See supra Section I.A. 
108.  This Article is motivated by the costs and benefits of all-asset sales proposed and completed 
under § 363 as compared to those completed pursuant to the Chapter 11 plan confirmation 
process, not by the choice of whether the company is sold versus more traditionally 
reorganized in that plan. 
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stakeholders through a plan of reorganization.109 Hybrids are possible, and 
indeed contemplated. Even companies that reorganize in the traditional sense 
emerge smaller, having sold assets or even divisions. Either way, the goal is 
understood as realizing the highest value for the company’s investors rather 
than some broader conception of maximizing social welfare.110 Second, value 
should, where possible, be determined by exposure to the market rather than 
by judicial assessment.111 And, third, distributions of sale proceeds in 
bankruptcy should respect distributional priorities established by the Code and 
non-bankruptcy law.112 
With regard to the third point, while economists tend to elevate allocative 
efficiency over distributional concerns, law and economics scholars in the 
bankruptcy context largely favor the concept of “absolute priority.”113 In some 
cases this is due to certain liberal commitments to property law—those with 
property rights in the debtor’s assets should come ahead of contractual and 
other unsecured claimants, who should in turn come ahead of equity owners. 
In many discussions, though, the justification for priority is rooted not in 
distribution, but in governance—in the suggestion that respect for non-
bankruptcy entitlements will create appropriate ex ante incentives, and that, ex 
 
109.  See, e.g., Baird & Bernstein, supra note 61, at 1937 (citing a conception of the sale as the 
“single engine” that “drives law-and-economics accounts of corporate reorganization”). 
110.  See Christopher W. Frost, Bankruptcy Redistributive Policies and the Limits of the Judicial 
Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 75 (1996). 
111.  See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 
127, 136-37 (1986); see also Susan Block-Lieb, The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy, 
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 503, 555-56 (evaluating the preference of law and economics scholars for 
markets over courts in bankruptcy). 
112.  See, e.g., Adler, supra note 33, at 316-17; Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, 
and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815 (1987); Thomas H. Jackson, 
Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982). 
113.  When these scholars use the term “absolute priority,” they seem to use it more broadly than 
bankruptcy doctrine does. See, e.g., Baird & Bernstein, supra note 61, at 1944 (using the term 
to include priority of senior secured lenders over other claims and interests, even in a sale 
context). We use the term in its more limited sense: an elaboration on the “fair and 
equitable” standard for “cramdown” of nonconsensual plans under § 1129(b) of the Code. 
Outside of a plan, at issue is a more general version of bankruptcy priority—what a claimant 
would receive if the debtor were liquidated according to the priorities applicable under 
Chapter 7 of the Code. 
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post, governance rights should be given to the class of stakeholders that has the 
greatest interest in maximizing value—the residual claimant.114 
These commitments, coupled with the empirical sense that bankruptcy is 
sometimes used by out-of-the-money owners to extort value from creditors (as 
Judge Winter worried in his Lionel dissent), have led law and economics 
scholars to prefer sales, whether piecemeal or as a going concern, to the pursuit 
of a reorganization.115 These scholars also argue that their normatively 
preferred approach has empirically triumphed, with major public company 
bankruptcies frequently getting resolved through sales.116 To the extent a 
Chapter 11 plan process followed these sales, the process merely allocated 
proceeds from sales of assets or unrelated sources (such as avoidance actions 
relating to transactions that occurred months or even years earlier). This 
pattern was followed by Chrysler and GM, as well as Enron, Adelphia, and 
Lehman Brothers.117 The sales in Chrysler and GM each were approved in fewer 
than forty-five days,118 and generated significant opprobrium. Commentators 
had less to say about the quick sale by Lehman Brothers, which sold its 
 
114.  Barry E. Adler & Ian Ayres, A Dilution Mechanism for Valuing Corporations in Bankruptcy, 111 
YALE L.J. 83, 88 (2001) (“But absolute priority is important, not because deviations would be 
unfair to investors, but because such priority, devised by contract, can create efficient 
investment incentives.” (emphasis omitted)). The focus on governance, and an elevation of 
contract over property, id. at 90 (“[A] bankruptcy regime that honors contracts, then, allows 
investors to be the masters of the applicable distribution scheme and the consequent 
incentives, while a regime that dishonors contractual priority necessarily interferes with 
such a scheme and incentives.”), has sometimes led to imprecision about legal priorities, 
which we address below. See infra Subsection II.C.2. 
115.  See Baird & Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, supra note 7, at 687 (“The claim of The End of 
Bankruptcy was both that financially distressed businesses typically have little or no going-
concern value and that, even when they do, sales provide the simplest and often the best way 
of preserving it.”); Baird & Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 7, at 764-69 
(arguing that most firms in financial distress do not have going concern value to preserve, 
and where they do, they can be sold as a unit). 
116.  See Baird & Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, supra note 7, at 679 (reporting that more 
than half the large public company Chapter 11s in 2002 were sales of one sort or another). 
117.  See Bankruptcy Court Backs Adelphia Sale, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2006, http://www.nytimes 
.com/2006/06/28/business/media/28adelphia.html (reporting on Adelphia’s sale to Time 
Warner); David Teather et al., Barclays Agrees $1.75bn Deal for Core Lehman Brothers Business, 
GUARDIAN, Sept. 16, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/sep/17/barclay 
.lehmanbrothers (reporting on Barclays’ purchase of Lehman Brothers’ assets just a few 
days after Lehman’s bankruptcy filing); Enron Judge OKs UBS Buy, CNNMONEY (Jan. 18, 
2002, 8:50 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2002/01/18/deals/enron_ubs (reporting on the 
filing in December and the sale to UBS Warburg in January). 
118.  Brubaker & Tabb, supra note 34, at 1377. 
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brokerage division to Barclays just a few days after the (unplanned) bankruptcy 
filing. Although the timing was even more extreme, the sale by Lehman was, 
perhaps, perceived as necessary due to systemic risk implications.119 
For the purposes of this discussion we accept the overall framework of the 
law and economics scholars, but challenge a number of their conclusions. We 
note that some of the same scholars who have historically favored bankruptcy 
auctions criticized the Chrysler sale because the short timeframe limited the 
ability of other parties to bid. These scholars have also raised concerns about 
subversion of bankruptcy’s distributional scheme (particularly as it applies to 
secured creditors).120 In general, we share their concerns about process as well 
as priority. With regard to speed, we recognize that a short timeframe may be 
necessary in certain cases. We believe, however, that there are ways to improve 
the courts’ ability to sort between cases where speed is a necessity, and those 
where it is used tactically. With regard to distribution, careful attention to the 
scope of non-bankruptcy entitlements and equitable tracing rules leaves us 
giving rigorous, but somewhat narrower, protection to secured creditors than 
critics of Chrysler.121 
A.  The Value Created by Bankruptcy (Sales) 
Notwithstanding our concerns, we acknowledge that asset sales are an 
important source of Bankruptcy-Code-created value. It is widely accepted that 
the availability of a federal bankruptcy forum has efficiency advantages over 
state law creditor remedies. State law debt collection is based on first-in-time 
priority and can precipitate a chaotic race to the courthouse followed by 
piecemeal liquidation. Chapter 11 bankruptcy, by contrast, provides a collective 
 
119.  See In re Lehman Bros., 445 B.R. 143, 153 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“At the time, the 
transaction was regarded by many as an admirable, even heroic, achievement that helped to 
salvage jobs, preserve going concern values and provide for the orderly transition of many 
thousands of brokerage accounts to a financially secure firm with the resources to manage 
and service the financial assets held in those accounts. . . . Nothing in the voluminous record 
presented to the Court in these protracted proceedings has done anything to change that 
undeniably correct perception.”); Teather et al., supra note 117. Espen Eckbo and Karin 
Thorburn studied mandatory auctions in Sweden, and found that where small companies 
were involved, the survival rate was relatively high and the values received compared 
favorably with the book value of the company. B. Espen Eckbo & Karin S. Thorburn, 
Bankruptcy as an Auction Process: Lessons from Sweden, 21 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 38 (2009). 
120.  See supra Section I.B. 
121.  See infra Subsection II.C.2. 
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forum that helps preserve going-concern value and prevents inefficient 
liquidations. As stated in the House Report for the 1978 Bankruptcy Code: 
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, 
is to restructure a business’s finances so that it may continue to operate, 
provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return 
for its stockholders. The premise of a business reorganization is that 
assets that are used for production in the industry for which they were 
designed are more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap. 
Often, the return on assets that a business can produce is inadequate to 
compensate those who have invested in the business. Cash flow 
problems may develop, and require creditors of the business, both trade 
creditors and long-term lenders, to wait for payment of their claims. If 
the business can extend or reduce its debts, it often can be returned to a 
viable state. It is more economically efficient to reorganize than to 
liquidate, because it preserves jobs and assets.122 
While the House Report focuses on the capacity of a traditional Chapter 11 
reorganization to preserve going-concern value, the same is true for going- 
concern bankruptcy sales, whether accomplished through a Chapter 11 plan or 
through a 363 sale. At least in theory, these sales can preserve going-concern 
value and transfer clear title to complex assets—from software licenses to whole 
companies, solving fragmentation and assemblage problems, and addressing 
issues of successor liability in relatively short order. 
Some critiques of Chapter 11, and their attendant formulations of the 
baseline distribution to secured creditors, proceed from an unduly 
romanticized account of creditors’ rights under state law.123 Recoveries from 
forced sales under state law are not necessarily greater or faster than those 
obtained in bankruptcy; indeed, as Ronald Mann has recounted, lending 
officers are likely to see state law foreclosure as a true last resort, associated 
with significant loan losses.124 Historically, state courts have been hostile to 
 
122.  H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 220 (1977). 
123.  The Code determines the baseline entitlement of a secured creditor based on the fiction that 
the secured party could have foreclosed on its collateral on the bankruptcy petition date. 
Whether that would have happened, however, depends on a variety of factors. 
124.  Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 MICH. L. REV. 159, 
164, 221-22 (1997) (reporting findings, from seventy-two lender profiles, that lenders 
forcibly repossessed property in an extremely small minority of instances). We focus here on 
recoveries in commercial loans. However, the recent robo-signing crisis in the home 
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security. Real property foreclosures are often seen as cumbersome by mortgage 
lenders and servicers, subject to the delays of judicial process and to mortgagor 
protections that postpone finality.125 Some jurisdictions (California, for 
example) impose complex election of remedy rules that can trap the unwary.126 
To the extent that a lender’s security interest encumbers diverse types of 
collateral, foreclosure may require multiple proceedings under state real estate 
law, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), and other more 
arcane schemes. Finally, foreclosure sales often transfer no more than a 
quitclaim deed, leaving title uncertain. 
As it has developed in practice, the bankruptcy system improves the lot of 
the creditor hoping to benefit from a sale of the debtor’s assets. We illustrated 
in Section I.A that bankruptcy sales, whether under § 363 or in a Chapter 11 
plan, provide the buyer with greater certainty and clearer title, increasing the 
sale price, and creating value for the estate.127 A federal court sale order can 
preempt state law, and can simultaneously quiet title to assets of an entity 
whose property and operations cross multiple state lines.128 And, all this can be 
accomplished very quickly—before inventory and customer lists become 
obsolete, relationships with key employees and suppliers sour, or the debtor 
simply runs out of money. 
Bankruptcy sales offer two distinct options that improve on coercive state 
law remedies: preserving going-concern value through reorganization or 
through a going-concern sale, under a plan or under § 363. This going-concern 
premium is a product of the federal bankruptcy regime. Sometimes, the going-
concern premium can only be obtained by acting quickly. Thus, a Bankruptcy 
Code created speed premium exists (as part of the going-concern premium) 
 
mortgage context, and similar problems with collection of credit card debt, highlight the 
uncertainty associated with state law remedies. See Editorial, Robo Redux, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/20/opinion/robo-redux.html; Nate Raymond, 
Judge Tosses Foreclosure Suit by ‘Living Dead’ Bank IndyMac, FORECLOSUREGATE GAZETTE 
(Oct. 8, 2012), http://foreclosuregate.prosepoint.com/story/judge-tosses-foreclosure-suit 
-living-dead-bank-indymac. 
125.  Wisconsin, for example, provides for a post-judgment period of twelve months (or six 
months if deficiency is waived) during which a debtor can redeem the property. WIS. STAT. 
§§ 846.10-846.101 (2011-12). See generally Melissa B. Jacoby, The Value(s) of Foreclosure Law 
Reform, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 511, 513-19 (2010) (cataloguing, and then critiquing, traditional 
complaints of real estate scholars that foreclosure takes too long and costs too much). 
126.  See Darren Conley, Comment, The Sanction for Violation of California’s One-Action Rule, 79 
CALIF. L. REV. 1601 (1991). 
127.  See supra note 51 and sources therein. 
128.  See supra note 48 and sources therein. 
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when a quick sale is necessary to preserve value. While both premia are worth 
preserving, we are concerned that parties not be able to exploit the perceived 
need for speed to distort the Code’s distributional scheme. 
B.  Cataloguing the Problems with Expedited All-Asset Sales 
In the preceding Sections, we have observed both that 363 sales can 
preserve value that would be lost under state law, and that they lack procedural 
protections associated with sales (or reorganizations) under a Chapter 11 plan. 
In this Section, we seek to identify more precisely the costs and risks associated 
with hurry-up 363 sales. First, we explore concerns related to information 
scarcity and asymmetry that create uncertainty about valuation and give sale 
proponents considerable transactional leverage. Second, we discuss the 
distributional consequences of this leverage. 
1.  Valuation Problems 
In our view, hurry-up sales outside of a Chapter 11 plan present three 
related problems regarding value: (1) information is likely to be scarce early in 
the case; (2) the available information is often asymmetrically distributed; and 
(3) the prior two points enhance the leverage and chances for opportunistic 
behavior of informationally advantaged parties. These problems are 
compounded by coordination problems. Most debtors have multiple types of 
creditors whose interests are not all aligned.129 The bankruptcy court has no 
more information than the informationally disadvantaged claimants. 
Consequently, the melting ice cube argument places the estate at the mercy of 
the sale’s advocates—usually, although not always, incumbent managers, the 
senior secured lender, and the purchaser. This leverage may facilitate a 
sweetheart deal, and, as we will discuss later, may lead the court and parties in 
interest to accede to sale terms that distort the Code’s distributional scheme. 
The estate (along with informationally disadvantaged creditors), therefore, 
bears the increased risk of erroneous undervaluation associated with the 
expedited sale, and absorbs the cost of the transactional leverage associated 
with the melting ice cube argument. 
 
129.  As discussed infra Subsection II.C.2, we argue that this is the case even when an 
undersecured creditor claims a blanket lien on all assets and asserts that other claimants are 
“out of the money.” 
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a.  Information Scarcity and the Informational Sweet Spot 
At the moment a debtor files for bankruptcy, it is axiomatic that valuations 
are uncertain. Insolvency itself interferes with the market for the debtor’s 
products, the market for the debtor as a going concern, and the market for the 
debtor’s discrete assets. Even if ownership of the debtor were in play or the 
debtor had negotiated over a restructuring before filing, the company is usually 
in crisis at the beginning of a bankruptcy case. It may be unclear how the 
company will function in bankruptcy, and whether it will be able to resolve its 
problems. The structure of Chapter 11 is specifically designed to address these 
concerns, providing breathing room for the debtor and its stakeholders to fix 
the business, gather information, and allocate value.130 Hurry-up sales, by 
contrast, demand an immediate decision in an information-poor environment, 
sometimes before it has become clear whether the debtor is a likely candidate 
for reorganization. 
In the early days of a case, some creditors, the as-yet unformed creditors’ 
committee, and certainly the court, have relatively little information about the 
debtor, its value, and the prospect of successful reorganization.131 Until the 
point of bankruptcy, trade creditors and other nonfinancial creditors probably 
viewed themselves as fixed claimants, rather than as parties with reason to 
evaluate competing business plans. Involuntary creditors, such as tort 
claimants or the taxing authority, are at an even greater informational 
 
130.  See infra Subsection II.C.1. Sometimes the filing of a bankruptcy petition is the last phase of 
an extended period of negotiation. In some instances, the case may not suffer from 
information asymmetries to the same degree. A sale under a prepackaged Chapter 11 plan—
e.g., in which votes actually have been solicited under applicable non-bankruptcy law—does 
not require a holdback. Depending on the circumstances, parties might be able to make a 
credible case for a reduced holdback in a 363 sale, as discussed infra Part III. 
131.  Some financially distressed companies may have been thoroughly marketed before a 
bankruptcy filing. See, e.g., COMPARISON SHOPPING GUIDE, supra note 48, ch. 2 (providing 
an overview of the 363 sales and marketing process). But when some third parties have had 
a full and fair opportunity to investigate the possibility of purchasing the company, it seems 
less likely that this company can accurately be presented as a melting ice cube to the 
bankruptcy court. Moreover, had there been time for ample vetting pre-bankruptcy, there 
also may have been time to solicit investors and conduct the sale under a prepackaged 
Chapter 11 plan. Thus, to the extent that a “thoroughly marketed” debtor is presented to the 
court as a melting ice cube, it may be a fair inference that this tactic is being used to benefit 
the stalking horse bidder, rather than to respond to an emergent crisis. See In re Gulf Coast 
Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407, 423 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (“Not every sale is an emergency, and 
. . . the reliability of uncontested evidence (and particularly the reliability of testimony that 
is not adequately cross-examined) is suspect.”). 
 ice cube bonds 
897 
 
disadvantage. Official committees that might represent the various claims or 
interests are barely getting started.132 The court may have first learned of the 
debtor on the petition date. 
Adding to the information-gathering problems, larger corporate debtors 
routinely request significant extensions of time to file their bankruptcy 
schedules, which provide information to the court and third parties on assets, 
liabilities, claims, transactions, and other factors.133 This delay further limits 
 
132.  The median time between creditor committee appointment and 363-sale orders was about 
three months in public company Chapter 11 cases between October 1, 1979 and December 
30, 2012, and the creditors’ committee was appointed no more than two months ahead in 
about a third of these cases. UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, UCLA SCH. L., 
http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu (last visited Sept. 3, 2013) (sample size of 114); see also 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1102 (2012) (authorizing the U.S. Trustee, part of the Department of Justice, to appoint a 
creditors’ committee and setting parameters for appointment). For more on committee 
problems, see Landers, supra note 66, at 101, 103, 107, which discusses how creditors’ 
committees have difficulty performing their responsibilities when a Chapter 11 debtor moves 
so quickly from filing to sale. Because the available data suggest that creditors’ committees 
do formally object to some sales with some frequency, see Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 27, 
at 531 tbl.9, we do not mean to suggest that all sales preclude organized response. The 
question is whether the committee is able to credibly respond in the cases where “secured 
lender preferences distort real economic outcomes.” Id. at 533-34 (finding a higher 
proportion of objections to sale in cases involving oversecured creditors, though not 
tracking how these objections were resolved). In addition, to the extent private equity and 
hedge funds hold unsecured debt in Chapter 11 cases, they can push back against premature 
resolutions in some subset of Chapter 11 cases. See Wei Jiang, Kai Li & Wei Wang, Hedge 
Funds and Chapter 11, 67 J. FIN. 513 (2012) (analyzing various forms of active hedge fund 
participation in Chapter 11 cases, but not studying 363 sales). It remains unclear, however, 
whether such active creditors are involved in the cases most likely to feature melting ice cube 
arguments. 
133.  Lisa Hill Fenning & Craig A. Hart, Measuring Chapter 11: The Real World of 500 Cases, 4 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 119, 135-36 (1996) (noting that the tendency of Chapter 11 debtors to 
seek extensions to file schedules reduces the adequacy of the information available to the 
courts); J. Bradley Johnston, The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 213, 289 & n.349 
(1991) (discussing how schedules and statements are often filed months after a Chapter 11 
case commences under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code). For an example of a court resisting a 
second request for an extension when the creditors’ committee and other parties objected, 
see In re Robotic Vision Sys., No. 04-14151-JMD, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 2048 (Bankr. D.N.H. 
Dec. 22, 2004). Rule 1007(c) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure requires the 
filing of schedules with the petition or within fourteen days after filing of the petition in 
voluntary cases and within fourteen days after the entry of relief in involuntary cases. FED. 
R. BANKR. P. 1007(c). Rule 1007(a)(5) also provides that extensions of time for filing 
schedules will be granted only on motion for cause shown and with notice to the U.S. 
trustee and other interested parties. Id. R. 1007(a)(5). Special timing rules apply to “small 
business” cases. See 11 U.S.C. § 1116(3) (requiring that small businesses file timely all 
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availability of relevant information about the debtor early in the case, especially 
with respect to debtors that are not publicly traded companies. 
Baird and Morrison have posited the existence of an informational sweet 
spot in Chapter 11 cases. As the case proceeds, the judge and creditors gather 
more information by observing how the debtor operates in bankruptcy, and 
take advantage of the investigative powers of creditors’ committees, the U.S. 
Trustee, and other stakeholders.134 After a while, though, the amount of new 
information will hit a plateau, and the costs of waiting will exceed the benefit 
of learning more. This is the sweet spot—a presumptively optimal point at 
which an entity’s stakeholders can make the decision whether and how to 
reorganize or liquidate.135 Such an informational sweet spot means that there is 
little benefit to allowing a debtor to linger too long in bankruptcy, but it also 
means there are informational costs to culling cases too early. The exact timing 
of the informational sweet spot may vary depending on the size or the nature of 
the business, whether it is publicly or privately held, and other factors. For 
present purposes, however, the crucial point is that an informational sweet spot 
exists.136 
Baird and Morrison’s discussion of the optimal decision point focused on 
the reorganize-or-liquidate decision of a firm. But the sweet spot will also 
 
schedules and statements of financial affairs unless the court grants an extension, and 
imposing a high burden on extensions of longer than thirty days). 
134.  Morrison, supra note 40, at 383 (“[P]atterns characterizing the duration to shutdown . . . are 
consistent with an economic model of optimal decision making developed by Morrison 
(2003) and Baird and Morrison (1999, 2001).”); see also Baird &  Morrison, supra note 40, at 
364-65 & n.18 (predicting a hump-shaped probability of shutdown in Chapter 11 by 
competent decisionmakers, with the highest probability associated with the period when 
information becomes thicker, and finding empirical support for this proposition in their 
preliminary analysis of cases in the Eastern Division of the Bankruptcy Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois). 
135.  In discussing primarily smaller cases, Baird and Morrison place that point at a few months 
after the petition date. Baird & Morrison, supra note 40, at 364-65. The Code gives a debtor 
the exclusive power to propose a plan for 120 days and the same amount of time to decide 
whether to assume or reject its real property leases. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121(b), 365(d)(4). 
136.  In his study of Chapter 11 cases filed in 1998 in Chicago, Morrison found that the decision 
to dismiss or convert a case among businesses that were shut down occurred within three 
months of filing for fifty percent of the cases and within five months for seventy percent of 
the cases. Morrison, supra note 40, at 382. Morrison notes that these findings may not be 
generalizable to large public company bankruptcies due to the small size of the businesses in 
his sample. Id. at 383, 386. In any event, the sweet spot is likely longer than the twenty-one-
day period that currently requires a higher level of justification of a preplan 363 sale under 
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 6003(b). FED. R. BANKR. P. 6003(b). 
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affect judgments about the price and timing of any significant asset sale and 
whether such a sale should occur pursuant to § 363 or under a Chapter 11 plan. 
In a rushed preplan going-concern sale, those with an interest in the 
bankruptcy estate have less-than-optimal information about price and whether 
the asset is wasting. To the extent that the sale request precedes the 
informational sweet spot, interested parties may not be able to evaluate price, 
the possibility of other bidders, or the very assertion that the debtor is a 
melting ice cube. Under current practice, however, the melting ice cube 
argument makes it risky and expensive for claimants to seek additional 
information or additional time.137 
b.  Information Asymmetry 
There is, therefore, a pernicious interaction between the lack of information 
at the beginning of a case and the melting ice cube argument. While 
bankruptcy may come as a surprise to many creditors, and the aggregate 
amount of information held by creditors on the petition date is low, the filing 
is not a surprise to everybody. Incumbent management, a key secured lender, 
or a favored purchaser may have (relatively) good information about a debtor 
at the inception of a bankruptcy case. The debtor’s management may have been 
preparing for bankruptcy for a while, or have spent considerable time in 
discussions with the proposed purchaser and evaluating the risks and rewards 
associated with a sale. Whether management will use this knowledge in a 
manner consistent with its fiduciary duties to the company, or instead to 
feather its own nest, is a significant concern.138 
Consider the Derby Cycle bankruptcy sale. An earlier owner of Derby, Alan 
Finden-Crofts, had sold the company in 1999, and came back as a 
CEO/turnaround manager in 2001.139 Later in 2001, Finden-Crofts and other 
members of management sought to buy the company. Derby filed for 
bankruptcy in August with an amended offer from Finden-Crofts and 
associates in hand and the allegation that the company was a melting ice 
 
137.  Casey, supra note 16, at 786 (arguing that “the speed with which the going-concern sales are 
occurring exaggerates the imperfections within capital markets”). 
138.  See, e.g., LOPUCKI, supra note 54, at 173-80 (discussing management’s alleged incentives for a 
sale strategy in Polaroid’s 2002 bankruptcy sale); Ben-Ishai & Lubben, supra note 21, at 621-
22 (discussing the difficulty of detecting management collusion with purchasers). 
139.  LOPUCKI, supra note 54, at 169, 172-73. 
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cube.140 The sale ultimately was approved, over objection, albeit a month later 
than the debtor had insisted was necessary to preserve its value. About this set 
of facts, LoPucki asks: “If it took Finden-Crofts—the former owner of Derby—
five months to evaluate the company from the inside and prepare a bid, how 
were competing bidders supposed to do it from the outside in five weeks?”141 
Why, after months of due diligence by a management-led group, had the 
company suddenly become a melting ice cube? 
The information gap is asymmetric with regard to both price and urgency. 
As a result, it is difficult and risky to assess or challenge the melting ice cube 
argument. The hurry-up sale may also chill bidding. Investing the time and 
resources to challenge the sale (or submit a bid) might therefore be doubly self-
defeating. While so-called “stalking horse” bidders are sometimes thought to 
prime the pump for subsequent bids by signaling that somebody is willing to 
bid, bidder protections and other lock-up devices may combine with the short 
timeframe to limit the abilities of other bidders to take advantage of that 
signal.142 In addition to potentially depressing the price, the absence of 
 
140.  Id. 
141.  Id. at 172. 
142.  Bidder protections such as breakup fees or topping fees are usually explained as reimbursing 
the expenses of the stalking horse bidder, but are nonetheless controversial. See 
COMPARISON SHOPPING GUIDE, supra note 48, § 2.1.3 (explaining the compensatory function 
of breakup fees and why a purchaser may want to be a stalking horse bidder, and also 
discussing the potential for overbidding and possible reactions of creditors and the court). 
Courts in the Second and Third Circuits have applied different standards to evaluate bidder 
protections. Bankruptcy courts in the Second Circuit apply variations on a “fair and 
reasonable” standard or the “business judgment” rule. See In re Ray Realty Fulton, Inc., No. 
1-09-41225-dem., 2009 WL 2600760 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2009); In re Metaldyne 
Corp., 409 B.R. 661, 667, 668 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Integrated Res., Inc., 147 B.R. 
650, 656-57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re 995 Fifth Ave. Assocs., L.P., 96 B.R. 24 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1989). The Third Circuit requires the protections to be “necessary” to preserve the 
value of the estate. See In re Reliant Energy Channelview LP, 594 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2010); In 
re O’Brien Envtl. Energy, Inc., 181 F.3d 527 (3d Cir. 1999). See generally COMPARISON 
SHOPPING GUIDE, supra note 48, § 5.1 (surveying the legal standards for buyer protections 
including the business judgment rule, the best interests of the estate test, and the 
administrative expense test). In LoPucki’s sample of 363 sales of large public companies, 
breakup fees averaged $5 million per case. LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 5, at 38 n.158. In 
the American Bankruptcy Institute sample of cases of a greater variety of sizes, breakup and 
topping fees, grouped together, ranged from 1.25-5 percent of the stalking-horse proposed 
purchase price, and in amounts from $150,000 to $55 million per case. COMPARISON 
SHOPPING GUIDE, supra note 48, § 5.2.1; see also Huebner & James, supra note 45, at 36 
(noting that “[b]reak-up fees in the range of 2-4 percent are not uncommon in (and out of) 
the bankruptcy context”). 
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additional bidders limits the generation of information about value beyond the 
offer already on the table.143 To the extent expedited all-asset sales have become 
routine in the current bankruptcy system, they may lead to a “lemons problem” 
or a persistent bad information equilibrium.144 
c.  Leverage 
Informational scarcity and asymmetry lead directly to a leverage problem. 
The debtor formally controls the moment of filing a voluntary bankruptcy 
petition. Therefore, the debtor can join with a potential purchaser to 
opportunistically exploit the fear associated with a crisis to capitalize on the 
informational disadvantage and strong-arm a favored deal. A determined 
purchaser might time its offer to coincide with an apparently deep (but in 
reality transitory) crisis for the company and set a short take-it-or-leave-it 
deadline. An oversecured creditor that would like to exit the case quickly may 
be indifferent to maximizing value beyond its own payment.145 Such a creditor 
may extend debtor-in-possession financing just long enough for a quick sale.146 
Debtor-in-possession financing (and its control features) became considerably 
more common in the 1990s,147 increasing the avenues through which to lock up 
quick sales. Indeed, debtor-in-possession financing by an existing incumbent 
lender has a common nickname among practitioners—the “defensive DIP”—a 
 
143.  See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 5, at 35-36, 38 (offering explanations for why the 363-sale 
process deters additional bidders). 
144.  See Casey, supra note 16, at 787-88. 
145.  Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 27, at 528 (discussing this incentive of oversecured creditors); 
see also Sarah Pei Woo, Simultaneous Distress of Residential Developers and Their Secured 
Lenders: An Analysis of Bankruptcy & Bank Regulation, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 617, 
620-21 (2010) (discussing how secured creditor control and the pursuit of foreclosure and 
liquidation “do[] not necessarily lead to an optimal utilization of assets during this 
economic downturn”). 
146.  See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. 
147.  Sandeep Dahiya et al., Debtor-in-Possession Financing and Bankruptcy Resolution: Empirical 
Evidence, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 259, 260 (2003); Kenneth Daniels & Gabriel G. Ramirez, 
Information, Credit Risk, Lender Specialization and Loan Pricing: Evidence from the DIP 
Financing Market, 34 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 35, 37 tbl.1 (2008) (documenting the rise in 
debtor-in-possession loan volume and frequency). Dahiya et al. focus on the relationship 
between debtor-in-possession financing, speed, and Chapter 11 emergence, and do not 
discuss 363 sales specifically. 
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debtor-in-possession financing order used to defend the secured creditor’s 
favored liquidation strategy from interference by others.148 
The short timeframe works as a defensive strategy by limiting the ability of 
other bidders to gather information or participate in the process. If the debtor 
really is a melting ice cube, these problems may have to be tolerated. We are 
concerned, however, with opportunistic use of the melting ice cube argument 
(by unplugging the freezer) to strong-arm a particular sale.149 
d.  Conflicts and Principal-Agent Problems 
The leverage created by the melting ice cube argument is thus a tool. Who 
uses this tool, and how, can vary from case to case. The debtor-in-possession 
(or the trustee) is the party authorized to formally propose a sale under 
§ 363.150 The debtor-in-possession has a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the estate, 
but generally gets the protection of the business judgment rule and the wide 
discretion it entails absent a conflict of interest.151 The evidence is fairly strong 
that senior creditors often impose considerable pressure on debtors in ways 
that directly affect corporate governance,152 often through a debtor-in-
 
148.  See James S. Rankin, Jr., Business: DIP Financing, AM. BANKR. INST. (Mar. 15-17, 2012), 
http://www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters/financialadvisors/vol9num1/dip.pdf. 
149.  For a discussion of other situations in which claimants seek to exploit informational 
asymmetries and melting ice cube leverage to lock up distributional advantages, see infra 
notes 171-177 and accompanying text (discussing cross-collateralization, critical vendor 
orders, and other examples of redistributive attempts beyond what is contemplated by the 
Code). Also, senior lenders sometimes seek to share value with shareholders when the 
unsecured creditors are not getting a distribution. Ralph Brubaker, Taking Chapter 11’s 
Distributional Rules Seriously: “Inter-Class Gifting is Dead! Long Live Inter-Class Gifting!,” 
BANKR. L. LETTER, Apr. 2011, at 1-15. 
150.  Section 363(b) gives the power to request a sale of property of the estate to the trustee, 
which is the debtor-in-possession in most Chapter 11 cases. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1107 
(2012) (giving a debtor-in-possession the rights and duties of a trustee). Sales through a 
Chapter 11 plan can be proposed by parties other than the debtor once the debtor’s 
“exclusivity” period to file a plan has expired or has been shortened by the court. Id. § 1121. 
151.  In re L.A. Dodgers LLC, 457 B.R. 308, 313 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (refusing to defer to 
management’s business judgment and imposing an entire fairness standard because of the 
lack of disinterestedness of corporate management). 
152.  Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, Control Rights and Capital Structure: An Empirical 
Investigation, 64 J. FIN. 1657 (2009); Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, Renegotiation of 
Financial Contracts: Evidence from Private Credit Agreements, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 159, 160 (2009). 
To the extent this is so, it may limit the descriptive fit of the team production model to some 
kinds of Chapter 11 cases. See Lynn M. LoPucki, A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy 
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possession financing order.153 Melting ice cube leverage might be used, 
however, by others—incumbent management,154 the buyer, or someone else. 
From the outside, it may not be transparent who is setting the terms. 
Embedded within every business bankruptcy case are numerous conflicting 
interests. An oversecured creditor may prefer a quick sale to a more time-
consuming traditional reorganization because it will get paid in full in any 
event.155 An undersecured creditor also may prefer a quick sale for a host of 
reasons. The creditor might be concerned that some of its asserted security 
interests are unperfected (rendering them vulnerable to avoidance in 
bankruptcy), or may seek to skirt questions about the amount of bankruptcy 
estate value properly attributable to its collateral. Alternatively, a potential 
buyer may have already purchased controlling positions across the capital 
structure. The speed associated with the quick sale may reduce the likelihood 
that such objections can be identified, raised, and considered.156 Unsecured 
 
Reorganization, 57 VAND. L. REV. 741 (2004) (extending to bankruptcy the insights of 
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. 
REV. 247 (1999)). Team production theory, a contractarian theory, starts from the premise 
that each constituent group associated with a corporation (shareholders, creditors, 
employees, suppliers, and others) has explicitly delegated the direction of the business and 
the allocation of rents and surpluses to the corporation’s board of directors, but that other 
expectations, including legally unenforceable expectations, flow to each of these 
constituencies. 
153.  See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 364 (authorizing financing and usually requiring notice and a hearing 
and specific findings); David A. Skeel, Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession 
Financing, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1905 (2004) (discussing control associated with debtor-in-
possession financing). 
154.  COMPARISON SHOPPING GUIDE, supra note 48, at § 2.1.5.4 (discussing potential conflicts of 
interest of managers in negotiating going-concern sales); Kuney, supra note 76, at 110-11 
(arguing that 363 sales “primarily serve[] the interests of secured creditors and . . . 
insiders”); LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 5, at 32-34 (discussing ways in which 
management benefits from 363 sales, and conceding that they “probably have only scratched 
the surface of managerial corruption in these cases” because of the lack of public disclosures 
once they decided to sell). 
155.  See sources cited supra note 145. 
156.  See infra Section II.C. For a recent example of a 363-sale order that seeks to definitively 
establish that secured lenders’ claims are not subject to avoidance actions, see Order (I) 
Authorizing the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtors Assets Free and Clear of All Liens, 
Claims, Encumbrances and Interests; (II) Authorizing the Assumption and Assignment of 
Certain Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases; and (III) Granting Certain Related 
Relief at 8, In re LCI Holding Co., No. 12-13319 (KG) (Bankr. D. Del., Apr. 4, 2013). In other 
cases, debtor-in-possession financing orders that fund a debtor pending a 363 sale might 
eliminate the debtor-in-possession’s ability to challenge these issues and give only a short 
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creditors might wish to squeeze out equity interests in the debtor, and could do 
so by cutting off the potential upside that lingers as a case heads toward a 
plan.157 They might even capture some of that upside for themselves by 
agreeing to take some of their own distribution in the form of stock in the new 
(purchased) debtor. 
We could conjure many other hypotheticals. For example, incumbent 
management might prefer a buyer likely to continue their employment, even if 
it is not offering the best price.158 Or the purchaser might wish to favor certain 
unsecured creditors over others (as the government did in Chrysler). 
Shareholders of the debtor might team up with the buyer and use the terms 
and covenants of proposed debtor-in-possession financing to squeeze out 
unsecured creditors. Whatever the scenario, the leverage and informational 
asymmetry associated with a hurry-up sale make it more difficult for the court 
or other stakeholders to smoke out and neutralize unsavory arrangements, and 
may cause claimants to be more accepting of priority deviations, assuming they 
become aware of them. 
e.  Institutional Capacity (Ex Ante) 
 The combined effect of information and incentive problems limits a court’s 
capacity to protect the estate regardless of a particular judge’s experience or 
sophistication. Poor information plus the (possibly manufactured) crisis create 
an untenable situation for courts. Judges are faced with the Hobson’s choice of 
permitting a potentially opportunistic sale or possibly overseeing the 
destruction of value by insisting on the diagnostic process that would reveal the 
truth.159 Although the purchaser might be bluffing about time being of the 
 
period of time (and perhaps limited funding) to a creditors’ committee to pursue them 
instead. See sources cited infra note 193. 
157.  Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity’s Share in the Bankruptcy 
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 153 (1990). 
158.  LOPUCKI, supra note 54, at 174 (discussing the tendency of debtors’ senior management to 
get lucrative employment from buyers after all-asset 363 sales). See generally Kenneth N. 
Klee, Barbarians at the Trough: Riposte in Defense of the Warren Carve-Out Proposal, 82 
CORNELL L. REV. 1466, 1480-81 (1997) (discussing historic concerns about collusion 
between secured lenders and debtors’ managers in a foreclosure sale context). 
159.  See supra Sections I.A, I.B. 
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essence, the risk associated with calling that bluff is considerable.160 In the GM 
case, for example, the bankruptcy court explained the discomfort: 
GM’s counsel noted in summation that the F & D Bondholders 
Committee was expecting this Court to play Russian Roulette, and the 
comparison was apt. So that the F & D Bondholders Committee could 
throw GM into a plan negotiation process, the Court would have to 
gamble on the notion that the U.S. Government didn’t mean it when it 
said that it would not keep funding GM. There is no reason why any 
fiduciary, or any court, would take that gamble.161 
To the extent that expedited going-concern sales under § 363 precede the 
informational sweet spot, they force the court (not to mention potential 
objecting creditors and potential alternative bidders) to make a key 
“reorganize/liquidate/hurry-up sale” decision prior to the optimal moment. 
Engineers of a sale increase their leverage by using the melting ice cube 
argument to make it seem dangerous to collect more information and explore 
other options. And, as the judges in Humboldt Creamery, GM and Digital 
Domain observed, judges and judicial process have little choice but to give way 
to this practical fait accompli.162 
2.  Distributional Consequences 
The cases that raise the most explicit distributional issues involve sale 
orders that contain explicit instructions about how to allocate value. These 
sales are often attacked as “sub rosa” plans—plans of reorganization disguised 
as sales in order to evade the requirements of plan confirmation.163 The 
procedures that govern the Chapter 11 plan process do not apply to the debtor-
 
160.  Landers, supra note 66, at 112 (reporting that courts have “generally gone along with a fast 
track process, and resisted pleas for more time to produce more value. And, maybe they are 
right—sale objectors are notorious for seeking delay to obtain leverage or support for 
individual agendas, without much concern for whether the sale produces the truly best bid. 
But, we will never know”). For a discussion of how corporate and bankruptcy law scholars 
such as Adler & Ayres, Daines & Hanson, and Casey, have sought to use market-based 
proposals to address management lock-ups, see infra Subsection III.C.5. As we note there, 
however, in insolvency situations, markets are imperfect, and we see judicial oversight and 
fact finding as unavoidable, and even desirable. 
161.  In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 493 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
162.  See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text. 
163.  E.g., In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 the yale law journal 123:862   2014  
906 
 
in-possession’s powers to administer the estate, such as the power to sell and 
use property of the estate under § 363, or the power to incur debt under § 364. 
But when the power to sell includes selling everything, and the power to 
borrow includes terms that predetermine the distribution of proceeds, the plan 
process can be rendered irrelevant. Thus, early sales, coupled with restrictive 
financing, facilitate the use of transactional leverage for individualized benefit, 
particularly by creditors holding prepetition undersecured claims. But even 
sales that lack obvious sub rosa features can have significant distributional 
consequences and are procedurally noncompliant, in that they short-circuit the 
safeguards of Chapter 11. 
As we describe below, the Code contains well-developed procedures, with a 
long historical provenance, that allows parties to negotiate an allocation of 
enterprise value in the shadow of an established disclosure regime (applicable 
to Chapter 11 plans), a mandatory set of legal findings, and a distributional 
scheme established by state law and the priority rules for Chapter 7 
liquidations. The Chapter 11 plan confirmation process imposes important 
limits on the use of transactional leverage to divert value. 
Section 1125 of the Code requires a disclosure statement that provides 
claimants with “adequate information” to make an informed decision whether 
to support or oppose a plan of reorganization.164 Section 1129(a)(7) requires a 
finding that each claimant will receive at least as much under the plan as they 
would if the debtor were liquidated under Chapter 7.165 This means that the 
distributions under the proposed plan must respect the distributional priorities 
contained in Chapter 7. 
Code-authorized priorities among unsecured claims are rooted both in the 
exigencies of bankruptcy, and in other public policy considerations. For 
example, unpaid employee wage claims get special priority,166 and Chapter 11 
entitles such claimants to payment in full in cash on the effective date of a 
confirmed plan.167 The Code also requires the debtor-in-possession to cure 
defaults in executory contracts that will be assumed and performed. The 
 
164.  11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). 
165.  Id. § 1129(a)(7). 
166.  Id. § 507 (providing priority to certain kinds of prepetition claims and for administrative 
claims that benefit the bankruptcy estate during the case). 
167.  Id. § 1129(a)(9) (requiring cash payment on the effective date of a Chapter 11 plan other 
than for tax claimants who have a different entitlement). For a discussion of how our Ice 
Cube Bond proposal intersects with proposals to further regulate sub rosa sales, see infra 
note 230. 
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estate’s counterparty goes from being entitled to only a pro rata share of the 
debtor’s unencumbered assets, to being entitled to one hundred percent 
payment of its prepetition claim.168 Debtors-in-possession can seek court 
permission to give super-priority or secured status to lenders offering to extend 
credit to the bankruptcy estate.169 These Code-authorized liens and priorities 
subordinate prepetition creditors in the interest of a successful reorganization. 
Yet, a common theme of these Code-authorized priorities is that they do 
not exacerbate, and are often designed specifically to limit, the leverage of 
prepetition creditors on the eve of, and early in, a bankruptcy case. The 
employee wage priority protects people who often have little leverage.170 The 
executory contract provisions allow the debtor to hold a non-debtor to its 
contract notwithstanding bankruptcy, and sometimes require the non-debtor 
to accept a contractual assignment, even if the non-debtor would prefer to do 
business with someone else. The financing provisions are meant to prevent 
prepetition creditors from placing a credit stranglehold on the debtor. 
Other mechanisms for redistributing value have developed (sometimes on 
shaky statutory grounds) through bankruptcy practice or been placed into the 
statute as a result of interest group lobbying.171 Rather than reducing 
 
168.  11 U.S.C. § 365(b); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 365.06 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. 
Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2013). 
169.  11 U.S.C. § 364(d). 
170.  Id. § 507(a)(4). This provision and issue is distinct from the rights of unionized employees 
under § 1113 of the Code. Section 1113 was enacted following NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 
U.S. 513 (1984), to reinstate the negotiating power of unionized employees when a debtor 
employer seeks to modify (or nullify) the collective bargaining agreement with its 
employees. That provision was meant to promote the transactional leverage that unions 
have outside of bankruptcy and to manage the interaction between two important federal 
policies. Daniel Keating, The Continuing Puzzle of Collective Bargaining Agreements in 
Bankruptcy, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503 (1994) (discussing § 1113 as a response to the 
rejection of collective bargaining agreements under Bildisco); Daniel L. Keating, Good 
Intentions, Bad Economics: Retiree Insurance Benefits in Bankruptcy, 43 VAND. L. REV. 161, 185-
87 (1990) (discussing § 1114 as a response to LTV Steel Corporation’s rejection of retiree 
medical benefits). 
171.  Notable examples of interest group pressure include the “shopping center” amendments 
limiting the ability to assume and assign leases under § 365, as well as the safe harbors for 
derivatives inserted into §§ 362 and 546, enacted to a limited extent in 1984 and 
substantially expanded in 2005. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(17), 365, 546(e)-(g); see Jeffrey A. 
Wurst & Michael S. Amato, Treatment of Franchisee Leases Under § 365, AM. BANKR. INST. J., 
July-Aug. 2011, at 47 (“In response to strong lobbying efforts by real property owners, 
landlords and managing agents, § 365(d) was amended, setting defined limitations on the 
time period to assume or reject nonresidential real property leases.”). 
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stakeholder leverage, many reflect the power of certain participants in the 
bankruptcy process. Texlon-type cross-collateralization and critical vendor 
motions, discussed below, are two prominent examples. 
Texlon-type cross-collateralization, named for the first case to criticize it,172 
involves the granting of postpetition liens to secure unsecured prepetition debt. 
The postpetition priorities and liens authorized in § 364 speak only of security 
for new postpetition loans and do not disturb the relative priority of prepetition 
obligations.173 The Code does not expressly authorize debtor-in-possession 
financing orders that use new liens to secure, and effectively pay, prepetition 
debt. But the case law of some jurisdictions permits cross-collateralization or 
arrangements such as roll-ups, if deemed to be in the best interest of the estate 
after considering multiple factors.174 Just like the melting ice cube sale, the call 
for financing deals with these terms typically depends on an assertion that the 
situation is dire, that there is no other possible financing, and no other 
prospect of preserving value for stakeholders.175 
Similarly, some courts permit debtors to invoke the equitable “doctrine of 
necessity” to give special treatment to so-called critical vendors, with whom 
business relationships must be preserved, by paying their prepetition debts in 
 
172.  Otte v. Mfrs. Hanover Commercial Corp. (In re Texlon Corp.), 596 F.2d 1092 (2d Cir. 
1979). In this case, Judge Friendly raised concerns about this financing technique and 
declined to approve it under the circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 1098. The 
opinion did not, however, disallow cross-collateralization per se. Id. (“In order to decide this 
case we are not obliged, however, to say that under no conceivable circumstances could 
‘cross-collateralization’ be authorized.”); see also Charles J. Tabb, A Critical Reappraisal of 
Cross-Collateralization in Bankruptcy, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 109, 115 (1986) (showing that the 
Texlon court declined an opportunity to permanently prohibit cross-collateralization). 
173.  11 U.S.C. § 364. 
174.  Roll-ups use postpetition loans to pay off prepetition debt in one hundred percent dollars. 
For a relatively recent discussion, see Craig R. Bucki, Cracking the Code: The Legal Authority 
Behind Extrastatutory Debtor-in-Possession Financing Mechanisms and Their Prospects for 
Survival, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 357, 373-74. For a discussion of variations on roll-ups, 
such as a creeping roll-up, see Conclusions of Law, In re Capmark Financial Group, Inc., 438 
B.R. 471, 511 n.15 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010). 
175.  See, e.g., Tiffany Kary, Lyondell Chemical Wins Approval for $8 Billion Bankruptcy Loan, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 28, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid 
=akq3.skbZ130&pid=newsarchive (describing this dynamic as manifested in Lyondell’s 
bankruptcy); Squire Sanders & Andrew M. Simon, Lyondell Chemical Company – The Impact 
of Tight Credit Markets on Debtor-in-Possession Financings, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 26, 2009), http:// 
www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=49d92842-abc4-4e3d-b8ee-d481d16889d0 (same). 
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full and early in a case.176 Supporters of these payments assert, sometimes 
without much evidence, that the deviation from priority makes creditors better 
off as a whole—a small price to pay, they say, if the absence of critical vendor 
cooperation will undermine the entire reorganization. But if too many parties 
exploit their leverage, and courts do not enforce the “critical” standard 
rigorously, those demands for cash and special treatment early in the 
bankruptcy case will have the opposite effect: smaller payouts for other 
creditors and a lower likelihood of reorganization.177 
Quick all-asset sales raise the same kinds of questions as these suspect types 
of priority.178 Indeed, the push for a quick sale can be tightly intertwined with 
proposed debtor-in-possession financing by a prepetition secured creditor, 
with the financing order (rather than the sale order) realigning statutory 
priorities. It is possible that the transaction is still in the best interest of 
creditors notwithstanding the distortion of bankruptcy priorities. Highly 
charged sale environments, in which parties proclaim the need for speed, make 
it difficult to determine whether the buyer is walking away with more than its 
share, leaving others with less.179 
 
176.  See, e.g., In re Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 821 (D. Del. 1999) (authorizing payment of 
prepetition claims to vendors judicially deemed “critical”). But see In re Kmart Corp., 359 
F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming the reversal for lack of evidence of a bankruptcy court’s 
determination that a particular vendor was “critical”). For an early analysis proposing that 
such payments be prohibited, or at least more tightly restricted, see Charles Jordan Tabb, 
Emergency Preferential Orders in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 75 (1991). 
177.  See STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES FOR DISTRESSED BUSINESSES § 5:25 (Jonathan Friedland ed., 
2012) (discussing how “the ‘churn’ of trade creditors and likelihood that a company failing 
to pay trade creditors will not survive the solicitation process requires ‘ride through’” of 
trade claims in prepackaged Chapter 11 cases); Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy from Olympus, 
77 U. CHI. L. REV. 959 (2010) (discussing Judge Easterbrook’s decision in Kmart). 
178.  Brubaker & Tabb, supra note 34, at 1378 (“[T]here is nothing about capturing reorganization 
value via a § 363 sale rather than a plan that is in itself problematic.”); id. at 1379 
(“[W]hether reorganization value is captured by ‘sale’ or by ‘plan’ is not the critical 
question, as long as the method chosen preserves and upholds Chapter 11’s distributional 
norms.”). 
179.  When thinking about what is appropriately the creditors’ share, it is necessary to distinguish 
the distribution a creditor would receive in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation from the 
incrementally greater distribution, based on a debtor’s going-concern value, available as the 
result of a successful reorganization. The liquidation value is the irreducible minimum to 
which the secured creditors are entitled. In a consensual case, the reorganization surplus is 
properly the subject of negotiation. Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Valuation 
in Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1106 (1985). See generally LoPucki & Whitford, supra 
note 157 (discussing negotiation practices in Chapter 11 reorganization). 
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While we do not inherently prefer reorganizations over going-concern 
sales, we do favor sales with more information and opportunity for bargaining 
in the shadow of the Code over sales concluded with less. We therefore favor 
going-concern sales accompanied by the procedural protections of a Chapter 11 
plan to those conducted under § 363 without disclosure, solicitation, voting, 
and judicial confirmation. If a going-concern sale is proposed as part of a 
Chapter 11 plan, the plan proponent must provide “adequate information” in a 
disclosure statement, usually including an explicit comparison to a Chapter 7 
liquidation, as well as adequate time to evaluate the proposal.180 Expedited 363 
sales, by contrast, run the risk of cutting short the opportunity to compare the 
value of the assets to the proposed price, to compare the proposed price to 
what might be offered were the debtor to be exposed to the market over a 
longer period of time, or to consider the benefits of a true reorganization. In 
other words, expedited all-asset sales of alleged melting ice cubes shift the risk 
of undervaluation to the estate and allow distributional distortions—even if the 
sale does not expressly dictate allocation as the Chrysler sale did. Our Ice Cube 
Bond proposal in Part III seeks to reduce this reallocation of risk and seeks to 
limit the leverage associated with a melting ice cube crisis. 
C.  Quantifying and Allocating the Costs and Benefits of Expedited All-Asset 
Sales 
The discussion so far, reduced to its essentials, suggests that the 
bankruptcy estate benefits from a quick 363 sale under some but not all 
conditions, and that parties with conflicts of interest may use the melting ice 
cube argument to distort the choice between a quick sale outside a plan, a sale 
under a plan, and a reorganization under a plan. In this next Section, we 
explore how to sort between value-maximizing and opportunistic quick sales. 
1.  The Speed Premium and Increased Error Costs—Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency 
Chapter 11 can help maximize the value of a debtor in a number of ways. As 
explored in Part I, Chapter 11 captures value that would have been lost in a 
 
180.  See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012) (requiring that claim holders receive a court-approved 
disclosure statement containing adequate information to enable informed judgment about 
the Chapter 11 plan). Whether courts’ sale process orders can or do accomplish a similar 
objective is likely to be the subject of debate. See Kuney, supra note 76, at 107-08 (comparing 
the procedural aspects of sales under Chapter 11 plans to 363 sales). 
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piecemeal sale under ordinary state law mechanisms or in a Chapter 7 
liquidation. This value can be preserved through a traditional plan of 
reorganization, or through a Chapter 11 plan with a going-concern sale as its 
centerpiece. This sale-created value derives in part from the flexibility of 
Chapter 11, which in practice allows pragmatic structuring of sales, a short 
timeframe (even under a plan), and, most importantly, the transfer of clear 
title.181 
Sometimes, however, preservation of this Chapter-11-created value may 
require a quick 363 sale prior to plan confirmation; this increment of preserved 
value is what we call the “Speed Premium.” The Speed Premium is the 
difference between the proposed “Expedited Sale Price,”182 and the present 
value of the price if one delays the sale until approval of a Chapter 11 plan or 
substitutes a traditional reorganization (the “Hypothetical Plan Price”): 
 
Speed Premium = Expedited Sale Price  Hypothetical Plan Price 
 
The asserted benefit of a quick sale does not exist unless, at the very least, 
the quick sale price exceeds the anticipated price under a Chapter 11 plan.183 In 
other words, the value of the assets are declining. The ice cube is melting. 
This is not the end of the inquiry, however. It is important to distinguish 
melting ice cube risk from the risk of erroneous valuation. Melting ice cube risk 
is based on the concerns about perishability reviewed in Part I. For example, 
fresh produce, customer lists, and other types of assets may quickly decline in 
value. Some firms run the risk that firm-specific value will dissipate quickly. 
Key employees may leave, for example. There are many reasons a Speed 
 
181.  See supra Sections I.A, II.A. 
182.  Here, we mean a sale of all or substantially all assets that occurs under § 363 in a Chapter 11 
case but outside the context of a confirmed Chapter 11 plan. 
183.  In response to a prior draft, Stephen Lubben asked whether the comparison should be to the 
foreclosure process under state law. This highlights an important distinction. The Speed 
Premium, which is relevant for governance purposes, is distinct from the concept of 
bankruptcy-created value. As discussed below, bankruptcy-created value can consist either 
of the difference between the Expedited Sale Price and the price realized through foreclosure 
outside of bankruptcy, or the difference between the value of the reorganized entity and the 
value of the assets as determined through a state law foreclosure process. The concept of 
bankruptcy-created value is important to determine the distributional baseline for secured 
creditors, but it is not relevant to the decision whether to conduct a hurry-up going-concern 
363 sale or confirm a Chapter 11 plan. Both are expected to produce greater values than state 
law foreclosure. The governance choice on the table is between competing dispositions of 
the assets within a bankruptcy case. 
 the yale law journal 123:862   2014  
912 
 
Premium may exist. However, a quick sale reduces the level of information 
available to interested parties to value the company, and therefore increases the 
risk of erroneous valuation. In particular, because of the information 
asymmetries discussed above, we assume that the sale proponents and debtor’s 
incumbent management have better information than the creditors and the 
court. We are therefore particularly concerned with the increased risk of 
undervaluation imposed on the estate by the quick sale. We will refer to this 
cost, along with the other reasons for increased likelihood of erroneous 
valuation, as the “Increased Probability of Undervaluation.” 
The governance question raised by a quick sale is to determine whether the 
Speed Premium’s value exceeds the costs imposed by the Increased Probability 
of Undervaluation. Information scarcity increases the probability that the quick 
sale will harm rather than benefit the bankruptcy estate. A quick 363 sale is not 
desirable if the Speed Premium is less than the cost imposed by the procedural 
shortcut.184 This is a more rigorous assertion of the governance holding in 
Lionel—that a good business justification is needed.185 
The costs imposed by a quick sale could be calculated by multiplying the 
increased probability that the Expedited Sale Price is too low times the 
anticipated undervaluation (“Undervaluation Amount”). Thus the Quick Sale 
Cost would be: 
 
Increased Probability of Undervaluation × Undervaluation Amount =  
Quick Sale Cost 
 
 
184.  This is true as a matter of efficiency. For reasons of fairness, discussed elsewhere, a sale 
should not be approved where leverage is being used to distort distributional priorities. 
185.  See supra note 19 and accompanying text. The Lionel court phrased the standard as a “good 
business justification,” but early commentators equated this standard with the “best 
interests of the estate” test. See, e.g., John J. Hurley, Chapter 11 Alternative: Section 363 Sale of 
All of the Debtor’s Assets Outside a Plan of Reorganization, 58 AM. BANKR. L.J. 233, 246 (1984) 
(noting that Lionel’s business justification test “appears to be compatible with the ‘best 
interests of the estate’ test announced by other courts”). Increased Probability of 
Undervaluation is distinct from the possibility that the value of the company may change 
over time for extrinsic market reasons. The quick sale allocates all of the “market upside,” or 
what is sometimes called “optionality,” to the buyer. By fixing the value, the 363 sale 
eliminates this market risk for the debtor’s prepetition creditors and investors, for better or 
for worse. But, so long as that risk allocation is made on the basis of symmetric information, 
without the influence of melting ice cube leverage, the ability to choose the timing of the 
sale is a benefit. 
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In sum, the increment of value created by a going-concern sale under § 363 
(“363 Sale Value”) can be quantified as the difference between the Speed 
Premium and the Quick Sale Cost: 
 
Speed Premium  Quick Sale Cost = 363 Sale Value 
 
If the 363 Sale Value is positive, then a quick sale is preferable to a sale 
under a Chapter 11 plan. If it is negative—that is, the Quick Sale Cost exceeds 
the Speed Premium—then there is no valid reason to shortcut the ordinary 
plan confirmation process to conduct a hurry-up sale under § 363.186 
Unfortunately, under current practice, the court must decide on the fly, 
without sufficient information and sometimes without an adversarial 
presentation, whether to declare the melting ice cube argument a bluff. As 
previously explained, this is too much to expect. As a result, there is a 
considerable risk that the court’s ad hoc estimate of a positive 363 Sale Value at 
the time of sale will turn out to be wrong. Under current law, this risk lies 
entirely with the bankruptcy estate. 
In our view, if the advocates of the quick sale are seeking a procedural 
shortcut, they should, at some level, insure the estate against the possibility 
that the value of the sale is negative. In other words, as we argue in Part III, 
those pushing for a sale outside the Chapter 11 plan process should be required 
to put their money where their mouths are and demonstrate, after the fact, that 
the estate has not been harmed by forgone process. 
 
186.  The concept of optionality offers another way to quantify some of the harm to the estate 
caused by quick all-asset sales. As previously mentioned, equities of insolvent companies 
and underwater debt securities of bankrupt companies continue to sell at positive values. See 
Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 455 (1999) 
(“The right to get an equity interest for its fair market value is ‘property’ as the word is 
ordinarily used. Options to acquire an interest in a firm, even at its market value, trade for a 
positive price.” (quoting BAIRD, supra note 30, at 261)). Until the case is over, and the claims 
or interests in the debtor are cancelled, there remains a chance of some type of distribution 
to such claims or interests under a consensual plan. See generally LoPucki & Whitford, supra 
note 157. Early all-asset sales foreclose this optionality, eliminating the possibility of a 
traditional reorganization, an upward market shift, or the emergence of a buyer willing to 
pay a higher price. This was an issue in Lionel, the seminal Second Circuit decision, where 
the estate ultimately realized a substantial premium over the price offered in the proposed 
Quick Sale. See supra note 62. The option value is the price someone might pay for a call on 
the assets at some point in the future. If the equation described above produces a positive 
363 Sale Value, then this implies that there is no option value or that it is negative. These are 
the only cases in which a Quick Sale is desirable. 
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2.  Distributional Consequences—Pareto Optimality and Bargaining over the 
Speed Premium 
Early sales can produce two types of harm. Valuation harm is absolute. 
Distributional harm is relative. Or, to put it another way, when one asks if the 
benefit of the Speed Premium outweighs the cost to the estate, one is asking if 
the early sale is Kaldor-Hicks efficient. By contrast, when the melting ice cube 
leverage is used to alter the relative distribution, the sale is not Pareto optimal. 
Efficiency is being achieved at the expense of one or more holders of claims or 
interests. 
Parties can, and frequently do, use the value preservation argument (e.g., 
“We must buy/sell before the ice cube melts”) to capitalize on their 
informational advantages. This use of transactional leverage has both efficiency 
and fairness consequences. As we discuss below, baseline entitlements cannot 
be modified without individual claimholders’ consent. By contrast, 
bankruptcy-created value is properly the subject of bargaining, subject to the 
protections of the Chapter 11 plan process. 
a.  Baseline Distributions—Best Interests and Pareto Optimality 
To be confirmed, a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization must satisfy a 
condition colloquially known as the “best interests of creditors” test: each 
holder of a claim (or interest) must receive in the Chapter 11 plan at least as 
much as it would have received in a liquidation of the assets in Chapter 7.187 
Section 363 does not have its own “best interest of creditors” test. Under 
current law, the proponent must simply demonstrate that it has a good 
business justification for the sale, or to put it another way, that it appears the 
sale will be in the best interest of the estate as a whole. Thus, if courts permit 
the distribution of 363-sale proceeds outside of a Chapter 11 plan, claimants do 
not get the same protection they would have received in a sale within a plan.188 
 
187.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2012). The holder of a claim is, of course, permitted to consent to 
lesser treatment by accepting a plan that so provides. Id. 
188.  For various assumptions about the timing of the distribution of 363-sale proceeds, see 
Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 27, at 520 (describing plans that disburse money from going-
concern sales); LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 5, at 26-27 (noting that some secured 
creditors probably were paid upon sale closing while other creditors probably had to await 
Chapter 11 plan consummation); and James J. White, Death and Resurrection of Secured 
Credit, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 139, 164 (2004) (suggesting that 363 sales produce 
quicker payouts to creditors). 
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Yet, where a sale of all assets is effectively determining the distributions in the 
case, it makes sense to impose a similar condition of Pareto Optimality. 
To establish whether the sale meets the Pareto condition, we need both a 
baseline valuation and a baseline distribution. To compare a quick 363 sale to a 
sale under a Chapter 11 plan, one ought to ask the same question: what would 
creditors receive if the debtor were liquidated or sold pursuant to a plan? 
Crudely stated, the secured creditors are entitled to receive the value of their 
collateral, and the unsecured creditors share pro rata in the remainder.189 In 
Chrysler, secured creditors argued that unsecured creditors were receiving value 
that should have gone to them.190 The bankruptcy court concluded, however, 
that the secured creditors were receiving considerably more than piecemeal 
liquidation would have yielded.191 So, in that case, the Pareto condition was 
satisfied. More typically, a secured creditor will claim it holds a first priority 
lien on all of a debtor’s assets, rendering everything sold in the quick sale its 
collateral. If this naked assertion were dispositive, most quick sales would 
satisfy the Pareto condition. As we will further explain, however, alleged 
blanket liens may be less complete than secured creditors frequently contend.192 
Thus, while Pareto Optimality requires protecting the secured creditors’ 
entitlements as of the petition date, it similarly requires protecting the 
unsecured creditors, by preserving any distribution they might have received. 
Spurious claims of priority or security reallocate assets that would (and 
sometimes should) have been available for distribution to others. The speed 
demanded in an alleged melting ice cube sale can preclude adequate 
investigation of the perfection and scope of the secured creditor’s lien, either as 
a term of the sale, as a term of an associated debtor-in-possession financing 
order, or as a practical matter.193 Such an improvement of the secured creditor’s 
 
189.  11 U.S.C. §§ 502, 506, 726, 1129(b). 
190.  See Adler, supra note 33, at 306-07; Roe & Skeel, supra note 2, at 733. 
191.  In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 97 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2009) (“[T]estimony, which is 
unrebutted, is that the $2 billion New Chrysler is paying for the Debtors’ assets exceeds the 
value that the First-Lien Lenders could recover in an immediate liquidation. . . . [T]he 
Debtors’ financial advisor, Capstone . . . concluded that liquidation would generate between 
zero and $1.2 billion.”); see also Lubben, supra note 35, at 544 (discussing why most secured 
lenders in Chrysler supported a sale giving them $2 billion in cash). 
192.  See infra Subsection II.C.2.b. 
193.  Some parties seek to condition a sale (or condition financing, whether or not associated with 
a sale) on a transfer or a waiver of avoidance actions and curing of any lien imperfections. 
See AM. BANKR. INST., DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION FINANCING: FUNDING A CHAPTER 11 CASE 
290-96 (Felicia Gerber Perlman ed., 2013) [hereinafter DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION FINANCING] 
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position reallocates unencumbered value from the bankruptcy estate to the 
secured creditor without any clear basis for the entitlement. 
b.  Allocating the Speed Premium 
Property rights in the bankruptcy estate’s assets and entitlement to the 
Speed Premium may vary from case to case. We cannot definitively allocate the 
cost and distribute the Speed Premium in a one-size-fits-all way.194 Ideally, the 
Chapter 11 plan process protects the ability of stakeholders to negotiate over 
the allocation of the various elements of value that are up for grabs. Quick sales 
short circuit the balancing of interests and opportunity for deliberation 
inherent in the plan process. So, in considering the distributive consequences 
 
(reviewing contract clauses and court orders that seek to prevent subsequent litigation about 
defects in lenders’ prepetition claims); Klee & Levin, supra note 46, at 9 (noting that debtor-
in-possession lenders typically request that the court make findings in the financing order 
about the validity of their prepetition liens); Kuney, supra note 76, at 64-65; Jonathan M. 
Landers, The Future of Avoidance Powers in Commercial Cases, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, 
Nov. 2012, at 1, 3 (discussing how some debtor-in-possession financing orders “admit the 
validity of liens and the absence of claims . . . against favored parties, limit the use of funds 
advanced by the DIP lender for investigation and litigation, and provide shortened periods 
for investigation of potential claims”). Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(c) sets 
forth, among other things, what a motion to obtain credit must disclose, including “a 
determination of the validity, enforceability, or priority for a claim that arose before the 
commencement of a case.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(c)(1)(B)(iii). Some waivers in debtor-in-
possession financing orders do not bar creditors’ committee action outright, but might 
impose strict time limits or monetary limits. See, e.g., In re FCX, Inc., 54 B.R. 833 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.C. 1985); Final Order, In re Caribbean Petrol. Corp., No. 10-12553 (KG), 2010 WL 
6982178 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 12, 2010); Final Order, In re Champion Enters., No. 1:09-bk-
12553 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 12, 2010); Final Order at 31, In re Wellman, Inc., No. 08-10595 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2008); Interim Order, In re DJK Residential LLC, No. 08-10375 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2008). Courts want adequate disclosure of efforts to obtain waivers 
within debtor-in-possession financing agreements, at least when sought on a very expedited 
basis. See, e.g., Local Rules of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Delaware, Rule 4001-2, Cash Collateral and Financing Orders (effective Feb. 1, 2013) 
(requiring that parties highlight provisions in debtor-in-possession orders that “bind the 
estate or other parties in interest with respect to the validity, perfection or amount of the 
secured creditor’s prepetition lien” that do not allow a window of time for a creditors’ 
committee to investigate); Kuney, supra note 76, at 58. Nonetheless, the leverage associated 
with melting ice cube arguments could pressure courts to approve orders containing these 
features and other claimants not to oppose them as rigorously. 
194.  As we discuss infra Subsection III.C.5, this problem is not fully addressed in other 
proposals, such as Adler & Ayres, supra note 114; and Casey, supra note 16. 
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of quick sales, it is essential to identify the possible beneficiaries and cost 
bearers. 
i.  Who Is Entitled to the Speed Premium? 
Consider the senior secured lender who asserts a blanket lien on all of a 
debtor’s assets. When such a creditor advocates for an early going-concern sale 
it will likely argue that it has the right to determine what to do with the estate’s 
assets, all of which the creditor believes are collateral for its loan.195 Here, 
however, we question the assumption that the senior secured creditor owns the 
Speed Premium. 
This assertion is first cast into doubt by the concept of optionality. As we 
have noted, in the absence of a bankruptcy filing, the secured creditor would 
have the right to foreclose under state law.196 Bankruptcy law cuts off this 
right. As such, the distributional baseline starts with the value a creditor would 
receive if it conducted a foreclosure sale of the liened assets under state law. A 
secured lender does not necessarily own an increase in value above this 
baseline, created by the efficiencies of the bankruptcy system.197 Anthony 
Casey, who has described option value in great detail, agrees that bankruptcy-
created value is not necessarily proceeds of the secured creditor’s collateral, and 
 
195.  Academic articles often document lenders’ efforts to obtain blanket liens on the property of a 
business. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Is Secured Debt Efficient?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1117, 1118, 1125, 
1138 (2001) (discussing the propensity among lenders to firms of lower financial quality to 
encumber “all their assets” even if some have little worth, although noting that some 
lending agreements carve out assets such as real estate, receivables, or a particular piece of 
equipment financed through a purchase-money transaction); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The 
Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795, 799, 810-12 (2004) (describing the 
dominant security interest as necessary to allow the creditor the ability to sell the business as 
a going concern without considering other stakeholders, but acknowledging barriers to fully 
capturing value, such as need for manager’s expertise); id. at 856 (noting that control in 
bankruptcy by a secured creditor might be appropriate if it is the only class of beneficiary, 
such as when a dominant creditor is undersecured). However, Westbrook’s analysis does 
not address whether dominant creditor control is possible under U.S. law. 
196.  See supra Subsection II.A; see also U.C.C. § 9-610 (2010) (authorizing commercially 
reasonable disposition of personal property collateral after default). 
197.  Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy and the Entitlements of the Government: Whose Money Is It 
Anyway?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 993, 1000 (1995) (arguing that “the government’s role in 
creating and supervising the bankruptcy system entitles it to use any value created by that 
system to further any legitimate interest of the government” and that any such value 
therefore does not inherently belong to any particular creditor group). 
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thus might not be owned by the secured creditor.198 He suggests that a secured 
creditor asserting a blanket lien should have to purchase the option value of the 
unsecured creditor’s claim if it is pursuing a sale, rather than a reorganization, 
through a Chapter 11 plan.199 Casey is concerned with post-confirmation 
option value in sales conducted pursuant to a plan. We are concerned with 
“optionality” during a different time period—between the quick sale and 
reorganization or sale under a plan. The logic is the same, however. The quick 
sale cuts off any option value that might be held by other claimants. And unlike 
Casey, the option value we seek to protect is already allocated to the estate by 
the Code. The key point is that the option value is not “owned” by the senior 
secured creditor. For this and other reasons, the asserted blanket lien may not 
encumber the full value of the enterprise, leaving value for others. 
ii.  Delayed Realization, Chapter-11-Created Value, and the Limits of 
Proceeds 
The terms “realization” and “option value” denote two components of firm 
value: the value of the firm if sold today, and the value of an option that would 
allow the sale to be delayed to a future date—the price of a bet that the value of 
the firm will go up. The price of equity shares of a solvent firm contains both 
values. The officers and directors retain the ability and obligation to maximize 
firm value by choosing when to liquidate assets. 
The situation changes when a firm becomes insolvent but is not yet in 
bankruptcy. Outside of bankruptcy, creditors have the power to force 
realization by liquidating assets to satisfy their debts. Unsecured creditors can 
obtain judgments and, to the extent state law permits, pursue unencumbered 
assets of the debtor to satisfy those judgments.200 Secured creditors that have 
contracted for collateral can repossess and foreclose on the assets securing the 
 
198.  Casey, supra note 16, at 797. 
199.  Id. at 791. If a senior secured creditor seeks a sale, says Casey, the senior creditor should have 
to make a proposal to junior creditors to buy out their option value (what he calls an 
“option-preservation priority”). In effect, the junior creditors would have a veto over the 
sale. It is important to note that while Casey is concerned with option value generally, we 
focus on the option value associated with the comparison between a quick sale and a sale or 
reorganization pursuant to a confirmed Chapter 11 plan. 
200.  E.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202, 5232-34 (MCKINNEY 2013). 
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debt.201 These are the state law entitlements of the secured and unsecured 
creditor on the bankruptcy petition date.202 
Conceptualized this way, the secured creditor is entitled to the value of its 
collateral on the bankruptcy petition date.203 As a practical matter, this dating 
rule is a legal fiction. Liquidation outside of bankruptcy (or even in Chapter 7) 
would take considerable time. Foreclosures outside of bankruptcy are subject to 
time delays by design or circumstances, and uncertainty about the title 
purchased.204 Because different systems govern the lender’s remedies upon a 
debtor’s default, cobbling together a nonconsensual, going-concern sale may 
be difficult, if not impossible. 
Chapter 11 offers a number of tools designed to enhance the value of the 
firm beyond what it would be worth if liquidated on the petition date. Some 
examples: 
   It gives the debtor-in-possession enhanced powers to sell the 
debtor as a going concern and to transfer those assets with clear 
title.205 
   It provides significant incentives to third parties to provide 
financing to the Chapter 11 debtor.206 
   It establishes mechanisms to allocate value.207 
 
201.  E.g., U.C.C. § 9-610 (“After default, a secured party may sell, lease, license, or otherwise 
dispose of any or all of the collateral in its present condition or following any commercially 
reasonable preparation or processing.”). 
202.  It also is the interest entitled to “adequate protection” against the decline of value during the 
bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. § 361 (2012) (defining adequate protection); id. §§ 362-364 
(listing instances in which secured creditors are entitled to request adequate protection). 
203.  The concept of realization upon insolvency is even clearer under non-U.S. law. Many 
jurisdictions retain a concept of liability for “wrongful trading” or “trading while insolvent.” 
The officers and directors have a duty to commence insolvency proceedings upon discovery 
that the entity is insolvent. See, e.g., Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 362 (U.K.). See generally 
Perry S. Granof, Presentation Before the New York City Bar Association: Insolvency and 
D&O Liability Around the World (June 11, 2009), http://www.granofinternational.com 
/documents/Presentation_NY.pdf (reviewing director insolvent-trading liability in Western 
Europe, Australia, and Canada). For a proposal to impose a similar requirement under U.S. 
law, see A. Mechele Dickerson, A Behavioral Approach to Analyzing Corporate Failures, 38 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2003). 
204.  See supra notes 123-126 and accompanying text. 
205.  11 U.S.C. § 363(b), (f). 
206.  Id. § 364. 
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   It overcomes coordination problems by limiting the power of 
individual holdouts through the class approval process and binding 
dissenting classes of claims or interests through the “cram 
down.”208 
   It delays realization (at least for junior claimants in cases where the 
debtor reorganizes) until completion of the Chapter 11 plan 
negotiation and confirmation process.209 
These tools can preserve value through a reorganization or sale under a 
Chapter 11 plan. 
Chapter 11 creates two possible routes for increasing the value of the estate 
beyond this baseline: a going-concern sale or a reorganization. Each, in its own 
way, preserves firm-specific investment and going-concern value and can be 
accomplished under a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization. The Chapter 11 plan 
may provide for the recapitalization of the firm, or for the sale of the firm and 
distribution of the proceeds. In some cases, an increment of the going-concern 
premium may arise because Chapter 11 provides a breathing spell and a chance 
to fix the business. Cases like Chrysler illustrate that just the opposite may be 
true in other cases: an increment of the going-concern premium may be 
attributable to the ability to accomplish a sale quickly and with finality. The 
Speed Premium arises postpetition, as a product of federal bankruptcy law. It is 
Chapter 11 that creates the ability to conduct a going-concern sale, and to do so 
before the firm loses value.210 As previously discussed, the Speed Premium 
sometimes can be obtained in a sale under a plan, either by moving quickly, or 
if the plan is prepackaged. In such cases, the Speed Premium is merged into the 
going-concern premium, and can be distributed through the plan process as 
the parties have negotiated. However, when it is claimed that a sale must be 
completed before plan confirmation, the Speed Premium must be weighed 
 
207.  Id. These include claims allowance, id. §§ 502, 506, priorities, id. §§ 507, 726, plan 
formulation, id. § 1122, and plan confirmation, id. §§ 1125, 1126, 1129. 
208.  See id. § 1126(c) (providing that a class of claims has accepted a plan if the plan has been 
accepted by creditors holding at least two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in 
number, with some limitations); id. § 1129(b) (binding non-accepting classes of creditors 
where the plan is “fair and equitable” and does not “unfairly discriminate”). 
209.  The effective date of the plan is the point at which securities issued pursuant to a plan of 
reorganization replace the prepetition claims. Id. § 1141. 
210.  See supra Section II.A. 
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against the attendant increased error cost.211 The key point here is that both a 
traditional reorganization and a going-concern sale create value that would be 
lost using state law remedies. 
So, to what extent is Chapter 11-created value the collateral of a secured 
creditor, as opposed to an unencumbered asset of the bankruptcy estate? State 
law provides the foundation for what a secured creditor can demand in 
bankruptcy.212 To the extent a debtor is worth more as a going concern than in 
a piecemeal liquidation—because of its talented workforce, unique assemblage 
of contractual and non-contractual relationships, or other factors—it is not 
clear that this extra value is tethered to, or subsumed in, the secured creditor’s 
collateral. Section 1129(b)(2)(A) allocates any increase in value in the collateral 
between the petition date and the effective date of the Chapter 11 plan to the 
secured creditor. However, § 552, and the concept of equitable tracing, ensure 
that this entitlement applies only to the value of the collateral itself, not to the 
value of the enterprise as a whole.213 Oversimplifying slightly, the filing of a 
bankruptcy petition cuts off the effectiveness of floating liens, which otherwise 
would attach to a debtor’s interest in property when the debtor acquires it.214 
 
211.  See supra Section II.C.1. When sale is through a quick 363 sale, the enhanced power to sell, 
the ability to obtain financing, and the silencing of holdouts are all present. The procedures 
for allocating value, the protections associated with the power to bind holdouts, and the 
delay of realization are forgone. 
212.  Under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a), the allowed secured claim is equal to the creditor’s interest in the 
debtor’s interest in the collateral. That value is determined by reference to applicable non-
bankruptcy law. 
213.  For a court’s analysis of why a lender’s claimed security interest in the contract rights of a 
business could not be construed to encumber every single dollar that the business generates, 
see In re Las Vegas Monorail, 429 B.R. 317, 335-36 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010). The sometimes-
divergent case law interpretations of this provision have been captured in a brief article by 
attorneys who advocate for a more expansive view of secured creditor entitlements. Erin 
Casey & Randy Klein, The Pre-Petition Right to Post-Petition Income Streams and the 
Misinterpretation of § 552, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec.-Jan. 2011, at 59. In arguing in favor of 
broader security interests post-bankruptcy, Casey and Klein state in another article, “when a 
secured lender underwrites and prices its loan based on the value of the borrower’s business 
(including the earning power of the collateral package) and seeks repayment from its 
security in that ‘source of value,’ there is no windfall.” Erin Casey & Randy Klein, Income 
Streams: An Economic Analysis of Rents as Proceeds, J. CORP. RENEWAL, Oct. 2011, at 34,  
36, http://www.goldbergkohn.com/media/site_files/129_JCR_Oct2011_IncomeStreams%20 
_2_.pdf. This may be the case as a matter of contract law, establishing the rights of the 
creditor against the debtor. This does not, however, mean that such a “promise” can 
necessarily be tied to all of the debtor’s property, or to property that the debtor acquires 
after filing for bankruptcy. 
214.  11 U.S.C. § 552(a). 
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The prepetition secured creditor’s collateral extends to traceable proceeds of 
the lender’s prepetition collateral. For example, if a piece of inventory is sold, 
then the security interest continues in the identifiable cash proceeds. By 
contrast, if flour, sugar, and eggs, collateral of the secured creditor, are used to 
make an elaborate wedding cake, the value of the cake that is the product of 
postpetition labor of at-will employees is not proceeds of the secured creditor’s 
collateral. Allocation may be difficult, but is not a new or unique challenge in 
bankruptcy law. The Code authorizes the court to use equitable tracing 
principles to allocate the value of work-in-progress, for example, between the 
creditor’s collateral and other sources, such as human capital.215 Proceeds have 
a tendency to expand, as collateral is converted to cash proceeds and cash 
proceeds are used to buy inventory and pay employees or otherwise run the 
business. The effect of equitable tracing called for in § 552 is to limit the extent 
to which assets will be reallocated to a prepetition secured creditor as the case 
moves forward. 
In sum, the Speed Premium and the going-concern premium both 
constitute Chapter-11-created value.216 In either event, the secured creditor’s 
right to this value is limited to the market increase in the value of its collateral 
and any traceable proceeds.217 As such, even a secured creditor with a purported 
blanket lien on the debtor’s assets is not likely to be entitled to all of the debtor 
firm’s enterprise value. 
iii.  Gaps in Security and Priority 
The suggestion that a secured creditor is entitled to the entire Speed 
Premium may be inaccurate for a second reason. Prior to the debtor’s 
bankruptcy a lender may have sought to obtain, and the debtor may have 
 
215.  Id. § 552(b)(1); see also Westbrook, supra note 195, at 812 n.55 (“[A] manager may . . . have a 
level of credibility and technical respect among customers that makes him or her essential to 
the business. Because personal services may not be legally commandeered in our society, 
even a dominant secured party cannot realize going-concern value in such a business 
without the cooperation of key personnel.”). 
216.  The Code sometimes grants a secured creditor an entitlement to later upside value. Two 
prominent examples are what is known as the “Section 1111(b) election,” which allows the 
secured creditor to avoid lien stripping, and § 1129(b)(2)(A), which calls for valuing the 
collateral on the effective date of the Chapter 11 plan. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1111(b), 1129(b)(2)(A). 
217.  Id. § 552. 
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agreed to convey, a first priority lien on all of a debtor’s assets.218 Yet, the 
mechanics of making such consensual liens binding on third parties is rooted 
in state property law generally, and real and personal property mortgages more 
specifically. Article 9 of the U.C.C. governs security interests in personal 
property.219 The scope of Article 9 is broad, but it may or may not encompass 
such things as franchise licenses, government-issued licenses, or certain causes 
of action.220 Security interests in collateral automatically extend to the 
identifiable proceeds of that collateral.221 Yet, not all property can be 
encumbered by a security interest as a legal or practical matter. Whatever the 
intentions of the parties, the so-called blanket lien is likely to have gaps. As just 
noted, one should be wary of, for example, characterizing value created by the 
work of at-will employees postpetition, a claim for failure to obtain business 
interruption insurance, or the value of a state issued liquor license, as proceeds 
of prepetition collateral.222 
Even if the debtor intended to grant the lender a security interest on all 
property interests that the law permits to be encumbered, the scope of the 
security interest is not ironclad. The security interest may not have attached to 
 
218.  Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 27, at 513-14 (reporting that in nearly all senior secured 
financings obtained before entering bankruptcy, the parties claimed the loans to be secured 
by all of the firm’s assets). 
219.  U.C.C. § 9-109 (2010). 
220.  Id. § 9-109 & cmt. 
221.  Id. § 9-203(f) (noting that attachment of a security interest to collateral automatically 
extends to proceeds); id. § 9-315 (providing rules for the attachment to proceeds and 
maintenance of perfection to proceeds); id. § 9-102(a)(64) (defining proceeds broadly). 
222.  While Article 9’s definition of proceeds is broad, there are limits. The proceeds must be 
traceable to original collateral. Compare In re Wiersma, 283 B.R. 294, 308 (Bankr. D. Idaho 
2002) (finding that business damages arising out of electrocution of cattle are proceeds), 
with Helms v. Certified Packaging Corp., 551 F.3d 675, 678-79 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that 
claims for failure to obtain business interruption insurance were not proceeds of the 
collateral). Also, Article 9’s concept of proceeds only reaches property. Some things of value 
to the enterprise (such as licenses) have been construed not to be property to which an 
Article 9 security interest can attach. See In re Chris-Don, Inc. 367 F. Supp. 2d 696 (D.N.J. 
2005) (finding that a liquor license is not property for Article 9 purposes under New Jersey 
law); Banc of Am. Strategic Solutions, Inc. v. Cooker Rest. Corp., No. 05AP-1126, 2006 WL 
2535734 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2006) (finding that liquor licenses are not property under 
Ohio law). Compare New Bank of New Eng., N.A. v. Tak Commc’ns, Inc., 138 B.R. 568 
(W.D. Wis. 1992) (finding that the value of a broadcast license is not proceeds of secured 
creditor’s collateral), with In re Ridgley Commc’ns, Inc., 139 B.R. 374 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992) 
(finding that the value of a broadcast license is proceeds of a secured creditor’s collateral). 
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the collateral,223 or may not have been perfected under applicable non-
bankruptcy law, either due to defects in the original transaction or due to 
changes over time.224 Methods of perfection vary by the type of collateral; the 
filing of a U.C.C.-1 financing statement in the correct government office 
perfects some, but by no means all, security interests in personal property.225 It 
may be particularly difficult to maintain perfection and priority with respect to 
collateral requiring a non-filing method of perfection and collateral for which 
possession of the collateral can trump filing. The rules are technical, and 
lenders can and do make mistakes, rendering the security interests 
unperfected.226 If a security interest is unperfected, it is vulnerable to an 
avoidance action in bankruptcy that frees the value of property that otherwise 
would have been collateral for distribution to other creditors.227 
Thus, again, it is important to question the assumption that a creditor 
asserting a blanket lien actually has one. Where there are gaps in perfection, or 
unencumbered assets at the time of a Chapter 11 filing, an increase in value of 
the debtor during the bankruptcy case cannot necessarily be traced back to pre-
bankruptcy collateral. This offers another reason to doubt that the senior 
secured lender is automatically entitled to all of either the going-concern 
premium or the Speed Premium. It is another reason that unsecured creditors 
should presumptively have a voice in the manner of asset disposition, and, if 
 
223.  U.C.C. § 9-203(b) (providing that the attachment of a security interest requires value being 
given, the debtor having rights in the collateral, and an authenticated security agreement 
containing a description of the collateral or a specified evidentiary alternative). 
224.  To perfect a security interest, one must take the steps that applicable law says are necessary 
to put the world on notice of the lien—often, but not always, the filing of a document in the 
public records. E.g., id. § 9-308(a) (explaining that perfection requires attachment plus the 
requisite formality for the type of collateral at issue); id. § 9-315 (discussing maintaining 
attachment and perfection through dispositions of collateral and creation of proceeds); id. § 
9-316 (discussing maintaining perfection through the transfer of collateral to debtors in 
another jurisdiction or the moving of a debtor to another jurisdiction). 
225.  Id. § 9-310 (identifying the financing statement filing as the primary method of perfection 
for security interests in personal property, and cataloguing exceptions to this method); id. § 
9-311(a) (recognizing alternative methods of perfection to the extent that Congress 
preempts Article 9 or state legislatures so provide, such as the certificate of title system for 
motor vehicles). Real property leases can be perfected under Article 9 in some jurisdictions 
but not others, in which case they must be perfected in the land records. 
226.  See, e.g., In re EDM Corp., 431 B.R. 459 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2010) (holding that a financing 
statement that included the trade name after the correct corporate name did not perfect the 
lender’s security interest). 
227.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 550 (2012). 
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the plan process is displaced, that steps should be taken to ensure their rights 
are protected. 
iv.  Impact of Bankruptcy Priority Rules on Allocation of the 
Bankruptcy-Code-Created Value 
In our view, the state law liquidation value of collateral establishes the 
distributional baseline for the purposes of fairness, and also perhaps 
constitutional purposes. The Code entitles the secured creditor to the value of 
its collateral plus the identifiable proceeds of its collateral, subject to equitable 
tracing as of the effective date of the plan of reorganization.228 The remainder 
of the value of the debtor, consisting of the value allocated to unencumbered 
assets, postpetition effort of at-will employees and other unalienable value, and 
any appreciation that is not tied to encumbered assets, is up for grabs. 
Declaring some portion of bankruptcy-created value as unencumbered does 
not determine who will receive it in the end. The drafters of the Code 
contemplated that Chapter 11-created surplus would be the subject of 
negotiation and compromise through the Chapter 11 plan process. 
To the extent that transactional leverage is used to lock up a portion of that 
surplus early in a case, without going through the Chapter 11 plan process and 
its attendant negotiation, hurry-up sales facilitate an end-run around the 
Code’s procedural protections. Chapter 11 seeks to give the debtor and its 
stakeholders time to stabilize the business, to resolve coordination problems 
among stakeholders, to consider different business options, and to negotiate 
over allocation of value.229 In some contexts, the intended breathing spell of 
bankruptcy is simply unaffordable, and value will be preserved only with 
exceptional speed. But, based on our analysis in Part I, it is not hard to see why 
and how the temptation to exploit the leverage associated with a quick sale 
itself could arise. And based on Part II, we see those harms producing several 
kinds of risks to the bankruptcy estate: (1) that the bankruptcy estate currently 
bears the burden of error in assessments of 363 Sale Value; (2) that the sale 
may go forward when the increased error costs exceed the speed premium; and 
(3) that parties may use transactional leverage, and exploit information 
asymmetries, for redistributive ends. 
 
228.  See supra Subsection II.C.2.b.ii.  
229.  See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362 (imposing a stay on collection of debt); id. § 1121 (initially giving 
the debtor the exclusive right to file a Chapter 11 plan). 
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Our proposal in Part III—the Ice Cube Bond—seeks to encourage quick 363 
sales motivated by value creation or preservation and discourage those that are 
being used to strong-arm a particular distribution contrary to ordinary 
bankruptcy principles. It seeks to return the bargaining over bankruptcy 
surplus to the plan process, even if it is necessary to sell assets before the plan 
can be confirmed. 
i i i .  ice cube bonds 
For the reasons discussed above, when a sale of substantially all assets takes 
place under § 363 and outside the purview of the Chapter 11 plan process, the 
bankruptcy court should require the sale proponent(s) to post a bond or 
reserve a portion of the sale price to cover any damages suffered by the 
estate.230 We call this reserved fund the “Ice Cube Bond.” An Ice Cube Bond 
requirement, if used consistently, will help courts and claimants sort between 
sales for which there is a need for speed and opportunistic use of the melting 
ice cube argument. 
At the outset, we should note that the Ice Cube Bond is consistent with 
broader commercial law principles. Outside of bankruptcy, a creditor who 
conducts a procedurally noncompliant foreclosure sale under the U.C.C. can 
lose her right to a deficiency judgment (the remaining debt left unsatisfied by 
the sale of collateral) unless she can show that the debtor has not been harmed 
by a low sale price.231 Some jurisdictions are harsher in the face of procedural 
 
230.  Our proposal does not demand a rejection of alternative suggestions to make more robust 
the prohibition against sub rosa sales that are really restructurings in disguise. See, e.g., Roe 
& Skeel, supra note 2, at 770-71. We assume that the existing sub rosa case law would remain 
intact. Ice Cube Bonds address an entirely different dimension of the 363-sale challenges. 
Our proposal is less restrictive than those prohibiting 363 sales outright absent real-time 
evidence of a wasting asset in the more traditional sense. See Bussel & Klee, supra note 35, at 
732 (stating a preference for a similar proposal). Our proposal also should be distinguished 
from deals contemplating a purchase price adjustment, which creates risks for the buyer. See 
COMPARISON SHOPPING GUIDE, supra note 48, § 3.1.2 (discussing holdbacks from the 
purchase price). Even critics of the extensive use of 363 sales have recognized both a strong 
demand and an economic value for some non-plan all-asset sales. See, e.g., George W. 
Kuney, Let’s Make It Official: Adding an Explicit Preplan Sale Process as an Alternative Exit from 
Bankruptcy, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1265, 1266-69 (2004). 
231.  U.C.C. § 9-626 & cmt. (2010) (creating a rebuttable presumption that the sale price equals 
the amount of the debt once the compliance of the disposition has been placed at issue). 
Whether lenders who actually foreclose on their collateral actually experience such penalties 
is, of course, a different matter. See Westbrook, supra note 195, at 846 (suggesting that 
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noncompliance in consumer transactions, requiring that the lender forfeit its 
entitlement to a deficiency judgment altogether.232 Under the Restatement of 
Mortgages, for real property, even if a sale complies with state procedures, the 
deficiency may be adjusted to reflect the actual value of the property.233 An 
improperly conducted real property foreclosure might even lead to an 
unwinding of the sale transaction.234 In bankruptcy, the analogous procedural 
baseline is resolution pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan, whether the plan 
contemplates a sale or reorganization. The hurry-up sale under § 363 departs 
from that procedural baseline, and should be viewed as non-compliant. As we 
will explain below, the burden should therefore shift to the sale proponent to 
show that the quick sale did not cause harm, and the Ice Cube Bond should be 
released only upon a showing that no harm was caused by the procedural non-
conformity.235 
A bonding requirement is neither unusual, nor should it be particularly 
controversial. However, it raises important legal and operational questions. 
First, can courts impose the Ice Cube Bond under current law? If yes, then how 
should the amount of the reserve be set? What is the baseline for measuring 
harm? Who should have the burden of establishing entitlement to the funds? 
We address these issues in order. 
 
lenders manage to avoid sanctions for noncompliant sales); see also infra note 235 (citing and 
explaining additional provisions of Article 9 on secured party remedies). 
232.  LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 72 (7th 
ed. 2012). 
233.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.4, cmt. a (1996) (providing that “[this 
Section] adopts the position of the substantial number of states that, by legislation or 
judicial decision, afford the deficiency defendant the right to insist that the greater of the fair 
market value of the real estate or the foreclosure sale price be used in calculating the 
deficiency”). 
234.  See id. § 8.3. 
235.  At least in the context of dispositions of personal property collateral, the entitlement to a 
deficiency judgment is not questioned until a party in interest puts it at issue. U.C.C. § 9-
626. Article 9 sales are generally conducted privately; there is no court overseeing the 
process. Id. § 9-610. Thus, Article 9 has no mechanism to withhold proceeds precisely 
parallel to the Ice Cube Bond in a bankruptcy sale. In addition, in going-concern sales under 
§ 363 of the Code, competing claimants have a claim to the sales proceeds themselves. 11 
U.S.C. § 363 (2012). 
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A.  Authorization Under Current Law 
While no provision of the Code specifically calls for an Ice Cube Bond, a 
variety of provisions could be used to authorize a court to impose one. Some of 
these provisions have general applicability. Others would apply to particular 
contexts. 
When parties seek expedited affirmative relief in other contexts, judges 
must order the posting of a bond to insure against the harm caused by an 
erroneous order. Although courts sometimes have waived this requirement or 
imposed a nominal bond,236 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) generally 
requires the posting of a bond before a court can order affirmative preliminary 
relief.237 Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7065 incorporates Rule 65, with 
one difference: it eliminates the bonding requirement for debtors, debtors-in-
possession, and trustees. It does not, however, prohibit a judge from requiring 
a bond. It simply leaves the issue to the bankruptcy judge’s discretion because 
of the limited cash available to Chapter 11 debtors.238 This cash concern does 
not apply when sale proceeds are being allocated. Furthermore, Rule 7065 
applies only to adversary proceedings (akin to civil lawsuits within bankruptcy 
cases). Section 363 sales are pursued as contested matters, not through 
 
236.  See, e.g., Habitat Educ. Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 607 F.3d 453, 458-59 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(reviewing conflicting case law and arguments regarding the imposition of nominal bond 
and waiver of bond, and rejecting the argument that non-profit entities should be exempt 
from having to post injunction bonds); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 
167, 168-69 (D.D.C. 1971) (rejecting the government’s request for a $750,000 bond and 
imposing a $100 bond, finding that requiring more than a nominal amount of security 
would “stifle the intent” of the environmental statute under which the suit was brought); 
Erin Connors Morton, Note, Security for Interlocutory Injunctions Under Rule 65(c): Exceptions 
to the Rule Gone Awry, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1863, 1873-82, 1905 (1995) (reviewing a circuit split 
in Rule 65(c) interpretation and proposing far narrower exceptions to the bonding 
requirement than some courts have applied). 
237.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) provides: 
The court may issue a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order 
only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to 
pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully 
enjoined or restrained. The United States, its officers, and its agencies are not 
required to give security. 
  FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c). 
238.  Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7065 provides: “Rule 65 F.R.Civ.P. applies in 
adversary proceedings, except that a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction 
may be issued on application of a debtor, trustee, or debtor-in-possession without 
compliance with Rule 65(c).” FED. R. BANKR. P. 7065. 
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adversary proceedings.239 Our proposal is inspired by the philosophy of Rule 
65—preserve issues for final adjudication by requiring the party seeking 
immediate relief to bear the risk of an erroneous preliminary order. The Ice 
Cube Bond is then available to compensate the bankruptcy estate for valuation 
error or proceeds misallocation that occurs as a result of the quick sale. 
As discussed below, the power to use a bond to preserve issues for later 
adjudication rests comfortably within the bankruptcy court’s ability to 
condition a sale order under § 363, to tax the secured creditor for the costs of 
liquidating its collateral under § 506(c), and, more generally, to exercise its 
authority under § 105 to preserve the estate. 
First, § 363 does not explicitly authorize an Ice Cube Bond, but it does 
permit the court to impose conditions on the sale of property of the estate—
such as through a lien or a holdback of a portion of proceeds—at the request of 
a party in interest to protect lienholders, including junior lienholders.240 This 
provision contemplates the exercise of judicial discretion to protect against the 
decline in value of a secured creditor’s collateral.241 Thus, to the extent the Ice 
Cube Bond is construed as protecting junior secured parties, this subsection of 
363 provides a partial source of statutory support. If the estate needs to be 
protected more broadly, courts can preserve disputes about lien priority by 
providing that a lien would attach to the proceeds of sale.242 When a debtor 
negotiates debtor-in-possession financing, it is also not unusual for carveouts 
to be created to preserve disputes about the amount to be surcharged under 
§ 506(c) or other matters.243 We are concerned that hurry-up sales under § 363 
may be closed, and, at least in some non-trivial subset of cases, the funds 
disbursed, before any such disputes about perfection or priority could be 
uncovered. The Ice Cube Bond anticipates the possibility of undiscovered legal 
 
239.  See FED. R. BANKR. P. 6003, 6004. Section 363 sales are contested matters under Federal 
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9014. 
240.  11 U.S.C. § 363(e). 
241.  See id. § 361 (giving examples of how to provide adequate protection, including periodic 
payments and replacement liens). 
242.  See id. § 363(f); supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
243.  See, e.g., In re Metro Fuel Oil Corp., No. 12-46913, 2013 WL 1495295, at *14 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2013) (“Nothing in this Order shall limit any rights to surcharge the 
Proceeds pursuant to section 506(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, nor does anything herein limit 
any parties’ right to object to same.”); In re Michael Day Enters., Inc., No. 09-55159, 2009 
WL 8189421, ¶ 23 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Nov. 10, 2009) (“Nothing in this Sale Order shall 
impair, modify or limit the rights of any party with respect to claims or defenses under 
Section 506(c) of the Bankruptcy Code . . . .”). 
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disputes, rather than providing only for those already identified. It ensures that 
funds will be available should any such disputes arise. 
In many, if not most, hurry-up 363 sales today, the collateral is liquidated 
principally for the benefit of a senior secured lender. Section 506(c) of the Code 
provides: “The trustee may recover from property securing an allowed secured 
claim the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing 
of, such property to the extent of any benefit to the holder of such claim.”244 To 
the extent that the estate is forced to absorb expenses, even in the form of 
increased valuation risk, one could argue that the additional risk faced by the 
estate benefits the secured creditor. As such, the estate should be compensated. 
In these instances, the Ice Cube Bond is consistent with, and in furtherance of, 
the existing mandate in § 506(c). 
More broadly, the statutory requirement that sales outside the ordinary 
course of business require notice, hearing, and court approval carries with it 
the implicit mandate that the sale should be approved only if it is in the best 
interest of the bankruptcy estate as a whole.245 Again, this leaves to case law 
and judicial innovation how to operationalize this mandate. The Ice Cube 
Bond provides the court with a useful tool for ensuring that the sale benefits 
the estate. 
Finally, § 105 empowers the bankruptcy court to issue any order “necessary 
or appropriate to carry out the provisions” of the Code.246 Congress explicitly 
authorized courts to exercise this power sua sponte.247 A classic use of this kind 
of power by courts in other contexts is to issue a “status quo” injunction—an 
order that prevents irreparable harm, while preserving issues for litigation.248 
The use of § 105 is controversial when employed to authorize actions that 
contravene the statutory priority rules,249 but our proposal does just the 
opposite. The Ice Cube Bond serves as a disputed claims reserve that can be 
used to give effect to the Code’s priority and timing principles in the face of the 
temporal exigency associated with the quick sale. 
 
244.  11 U.S.C. § 506(c). 
245.  See id. § 363(b). 
246.  Id. § 105(a). 
247.  Id. 
248.  See Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 411, 422 (4th Cir. 1999); ELAINE 
W. SHOBEN & WILLIAM MURRAY TABB, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON REMEDIES 160 (2d ed. 
1995). 
249.  See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
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Under this analysis, courts currently have the authority to impose an Ice 
Cube Bond, whether as a literal bond or as a reserve or holdback of proceeds. 
No further statutory authorization is necessary. 
B.  Operationalizing the Ice Cube Bond 
The Ice Cube Bond allows a quick sale to go forward but preserves the legal 
status quo by providing for compensation in the event that the sale causes 
harm or distorts distributional entitlements. As our analysis in Part II 
illustrated, there are two types of harm to consider: (1) Quick Sale Cost that 
exceeds the Speed Premium, and (2) distortions to the bankruptcy priority 
scheme. To address both harms, the funds would be considered unencumbered 
property of the bankruptcy estate to be distributed pursuant to a confirmed 
Chapter 11 plan, unless a sale proponent met its burden of establishing that (a) 
the purchase price was not reduced by the expedited nature of the sale; and (b) 
the claimant is entitled to the funds as proceeds of its collateral, or pursuant to 
a specified priority entitlement.250 The Ice Cube Bond thus preserves the legal 
and economic status quo, without undercutting the finality of the sale. The sale 
proponent gets the expedited all-asset sale. The purchaser gets clear title to the 
assets. This approach makes it possible to approve a sale while postponing the 
discussion of proceeds allocation and possible valuation error. 
1.  How Much? 
Just as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 provides a blueprint for the Ice 
Cube Bond, it also articulates a principle that can be used to establish its size: 
“an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages 
sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or 
restrained.”251 In Part II, we detailed the possible harms: (1) erroneous 
approval of the sale because it was not in the best interest of the estate (Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency); and (2) opportunistic use of leverage to alter the distribution 
of sale proceeds (Pareto Optimality). 
 
250.  The confirmed plan could also provide for a different negotiated disposition of the funds, so 
long as the disposition was negotiated after the sale was completed. 
251.  FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c). As previously noted, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7065, 
which extends Rule 65(c) to adversary proceedings in bankruptcy cases, does not require 
injunction bonds in bankruptcy cases, but also does not prohibit them. See FED. R. BANKR. 
P. 7065. 
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The portion of the Ice Cube Bond attributable to valuation error likely 
would depend on the type of property. Where the principal assets are tangible 
and easily priced—restaurant fixtures, for example—the bond might be quite 
small. By contrast, a promising startup company with significant upside might 
be quite difficult to value. In between, a business with a predictable cost 
structure and cash flow might be capable of valuation but only with well-
presented data. The Ice Cube Bond serves an information-forcing role: the 
better the information provided by the sale proponent, the smaller the reserve. 
The Ice Cube Bond thus encourages sale proponents to reduce the information 
asymmetry associated with the sale—one of the problems that precipitated our 
proposal in the first place. 
The same information-forcing effect operates with regard to allocation of 
sale proceeds. Allocation error can arise in a number of situations. It can arise 
when incumbent management seeks a sweetheart deal to ensure itself a place in 
the company going forward. This form of allocation error merges with 
valuation error. More often, though, allocation error may arise due to 
overcompensation of a secured creditor arising from (1) a gap in perfection of 
prepetition liens, and the presence of unencumbered assets; or (2) an 
increment of going-concern value or the Speed Premium that cannot properly 
be classified as proceeds of the secured creditor’s collateral. In this context, to 
the extent that the sale proponent can provide information that establishes the 
secured creditor’s entitlement to sale proceeds, the necessary reserve may be 
smaller. 
The informational limits that make it difficult to evaluate expedited sales 
also make it costly to craft the optimal bond on a case-by-case basis. Precision 
is not essential here, however, as the funds will not disappear and the amount 
can be adjusted later. Indeed, implementation of the Ice Cube Bond might 
benefit from a presumptive amount, such as ten percent of the purchase 
price.252 It need not, and probably should not, be set by statute, but rather by 
case law, local rule of procedure, or standing order.253 A presumptive amount 
 
252.  The easiest scenario in which to implement the proposal involves an all-cash sale. As is well-
known, non-cash sales and part-cash sales reduce the ability to easily compare bids. See 
Landers, supra note 66, at 111-12 (describing the common non-cash features in current 363 
bidding). Some sales involve no exchange of cash because the secured creditor credit bids. 11 
U.S.C. § 363(k). We return briefly to that issue infra note 255. 
253.  Bankruptcy courts have adopted guidelines for 363 sales, financing, and related matters 
through general orders or local rules, so implementation through this approach would be 
within the mainstream. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Amended Guidelines for the Conduct of 
Asset Sales, General Order Amending M-331, M-383 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2009), 
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would alleviate concerns that disputes over the amount of the bond would bog 
down the sale process. As we envision it, the court could deviate even from a 
presumptive amount if the existing evidence showed the range of valuation 
errors or allocation errors was particularly large or small. 
Whereas the melting ice cube argument may be a valid reason for 
accelerating the sale, any attempt by management or others to use melting ice 
cube leverage to seek a total waiver of the Ice Cube Bond should raise a red 
flag. Even with respect to Rule 65(c), which by its terms requires a preliminary 
injunction bond, courts have split over whether the district judge has the 
discretion to set the bond at $0 or a nominal amount.254 We think the court 
and creditors should be able to resist in this context. First, melting ice cube 
leverage is greatest in cases where the valuation is most uncertain. Such 
situations counsel in favor of a greater bond, not a smaller one. Second, the Ice 
Cube Bond should not affect the value of the assets received by the buyer and 
thus should not affect the purchase price. As such, buyer interference in the 
reserve-setting process should backfire, signifying potential collusion with 
another party in interest. The only permissible basis for reducing the amount 
of the Ice Cube Bond should be certainty as to value, and this reduction should 
only be done by the court. It should not be the subject of pre-sale bargaining. 
The Ice Cube Bond will make some claimants less certain of their ultimate 
distribution. However, this uncertainty is likely to improve rather than hinder 
governance. The Ice Cube Bond would place some, or all, claimants behind a 
veil of partial ignorance as to their distribution. This encourages such 
claimants to seek the highest value. More importantly, though, the Ice Cube 
Bond could be avoided by conducting the sale through a Chapter 11 plan. This 
would refocus questions about timing on the existence or non-existence of a 
Speed Premium. After all, when making the decision whether to hold an 
expedited sale, the question should not be whether the outcome is optimal for a 
 
http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/m383.pdf; LOCAL RULES FOR THE 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT: DISTRICT OF DELAWARE Rule 6004-1, at 67 (Feb. 
1, 2013), http://www.deb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/local_rules/Local_Rules_2013.pdf 
(addressing “Sale and Sale Procedures Motions”); LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULES OF THE 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS app. G (Apr. 1, 
2012), http://www.txnb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/local_rules/TXNB_Local_Rules.pdf 
(providing guidelines for the early disposition of assets in Chapter 11 cases, the sale of 
substantially all assets under § 363, and overbid and topping fees); UNITED STATES 
BANKRUPTCY COURT, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS: LOCAL RULES Rule 4001-2 (Jan. 
1, 2012), http://www.ilnb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/local_rules/Local_Rules_2012.pdf 
(providing rules for cash collateral and financing orders, not for sales). 
254.  See supra note 236 and accompanying text. 
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particular claimant but whether holding the sale outside a plan is good for the 
bankruptcy estate. 
2.  Who Pays? 
Up until this point we have stated that the Ice Cube Bond, whether a true 
bond or a reserve from proceeds, would protect against valuation and 
allocation errors. We have not specified who will pay. Sometimes the 
proponent of the sale may be obvious. In some cases, an undersecured creditor 
(or syndicate of investors in a credit facility) asserting a blanket lien will push 
for a sale and try to claim all of the proceeds.255 In principle, that undersecured 
creditor should bear the entire cost. It is also axiomatic that claimants would 
not be required to post a bond if they are not going to receive a distribution in 
any event. However, cases are not always this straightforward.256 There may be 
a fully secured first lien claimant and an undersecured second lien claimant. Or 
there may be enough to pay all senior claimants, and a significant pro rata 
distribution to unsecured creditors, but no distribution to equity. There may 
be an indisputably undersecured senior creditor as well as unencumbered 
assets of the debtor. The principal beneficiary of the sale may not be obvious. 
We do not want the costs of administering the Ice Cube Bond to eat 
substantially into its potential benefits. If a case-by-case approach is seen as 
unworkable, another approach would be to deduct pro rata from each claimant 
that stands to receive a portion of the sale proceeds, possibly adjusted based on 
any more specific information about the sale proponents. Everybody receiving 
a distribution would be involved proportionally. This would have the virtue of 
encouraging objections to the sale from claimants that doubt the existence of a 
Speed Premium. 
 
255.  How the participants in a credit facility consortium or syndicate might allocate the cost 
amongst themselves is beyond the scope of this Article. We do not see the Ice Cube Bond 
working differently depending on the number of investors in a credit facility who would 
appoint an agent to speak on their behalf. Coordination problems may arise in this context, 
just like they could in any other. Douglas G. Baird & Anthony J. Casey, Bankruptcy Step Zero 
6 (Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 419, 2013). Disagreements among 
syndicate members arise in a variety of contexts in bankruptcy, and resolution often involves 
fact-intensive questions of contract interpretation and negotiation. See, e.g., In re WestPoint 
Stevens, Inc., 600 F.3d 231 (2d Cir. 2010). But reducing those risks and resolving those 
questions is not an Ice Cube Bond problem; those disagreements must be dealt with within 
the syndicate itself. 
256.  See supra notes 156-161 and accompanying text. 
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The Ice Cube Bond should not harm the bankruptcy estate by reducing the 
sale price. The requirement affects the distribution of the sale proceeds, at least 
temporarily, but it does not directly affect the value received by the purchaser 
and should not affect the price they are willing to pay.257 
3.  When to Release? 
In other judicial contexts, an injunction bond is released if the party that 
sought the injunction succeeds at trial. In other words, the bond remains in 
place until the proponent establishes that the injunction was properly issued. 
Bankruptcy sales are usually not reversible even if later found to be 
improvident.258 Indeed, the finality and clean title associated with bankruptcy 
sales contribute to bankruptcy-created value, as discussed in Parts I and II. The 
Ice Cube Bond is meant to preserve the finality of court-approved 363 sales. 
The legal questions relevant to releasing the Ice Cube Bond are whether 
expediting the sale reduced the value of the estate, and who is entitled to the 
sale proceeds. 
With regard to sale price, Article 9 of the U.C.C., like bankruptcy, values 
transactional finality. Article 9 sales generally cannot be unwound even if the 
sale was noncompliant.259 The buyer can take its newly purchased property and 
go home, leaving any disputes about noncompliance to others.260 As stated at 
the outset of Part III, all-asset 363 sales in bankruptcy cases can similarly be 
characterized as noncompliant because the Chapter 11 plan process was 
designed to accommodate sales, not just traditional reorganizations.261 
 
257.  As with Polaroid’s sale in 2002 (but unlike with Chrysler’s sale), the identity of the investors 
in the purchasers may not be transparent at the time of the transaction, and some holders of 
claims or interests in the debtors may also be investors in the purchasing party. In this 
scenario, parties in interest may have an incentive to use melting ice cube leverage 
opportunistically, as we discussed in Part I. We cannot detail all the ways in which these 
patterns may affect or distort the size of the bids. Our proposal should help in at least three 
ways. First, it will make such conflicts more expensive for the conflicted party (by reducing 
their distribution). Second, the conflicts may be more apparent when the conflicted party 
seeks to recover the reserve. Third, the Ice Cube Bond encourages a sale through a plan 
when there is no Speed Premium. This would again make the conflicts more transparent. 
258.  11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2012). 
259.  See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-617 (2010) (defining the scope of a good faith transferee’s right to clear 
title in cases where the secured party failed to comply with Article 9). 
260.  Id. 
261.  See supra note 39; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(D) (providing that a Chapter 11 plan shall 
provide adequate means for the plan’s implementation, such as sale of property); id. § 
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Consistent with this analogy, the reserve should be distributed as 
unencumbered assets on the effective date of the Chapter 11 plan, unless the 
sale proponent can establish that the 363 Sale Value was positive.262 
With regard to distribution, as we discussed above, there are considerable 
reasons to doubt that even a secured lender with a blanket lien is entitled to all 
of the sale proceeds.263 As a result, a party seeking to recover withheld funds 
must do more than show lack of harm, but also that it is entitled to those sale 
proceeds—that, in the instance of a secured lender, they are proceeds of its 
collateral. Here we would place the burden of establishing entitlement on the 
claimant seeking preferred treatment. 
C.  Potential Concerns 
1.  Priority Rules 
Some may argue that withholding sale proceeds from a secured creditor 
while making a distribution to unsecured creditors subverts priority. To the 
contrary, our proposed bonding procedure takes legal priorities seriously—
perhaps more seriously than current practice. A security interest is not a 
straight distributional priority. It is an interest in particular property of the 
debtor.264 As previously discussed, we neither assume the enforceability of 
blanket liens, nor expand the concept of proceeds to include reorganization (or 
other enterprise) value.265 We seek to carefully define what constitutes the 
collateral of the senior lenders. Under our interpretation, a senior lien claimant 
is entitled to the value of its collateral. Its collateral consists of the assets 
 
1129(a)(11) (providing that the plan shall be confirmed only if confirmation is not likely to 
be followed by liquidation or the need for further reorganization unless liquidation is 
proposed in the plan). 
262.  Some Chapter 11 cases convert to Chapter 7 after a sale. See Klee & Levin, supra note 46. 
Claims to the reserve could be handled in the Chapter 7 case by a trustee. Other cases might 
be subject to a structured dismissal, producing a different process through which the reserve 
would be managed. See Norman L. Pernick & G. David Dean, Structured Chapter 11 
Dismissals: A Viable and Growing Alternative After Asset Sales, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 57-58 
(2010) (describing the most frequently granted types of relief in structured dismissal orders, 
but noting that there are very few reported or unreported decisions approving them). 
263.  See supra Subsection II.C.2.b. 
264.  E.g., U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (2010) (defining a security interest as “an interest in personal 
property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation”). 
265.  See supra Subsection II.C.2. 
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encumbered on the bankruptcy petition date, plus traceable proceeds subject to 
the limitations of § 552(b). Thus, for example, the senior creditor’s entitlement 
would exclude sale proceeds traceable to postpetition work by the debtor’s at-
will employees as well as proceeds attributable to value that would not be 
realized had the assets been sold piecemeal, unless the senior creditor can show 
they are traceable proceeds of its collateral. Our approach does not deprive 
secured creditors of their property rights.266 It merely requires them to 
establish their entitlement. Preventing senior creditors from receiving more 
than they bargained for ex ante reflects the fact that priority has limits.267 An 
important point here is that, while our approach may increase the likelihood 
that junior interests will participate in a distribution, and gives them a voice, it 
does not allow the junior creditors to play for time by blocking a sale pending 
resolution of a priority dispute. The bond allows the sale to go forward and 
preserves the dispute for later. 
 
266.  A procedural nuance arises when a senior secured creditor seeks to acquire the property with 
a credit bid, meaning that it credits the sales price against the amount owed by to it by the 
debtor in the nature of a setoff. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k). The Supreme Court recently made clear 
that the right to credit bid is an incident of the secured creditor’s property right. RadLAX 
Gateway Hotel v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012). In RadLAX, the debtor sought 
to confirm a non-consensual Chapter 11 plan featuring a sale that would prohibit credit 
bidding. Although § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) expressly incorporates the § 363(k) credit bid right 
into non-consensual plans, the debtor argued that the proposal satisfied another route to 
cramdown. However, § 363(k) gives the court the power to disallow credit bidding for 
cause, and the debtor in RadLAX did not challenge on appeal the bankruptcy court’s 
rejection of its request. Thus, the Supreme Court did not reach that doctrinal issue. Our 
proposal does not depend on banning credit bidding; it simply does not excuse the bonding 
requirement per se. We leave to courts the issue of how to handle situations in which the 
federal government is a secured creditor and seeks to credit bid in an expedited sale fitting 
the parameters of our proposal. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) exempts the U.S. 
government from posting a bond. Generally, the U.S. government is blocked by anti-
deficiency laws from laying out more cash. RadLAX, 132 S. Ct. at 2070 n.2; see Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 28-30, RadLAX, 132 S. Ct. 2065 
(No. 11-166), 2012 WL 765217. However, commentators have noted other reasons why the 
bankruptcy estate may benefit if credit bidding is disallowed, such as unusually chilled 
bidding if third parties doubt the estate will have the cash to pay a breakup fee. 
COMPARISON SHOPPING GUIDE, supra note 48, § 5.7. 
267.  Cf. N. Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913) (criticizing an attempt by senior creditors to 
freeze out their junior counterparts); Michael T. Roberts, The Bankruptcy Discount: Profiting 
at the Expense of Others in Chapter 11, 21 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 157 (2013) (describing how 
artificially low equity valuations for bankrupt firms can mask inappropriate transfers of 
value from junior to senior creditors). 
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2.  Institutional Competence 
Our proposal relies on a court to adjust the size and source of the bond or 
reserve on the front end (either setting it outright or establishing deviations 
from a presumptive amount), and preserves the ability of the court to 
determine release on the back end if necessary. Given that the role of the judge 
in Chapter 11 has been a perennial (albeit undertheorized) concern in the 
academic literature, the Ice Cube Bond will likely provoke questions about the 
judicial role in matters of valuation and distribution. When speaking of a 
market for distressed businesses and assets, advantages of a (generally thin) 
marketplace can be overstated. But whatever one’s views on this debate, the Ice 
Cube Bond should improve the quality of decisionmaking with less time 
pressure. 
Scholars have long declared that judicial valuations are inferior to market 
measures.268 To say that a litigation process will better determine a company’s 
worth than would a price paid by a willing buyer will strike some readers as 
extremely problematic; this concern has prevented some judges from 
permitting other kinds of evidence to be entered about asset value in the 
context of a sale.269 For many observers, therefore, it is hard to imagine a 
situation in which an ex post presentation by experts could or should be 
undercut or be substituted for an actual market price. 
On the other hand, the assumption that judicial valuations are inherently 
inferior deserves more critical examination. For example, in their study 
comparing 363 sales to traditional reorganizations, LoPucki and Doherty found 
that the all-asset 363-sale market underperformed the judicial valuations in 
traditional Chapter 11 plan confirmations. “The judicially-based valuations in 
reorganization cases were surprisingly accurate predictions of post-
reorganization trading values. The market valuations in sale cases appeared to 
average less than half of what the companies were actually worth.”270 As one 
 
268.  E.g., Baird, supra note 111; Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 179; see also David Gray Carlson, 
Secured Creditors and the Eely Character of Bankruptcy Valuations, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 63 (1991). 
269.  Indeed, the Delaware court voiced this concern in the first Polaroid case when objectors to 
the proposed sale wanted to present evidence about the firm’s value. See LOPUCKI, supra 
note 54, at 176 (quoting the hearing transcript); LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 5, at 13-14. 
270.  LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 5, at 10. Earlier studies of aircraft sales found fire sale 
discounts based on firm identity and financial distress and concluded that these findings 
cast doubt on the earlier assumption of law and economics scholars that sales were 
inherently better than judicially supervised reorganizations. Todd C. Pulvino, Do Asset Fire 
Sales Exist? An Empirical Investigation of Commercial Aircraft Transactions, 53 J. FIN. 939, 941 
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would expect, LoPucki and Doherty’s explanations have attracted some 
criticism,271 but their findings reinforce the basic concerns about markets for 
distressed assets. They examine the segment of Chapter 11 cases in which one 
would expect the most transparency and information: large, publicly held 
firms. Research on smaller firm outcomes in Chapter 11 has suggested reason 
for optimism about judicial decisionmaking—even among scholars who were 
once skeptical.272 
 
(1998) (discussing the implications for the debate over the desirability of Chapter 11 
reorganization); Todd C. Pulvino, Effects of Bankruptcy Court Protection on Asset Sales, 52 J. 
FIN. ECON. 151, 153-54 (1999) (discussing the possibility that bankruptcy attracts low-ball 
bids from opportunistic buyers and that the structure of bankruptcy incentivizes managers 
to accept them). Fire sale prices, and buyer windfalls at the expense of creditors and equity 
holders, are essentially what LoPucki and William Whitford predicted based on their earlier 
studies of large public companies in Chapter 11. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, 
Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 
U. PA. L. REV. 669, 753-67 (1993); see Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 
WIS. L. REV. 729, 758. Whether the sales achieve full value may be a function of the sale 
procedures. For example, Eckbo and Thorburn, supra note 119, found that prices and rate of 
business continuation were high for small- to medium-sized corporations where statutory 
sale procedures were followed. 
271.  The most pointed response, James J. White, Bankruptcy Noir, 106 MICH. L. REV. 691 (2008), 
did not, in our view, impair the essential insights of Bankruptcy Fire Sales. See Lynn M. 
LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Vérité, 106 MICH. L. REV. 721 (2008) (offering a 
systematic response to issues raised by White). Perhaps the strongest empirical counter to 
Bankruptcy Fire Sales that we have seen so far comes from an unpublished working paper 
that raises questions about selection effects. Branko LJ. Radulović, The Effect of §363 Sales 
on Recovery Rates: Allowing for Self-Selection Bias (Sept. 18, 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1360383; see also Jared A. Wilkerson, Defending the 
Current State of Section 363 Sales, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 591, 605 (2012) (challenging 
explanations offered by LoPucki and Doherty for Bankruptcy Fire Sale findings, and also 
raising selection effects arguments, but noting that “it can simultaneously be true that 
debtors are getting the highest price available and the winning bidder is getting a great deal 
on the assets”). Baird and LoPucki also debated the selection effect question in an online 
exchange. See H2H: LoPucki v. Baird, U. CHI.: FACULTY BLOG, http://uchicagolaw.typepad 
.com/faculty/h2h_lopucki_v_baird_/index.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2013). 
272.  See Baird & Casey, supra note 29, at 8 n.29 (citing Morrison, supra note 40, at 411, for the 
proposition that courts “shut down firms in the same fashion as a rational decisionmaker” 
contrary to earlier conventional wisdom, and Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, 
The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the Critics, 107 MICH. L. REV. 603, 627-30 (2009), for 
further empirical support of this finding). Morrison’s work suggests that bankruptcy judges 
can play an important role in tempering the overreaching of parties with an expected bias 
too far in favor of premature liquidation or protracted reorganization. Morrison, supra note 
40, at 394. 
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In addition, the basic courts-versus-markets dichotomy as a matter of 
theory has long been over-emphasized. First, as Susan Block-Lieb has 
discussed, most proponents of contract corporate bankruptcy have not 
adequately explained how or whether those market alternatives would avoid 
the problems of decision costs and market imperfection when applied to real 
world settings.273 Second, market proponents have regularly characterized the 
role of courts in Chapter 11 as far more exceptional than is accurate in the 
federal court system.274 
We accept that the potential for an ex post hearing is a second-best solution 
when compared to a thick and liquid market. But, as previously noted, this is 
not the situation in bankruptcy.275 When compared to the markets that actually 
exist for distressed assets, the comparative disadvantage of courts may not be 
as great as generally assumed. Another asserted disadvantage of judicial 
determination of value is cost. However, this too is likely a red herring because 
parties are likely to bargain post-sale rather than litigate over allocation of the 
holdback. The Ice Cube Bond ensures that questions about the existence of a 
Speed Premium and related matters of distribution will be scrutinized and 
negotiated after the sale has closed, in a circumstance of reduced time pressure 
free of melting ice cube leverage. The reduced time pressure should increase 
the quality of decisionmaking. 
The Ice Cube Bond comes into play with respect to 363 sales that are best 
understood as procedurally noncompliant,276 and that produce specific 
valuation and allocation risks.277 Procedurally compliant foreclosure sales are 
entitled to deference, while procedurally noncompliant foreclosure sales are 
not.278 It is precisely because the valuations in hurry-up sales are suspect that 
 
273.  Block-Lieb, supra note 111, at 555-58. 
274.  See Melissa B. Jacoby, Fast, Cheap, and Creditor-Controlled: Is Corporate Reorganization 
Failing?, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 401, 422-37 (2006) (using broader judicial behavior literature and 
models of judging from class action scholarship to evaluate bankruptcy courts’ handling of 
Chapter 11 cases); Edward J. Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence 
and Statutory Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 579-81 (2001) (illustrating how critiques of 
bankruptcy judges focused on an overly narrow conception of judging, ignoring the roles 
played by judges in public law and structural reform cases). 
275.  See, e.g., Samuel L. Bufford, What Is Right About Bankruptcy Law and Wrong About Its Critics, 
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 829, 846 (1994). 
276.  See supra notes 231-235 and accompanying text. 
277.  See supra Section II.C. 
278.  It is axiomatic that prices obtained at procedurally compliant foreclosure sales are entitled to 
deference. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 542 (1994). This was true even 
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we want to preserve the opportunity to reexamine them afterwards. Similarly, 
the sale price may be viewed with more confidence where there is no evidence 
of attempts to use leverage to distort the distributional scheme. In such cases it 
may be quite straightforward for the court to release the bond, essentially 
ratifying the sale price, but only after the sale has been completed. 
When considering entitlement to the sale proceeds (to be distinguished from 
valuation), the market does not have the same degree of comparative advantage 
over courts. The market is good at valuing enterprises, not determining who 
has properly perfected a lien or is entitled to a particular priority. Nor is there 
as much need to resolve distributional questions before the sale. While 
questions of legal status, such as perfection, entitlement to priority, or 
preference liability, can be settled through negotiation, these negotiations are 
not time sensitive. The existence of a preferential transfer,279 or lack of 
perfection of a lien on the petition date,280 should not affect the viability of the 
business, and the legal arguments are not likely to change over time. As noted 
earlier, secured lenders do sometimes try to resolve such issues quickly through 
waivers in association with a sale or with financing.281 But these efforts may 
themselves be evidence of melting ice cube opportunism. 
The complexities and variations in Chapter 11 cases also give us a greater 
appreciation for the role of the judge overseeing these sales and cases. Although 
the largest public bankruptcies receive the most attention in the press, and have 
been the most systematically studied in the academic literature, the dynamics 
we have explored affect business bankruptcy cases of many sizes and 
structures. Many commentators assume the existence of a senior undersecured 
creditor (or syndicate) with a blanket lien on all assets, and that has been 
common in recent years. But that was not always the case historically and is not 
 
under the earlier rule on fraudulent transfers and foreclosure sales espoused in Durrett v. 
Washington National Insurance Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980), so long as the sale price was 
greater than seventy percent of the appraised value, id. at 203. 
279.  See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2012) (authorizing under certain conditions the avoidance of transfers of 
property of the debtor prior to bankruptcy that made the creditor better off). 
280.  See id. § 544(a) (authorizing the avoidance of liens that are not properly perfected under 
applicable non-bankruptcy law). 
281.  See, e.g., In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407, 412 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (reporting on 
an unobjected-to cash-collateral order that “stipulates to the validity, priority, perfection, 
extent, and ‘non-avoidability’ of [the lender’s] liens”); DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION FINANCING, 
supra note 193, at 290-96 (identifying various clauses from proposed financing orders that 
debtor-in-possession lenders seek to reduce or eliminate the potential for litigation over the 
status of their prepetition claims); see also supra note 193 (providing examples of financing 
and cash collateral orders). 
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universally the case today. We anticipate a wider constellation of arrangements, 
including cases in which lenders intend a blanket lien but do not achieve it. A 
court can adjust to the variation, ensuring that the Quick Sale Costs and Speed 
Premium benefits are properly allocated. 
3.  Incentives 
 Law and economics scholars also worry that the possibility of ex post 
revision of transactions can distort ex ante incentives. In our view, this 
distortion is likely to be salutary rather than problematic. Ex post review 
should reduce the likelihood of proposed sales that substantially overreach. 
This dynamic exists whether or not a judge ultimately is called upon to make a 
determination (or, as might happen more regularly, the allocation of the 
reserve is worked out through post-sale bargaining). By deterring 
overreaching, the availability of ex post review may improve market behavior 
ex ante, where, as here, there is considerable concern about opportunistic 
behavior. We are not concerned about hurry-up sales, per se. We are concerned 
about the impact of the opportunistic use of the melting ice cube argument on 
valuation and distribution. 
Given that it does not actually prevent a quick sale from going forward, the 
Ice Cube Bond can be distinguished from proposals that would affirmatively 
limit the use of 363 sales.282 But, if properly administered, the Ice Cube Bond 
should deter quick sales for which the Speed Premium, if any, is outweighed by 
the Quick Sale Costs, and channel them towards a sale under a plan. It should 
also reduce the routine use of the melting ice cube argument when it is not 
warranted. Sale proponents have options. They can propose a quick 363 sale 
and either accept the fact of the bonding requirement, or be prepared to 
establish entitlement to the funds. This will be worthwhile only if the debtor 
really is a melting ice cube. Or they can conduct the sale as part of the full 
Chapter 11 plan process.283 This may occasion some delay, but no Ice Cube 
Bond would be necessary. If the debtor is not a melting ice cube, the proponent 
 
282.  See Bussel & Klee, supra note 35, at 732 (favoring limiting all-asset sales under § 363 to 
instances of “true emergency”). 
283.  11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4) (providing that a Chapter 11 plan may provide “for the sale of all or 
substantially all of the property of the estate . . . and the distribution of the proceeds”). 
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will be encouraged to comply with the normal plan process rather than take a 
shortcut.284 
4.  Bargaining 
As previously noted, some readers may worry that the buyer will use its 
leverage to specify that, as a condition of sale, the estate will forgo the Ice Cube 
Bond. The concern here is that the same pre-sale leverage that is used to 
bargain for other favorable conditions also will be used by the buyer to obtain a 
waiver of the Ice Cube Bond. As we said before, this should be a red flag. A key 
benefit of the Ice Cube Bond is that it allows the buyer to take clear title to the 
assets without being embroiled in disputes about the distribution of the 
proceeds. We see no legitimate reason for the buyer to care how the proceeds 
are distributed, unless it has struck a side deal with a party in the case. In short, 
such a stipulation is not about the purchase, but about distribution, and a sign 
that a particular creditor constituency has agreed to support the sale in return 
for an enhanced distribution. The court, the creditors’ committee, or individual 
parties should call this bluff. 
It is important to recognize that if the sale proceeds holdback is to be 
distributed pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan, it will be subject to negotiation and 
potentially allocated pursuant to a consensual arrangement. A full judicial 
hearing need not happen. This raises another question: if the proceeds are 
going to be the subject of bargaining ex post, why is this preferable to allowing 
them to be the subject of bargaining prior to the sale? The difference lies in the 
absence of transactional leverage. The type of bargaining that happens ex post 
over distribution of the Bond is likely to be quite different from the hothouse 
bargaining that occurs ex ante prior to the sale. 
Pre-sale bargaining would likely be based on transactional leverage—“my 
way or the highway” arguments.285 The potential buyer is in the driver’s seat, 
and it can exact concessions for its allies, in the form of deviations from the 
bankruptcy distributional scheme or price concessions. This form of brute-
force bargaining does violence to legal entitlements that, outside of 
bankruptcy, might give rise to an economic duress defense against contract 
 
284.  Note, too, that the Chapter 11 plan process itself can move quite quickly, as evidenced by the 
use of prepackaged and pre-negotiated Chapter 11 plans. See supra note 130. 
285.  See supra Part I. 
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enforcement.286 The Humboldt Creamery case discussed earlier shows that 
transactional leverage risks strong-arming the court as well, and insulates deals 
that might otherwise be unenforceable under contract law.287 
By contrast, bargaining after the sale is positional. Instead of arguing about 
leverage, the conversation is about entitlement. Bargaining about the 
distribution of the Ice Cube Bond proceeds can and should be part of the 
Chapter 11 plan process. At that point, the conversation unfolds in the shadow 
of a judicial determination of value and entitlement rather than a game of 
transactional chicken. The fact that positional bargaining or judicial decision 
will occur ex post alters the nature of the bargaining ex ante. The bonding 
requirement thereby limits the extent to which transactional leverage can be 
used to distort legal entitlements. 
5.  Comparison with Other Lock-up Related Proposals 
The melting ice cube argument is a member of the family of tools that 
business purchasers utilize to lock up a favored deal in various transactional 
contexts. In the corporate law literature on lock-ups, a number of alternative 
proposals reflect the concern that a sale deprives dissenting stakeholders of 
option value. Daines and Hanson propose that the dissenters be given bonds 
that would pay off if the original sale price for the company turned out to be 
inadequate.288 Adler and Ayres, along with Lucian Bebchuk, propose various 
mechanisms through which junior interests could purchase the option value 
from the senior interest to protect their positions.289 Flipping this idea on its 
head, Anthony Casey suggests that the senior creditor be required to purchase 
the option value from the junior creditors.290 
When thinking about the melting ice cube problem in 363 sales, we have 
concerns about each of these approaches. The topping off bond eliminates the 
finality and clean title that is the hallmark of bankruptcy sales, as we explored 
earlier. Given the choice, purchasers prefer to have all price risk resolved at 
closing, and may seek to make it a condition of the sale. Unlike the topping off 
 
286.  See, e.g., Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 584 P.2d 15 (Alaska 
1978). 
287.  See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text. 
288.  Daines & Hanson, supra note 14. 
289.  Adler & Ayres, supra note 114; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate 
Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775, 785-86 (1988). 
290.  Casey, supra note 16, at 791. 
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bond, our Ice Cube Bond proposal does not alter the finality of the outcome.291 
The Daines and Hanson proposal, by contrast, would leave the purchase price 
open for the duration of the proposed bond, which would undercut finality and 
reduce the asset’s value to the buyer. Our Ice Cube Bond proposal does not 
erode this finality; it merely reserves the questions of value and allocation 
errors for another, later day. These questions of allocation do not concern the 
buyer and should not affect the sale price. 
The other proposals noted above would require the junior creditors to set 
the value of their interests at the very time when their information is at its 
weakest. Bebchuk would require the junior interests to buy out the senior 
interest. Adler and Ayres would auction off the equity. Casey would have the 
senior interest buy out the junior interest’s optionality. While these proposals, 
to varying degrees, have information-forcing attributes that might reduce the 
information asymmetry, none addresses the underlying problem of 
information shortage and time constraint associated with an early sale. They 
seek a market-based solution at a time when markets are thin, and, as Baird 
and Morrison point out in the Chapter 11 context, information is in short 
supply.292 This makes us wary of a solution that seeks to definitively allocate 
option value at the time of sale.293 
In addition, each of these proposals assumes a senior undersecured creditor 
with a valid blanket lien. But what happens if priority becomes non-
hierarchical or uncertain, as often can be the case? The bargaining games 
become too complex under real-world conditions, particularly in a time-
sensitive negotiation, for these proposals to operate. Where there are issues of 
entitlement, priority, and leverage, held by multiple parties, coordination 
problems may make consensual solutions impossible to achieve. Authoritative 
determinations based on legal entitlements may be unavoidable. 
Moreover, the Adler and Ayres type auction might be difficult to 
accomplish within the time constraints associated with a true melting ice cube 
sale. Casey’s priority may be even more problematic. By giving the junior 
creditors a veto, Casey takes a contractual right to repayment (protected with a 
 
291.  See 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2012) (limiting the impact of reversal or modification of a sale order 
on appeal). 
292.  See supra notes 134-136 and accompanying text. 
293.  This concern also makes us wary of the preemptive cramdown proposals. See LoPucki & 
Whitford, supra note 157, at 186-90; Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Preemptive 
Cram Down, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625 (1991). 
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liability rule) and enforces it with a property rule.294 The sale could not go 
forward unless junior creditors agreed to a price at which they might sell their 
option. He does not attempt to value the priority and does not suggest a 
judicial mechanism for doing so. As such, there is no set strike price that would 
allow the sale to go forward. This right to block a quick sale, like any functional 
property right, creates a unilateral veto and a bilateral monopoly.295 Moreover, 
Casey assumes that junior creditors will be able to bargain as a group. But 
unsecured creditors are often diffuse and, at least in larger cases, numerous, 
and may find it difficult to coordinate.296 Individually, they will have 
insufficient incentive (and limited capacity) to gather the necessary 
information. 
While negotiation about the price of the option value may force out 
information and thus limit the information asymmetry, Casey’s proposal does 
not remedy the problem that the melting ice cube argument forces negotiation 
to occur at a time when information is generally in short supply. As a result, 
Casey’s proposal could overdeter quick sales. 
conclusion 
Although the particular confluence of events that led to the Chrysler 
bankruptcy and sale may be a rarity, the case put the melting ice cube problem 
before the public in a concrete way. When a debtor and purchaser pursue a sale 
prior to a Chapter 11 plan and assert that the debtor is a quickly wasting asset, 
they initiate a game of chicken with other parties and a court that are at serious 
informational disadvantages. 
If delay will destroy the value of the debtor, then bankruptcy law should 
facilitate a quick sale. Here, we have dissected the problem in a way that has led 
to a tailored solution: the Ice Cube Bond, reserved at the time of sale to insure 
 
294.  While calling the entitlement a priority, Casey effectively gives the junior creditors a 
property right to insist on a sale of the debtor pursuant to a plan. 
295.  Bilateral monopolies tend to produce expensive negotiations and may miss Coasean 
bargains. Cf. Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to 
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1051 (1995) (noting a cause of friction in bilateral 
bargaining). 
296.  Even if a creditors’ committee has been appointed, its positions do not bind individual 
creditors, and thus the existence of a committee does not overcome this concern. Cf. 
Landers, supra note 66, at 106-08 (discussing how a creditors’ committee can become 
“marginalized” by swiftly moving cases, particularly when debtor-in-possession lenders seek 
to limit the funding and investigatory scope of the committee). 
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against valuation errors and distortion of the bankruptcy priority scheme. The 
proposal should limit the leverage created using a melting ice cube bluff. We 
neither glorify nor vilify sales as a general matter, but seek to limit the use of 
transactional leverage by sale proponents, and facilitate the re-internalization of 
risks associated with expedited all-asset sales.  
